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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is a collection of theoretical essays in the area of trade policies, 
mergers and foreign direct investment. We employ partial equilibrium analysis 
to investigate various issues concerning the above topic. 
In the first chapter we review theoretical works that investigate the links 
between trade policy and merger activity. We focus our attention on Falvey 
(1998) which analyses the effects of tariff policy on mergers and reaches the 
conclusion that tariffs tend to encourage mergers involving small firms based 
in the restricting country but discourage mergers involving small firms based in 
the non-restricting country. 
In the second chapter we extend Falvey (1998) to include the effects of the 
quotas on merger profitability. The quotas tend to discourage mergers 
involving small firms from both restricting and non restricting countries. When 
a ranking of the tariff and the quota regimes can be made, mergers gains are 
larger under the equivalent quota regime. 
In the third chapter we investigate tariff and quota equivalence when firms 
have the option of direct investment. High tariffs induce a foreign firm to 
switch from trade to investing directly in the home country. Restrictive quotas, 
however, induce a foreign firm to engage in direct foreign investment in 
addition to trade. The two regimes are not always equivalent especially in 
terms of the level of imports. 
In the fourth chapter we use game theory to investigate the interaction 
between welfare maximising home government and a foreign firm capable of 
choosing the direct foreign investment option. If the foreign firm move first, it 
may pre-empt the home government by committing to the direct investment 
option if the optimal tariff is expected to be high. If the home government 
move first, it may need to set the tariff below the optimal level so that direct 
foreign investment is not induced. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is a collection of theoretical essays on the effects of trade 
policies on mergers and foreign direct investment. We investigate the effects of 
tariff and quota policies on mergers in the first two chapters. In the third 
chapter we investigate the tariff-quota equivalence when foreign direct 
investment is possible. Finally we investigate the interaction between the 
foreign firni who has a choice of direct investment and the welfare maximising 
home govemment. 
The methodology used in this thesis is the partial equilibrium analysis. The 
base model which we use throughout the thesis is the intemational Coumot 
oligopoly model. We choose oligopoly because we believe that world 
production is increasingly dominated by international oligopolies, while the 
Cournot model appealed to us because it provides reasonable and intuitive 
economic implications for pricing in oligopolistic markets and it is easily 
tractable. We also assume linear demand and linear marginal costs, these 
assumptions simplify the analysis greatly and help us to obtain some explicit 
solutions which are necessary for most of our analysis. In the final chapter we 
also apply the game theoretical technique to investigate the strategic interaction 
between the home government and the foreign firm. 
On the topic of trade policies and mergers, we begin in chapter 1 by 
reviewing theoretical works that investigate the link between trade policies and 
mergers. A common approach to examine this issue is to model a merger as an 
exogenous reduction in the number of finns and see how this affects the 
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welfare and what the optimal trade policy response should be. However this 
approach ignores the fact that a merger is a private decision and only occurs if 
it is profitable to do so. There is an alternative approach which models a 
merger explicitly in the open economy context. This can be done by 
incorporating a range of models available in the general merger literature. One 
of the theoretical works using this alternative approach is Falvey (1998). 
Falvey employs a model of international Cournot oligopoly with linear 
demand, constant marginal cost and segmented markets. Potential mergers 
between large and small firms, which will result in the closure of the high cost 
(small) firm, are considered. We find that the condition for profitable merger 
depends on the relative size of the merger participants. When the home country 
imposes a tariff on imports, the pre-merger sales of home firms rise while the 
sales of foreign firms fall. As a result the tariff decreases the profitability of 
marginal mergers that involve the inefficient home firm but it increases the 
profitability of marginal mergers that involve the inefficient foreign firm. 
In chapter 2, we extend Falvey's (1998) model to include the analysis of 
quota policy and merger profitability. We consider the case where the home 
government imposes a quota on imports, with quota rights allocated in 
proportion of free trade sales. We find that the quota, which increases the sales 
of the home firms, discourages the potential (national and international) 
mergers that involve the inefficient home firm, at the margin. The national 
merger between two foreign firms will lead to the transfer of the high cost 
firm's quota to the remaining low cost foreign firm. Then the quota 
discourages this merger if the quota constraint is binding on the merged firm. If 
the quota constraint is not binding, the quota may increase the profitability of 
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this merger. The merger between the large home firm and the small foreign 
firm is also discouraged by the quota at the margin. Comparison between the 
tariff and the quota regimes shows that the gains from national mergers 
between the high cost and the low cost firm are higher under the equivalent 
quota regime, while the results from international mergers are ambiguous. 
In chapter 3, we investigate the issue of tariff-quota equivalence when the 
foreign firms have the option of direct investment. We consider the model of 
international Coumot oligopoly with linear demand, constant marginal cost and 
where all consumption of the good in question occurs in the protected home 
market alone. We then focus on the decisions of two asymmetric foreign firms 
who have the option of direct foreign investment (DFI) so that they can 
produce goods inside the home market albeit at higher marginal costs than the 
export option. Under the tariff regime the foreign firm will switch from the 
usual export option to the DFI option once the margin from the DFI option is 
larger than the margin from the export option which is subjected to a specific 
tariff Under the quota regime the foreign firms always supply the home market 
by trade, however the foreign firm will also engage in the DFI once the margin 
from the DFI option is larger than the permitted export volume. On the 
Comparison of the two trade regimes, we cannot always find the equivalent 
regimes that lead to the same price and same imports in the home market. We 
can always find tariffs and quotas that lead the same price, but for some range 
of quotas there would not be import equivalent tariffs. 
In chapter 4, we investigate the interaction between the welfare maximising 
home government and the foreign firrn which has the option of direct 
investment. We use a simple sequential game to find the outcomes of this 
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interaction. We first consider a game which sees the foreign firm move to 
choose between export and direct investment before the home government sets 
the optimal tariff after which the foreign firm will choose the level of 
production. A rational foreign firm will foresee the level of the optimal tariff 
that the home firm will set, and this will help the foreign firm to decide the 
home market entry choice. The foreign firm will pre-empt the home 
government by choosing the direct investment option if it anticipates the 
optimal tariff to be high. For the home government, it cannot always set the 
tariff optimally because the foreign firm can avoid high trade cost by choosing 
the direct investment option. If the home government moves first and provided 
that the direct investment contribute nothing to the home welfare, we may see 
the govenunent set the tariff just below the switch-over level to prevent the 
foreign firm from choosing the direct investment option. 
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CHAPTER 1 
TRADE POLICIES AND MERGERS 
A Literature Review 
1.1 Introduction 
In the last few decades we have witnessed a significant reduction in trade 
barriers. This is resulted from among other things, successions of multilateral 
trade negotiations (mostly via the GATT and the creation of the World Trade 
Organization) and the creation of many preferential trading areas. Falling trade 
barriers together with declining foreign investment restrictions and on going 
deregulation have brought significant changes in business strategies. One 
prominent corporate development observed in the wake of this freer trade 
environment has been a merger wave of unprecedented scale. ' There is now a 
considerable literature which offers a theoretical account of the link between 
trade policies and mergers. The objective of this chapter is to review some of 
the recent advances in this topic especially on the issue of the effects of tariff 
on mergers. 
The policy relevance of this topic is very significant, especially for its 
implication on competition policy. The insight into this topic is important to 
our understanding of how the competition policy should be designed in the 
wake of freer trade cnviromnent. If the reduction in trade barriers induces 
1 For example a recent figure shows that the value of completed (cross-border) mergers 
worldwide rose from the total of $200 billion in 1995 to more than $500 billion in 1999 (Evenett et al, 2000). While earlier observation by Long and Vousden (1995) implicates that 
the lowering of trade barriers within Europe has been followed by a spate of domestic and 
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increased merger activity, it is suggested that we need to have a strong 
competition policy to counter the increased market concentration. Then this 
policy implication contradicts a conventional belief that trade liberalisation can 
be substituted for a stricter competition policy. 2 The understanding of the link 
between trade policies and merger activity will also help us to assess the 
concern that some governments are now substituting the increasingly limited 
trade policies with the competition policies to pursue the undesirable goal of 
beggar-thy-neighbour. 3 
In order to understand the link between trade policy and merger activity we 
need to know whether the reduction in trade barriers stimulates merger activity 
and if so what type of merger activity. A substantial number of works 
investigating this topic model mergers as a choice of the number of identical 
domestic firms chosen by the government. This approach may simplify the 
analysis greatly, but it ignores the fact that a merger is the decision of private 
firms and only occurs if it is profitable to do so. There is an alternative 
approach to model mergers explicitly and this can be done by incorporating 
general (domestic) merger models into open economies context. 
In this chapter and the next we will investigate the link between trade 
policies and horizontal mergers under Cournot competition. In this chapter we 
begin by reviewing theories on horizontal merger in the closed economy. Then 
cross-national mergers and the same phenomenon has also been observed in Canada in the 
wake of Canada-US ftee trade deal. 
2 One may expect the scaling down of trade barriers to raise domestic and international 
competition, and hence leading lower prices and higher efficiency. However if market is not 
perfectly competitive, we might not achieved increased competition following the reduction of 
trade barriers. 
3 This concern has led to increasing attention from international organizations, such as WTO 
and OECD, traditionally concerned with trade policies. 
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we look at the recent development of theories of mergers in open economies. 
We will focus our attention on the works that investigate the effects of tariff 
reduction on merger profitability. The literature review in this chapter will give 
us a firm foundation for the development of the original analysis of quota 
policy and merger activity in chapter 2. The organisation of this chapter is as 
follows: Section 1.2 presents the literature review on domestic horizontal 
mergers. Section 1.3 presents the theoretical review on mergers in open 
economies. Section 1.4 we investigate the effects of tariff on merger incentives. 
Conclusion remarks are given in section 1.5. 
1.2 Domestic Horizontal Merger 
The foundations of the analysis in this chapter and the next are theories of 
domestic horizontal mergers and theories of mergers in open economies. There 
exist a large number of theoretical works on domestic horizontal mergers. The 
general concerns of the literature in this area are the profitability of horizontal 
mergers and their welfare effects. The early development by Stigler (1950) 
points out that the new merged firm typically produces less than the combined, 
pre-merger production of its constituent firms. Unless there is large cost saving 
from a merger, the reduction in quantity normally increases the industry price. 
The non-merging firms will benefit from this merger externality and expand 
their production. On welfare implications of a merger, Williamson (1968) 
shows that the net social welfare effect of a merger is given by the sum of cost 
saving gains and additional profits to the remaining firms minus the lost of 
consurner9s urplus (as a result of the higher price). 
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In the past few decades substantial numbers of formal analysis on domestic 
horizontal mergers have emerged. One of the prominent works in this field is 
the paper by Farrell and Shapiro (1990). In their work, Farrell and Shapiro 
propose a simple condition for a welfare-improving merger, in a context of 
Cournot oligopoly with general demand and cost functions. Since the main 
analysis of this chapter and the next are set in the context of Cournot oligopoly, 
we will look at Farrell and Shapiro (1990) in detail. 4 
Consider a closed economy in which n firms produce a homogeneous 
product. Assume that the inverse demand for this good is given by p= p(H) 
where H is the industry output and p'(H) < 0. Firm i produces h, unit of 
output and faces a cost function cl(h). Competition in this market is assumed 
to be Cournot and new entry is not permitted. Firm i's profit function is given 
by 
; r, = p(H) - hi - c, (h) (1) 
Taking aH 
= 
1, the best response of firm i to the output decision of all other ahi 
firms, H-, 
, 
is the unique solution to the first order condition: 
p(hi + H-j) + hi 
- 
p'(hi + H-j) 
- 
c, (h) =0 (2) 
To ensure the existence of Cournot equilibrium and the continuous reaction 
functions we assume that the decreasing marginal revenue property 
(p'+hip"-<O) holds, and the cost functions are smooth and ci'-p'>O. 
Together with the previous assumption about the inverse demand (p'< 0), 
4 The Cournot model provides simple yet reasonable and intuitive economic implications for 
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these conditions ensure that the profit function (1) is concave in h,. 5 Then we 
have a negative second order condition6: 
2p'+hip"-c, "<O 
The slope of firm i's reaction function is obtained by differentiating (2), which 
gives 
p_ dhi pf + hiP" Ri 
- dHýj 2p'+ h, p"- 
(3) 
By the second order condition, the denominator of the fraction on the far right- 
hand side in (3) is negative. The numerator is negative from downward-sloping 
marginal condition. Thus the slope of the reaction function is negative 
(Ri < 0), which implies that an increase in the output of all other finns will 
lead to the contraction of firm i's output. And from (3), we can write 
dhi 
- 
(I + RI) = Ri - (dh, + dHýj) = R, - dH, or 
dhi 
= -Aj - dH (4) 
where Ai == 
p'+ hip" 
>0 as p'+h, p"--50 and c, "-p'>O. Since I+Rj P, 
- 
C" 
dhi 
= 
-AdH and dH-i = Ej; aidhj =- dH, then 
dH 
= 
dhi + dH-i = dhi - (Zjý,, Aj) - dH 
from which we have 
pricing in oligopolistic markets. Another reason that we employ the Cournot model is its 
tractability. 
5 See Vives (1999) and Collie (1992) for discussions of several types of existence results which 
may apply to the Cournot model. 
6 This follows since 
al1r. 
= p'+ h-p" + p'- c" <0 as p'+ hipff: 5 0 and c" - p'> 0. (ah i)2 Iii 
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dH I 
dhi Q+ xi) 
(5) 
Because the ki coefficients are positive, then 0< 
dH 
<1. This result implies dhi 
that if finn i changes its output, and all other finns adjust output along their 
reaction curves, the aggregate output will change in the same direction as fin-n 
i's output, but by less. With this result we can see the price effects of the 
domestic horizontal merger by simply concentrating on the change in output of 
the merger participants. 
Suppose that the first m firms (of the total n firms) merge into a single firm. 
M 
.., 
hj. At the pre-merger Let the pre-merger output of the first m firms be H. = 2] 
i-I 
output, the marginal revenue of the merged firm is given by p(H) +pP (H) - H.. 
The merged firm will reduce output if and only if its post-merger marginal 
cost, cý 
, 
exceeds marginal revenue at the pre-merger output level, or 
cl >p+H. p' 
-H,. pp > P-C, (6) mm 
From the merged firm's reaction function (2), we can write, 
-p'Hm [p - 
Thus the merged firm will reduce output (from the pre-merger level) if and 
only if it's post-merger mark-up is less than the sum of the pre-merger mark- 
ups of its constituent finns, i. e. if and only if 
-C, I>P-C, m 
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The above condition must hold if c' 
. 
ý!: min {c; I, since p ý: c, 
, 
Vi (so that each i 
firm produces positive output). In other words, the merger will lead to the 
reduction in output of the merged firm (from the pre-merger level) unless the 
marginal cost of the newly merged firm is lower than the pre-merger marginal 
cost of the most efficient merger participant. If the merged firm output is 
reduced from the pre-merger level, then it follows immediately that the new 
aggregate output will also be reduced (from equation 5), and the price will rise. 
In a simple two-firin merger between firm I and firm n (with 
< the price will fall if and only if p- cm' > (p 
- 
c, ) + (P 
- 
c. ), CI <C2 
... 
< c. 
or equiva ent y 
c", 
- 
cm, >p- cl, (8) 
If a merger generates no synergies, i. e. the new merged firm's production 
possibilities are no different from those of the merger participants Oointly) 
before the merger, then the merger raises domestic price. With no synergies, 
cý is normally the marginal cost of the most efficient firm that participates in 
the merger. In the above two-firm merger case, the post-merger production 
possibility is equivalent to cl. It is now easy to show that condition (8) is 
reduced to c,, > p, which cannot be true. Thus this merger will lead to an 
increase in price. Farrell and Shapiro (1990) also show that condition (8) can 
be expressed in terms of pre-merger variables as 7 
7 From (8), we have c' < 
-P + c' + C' 
. 
Then we can rewrite the inequality as MIR 
<p- [(p 
- 
cl') + (p or equivalently c. ' <p+ p'[h, + h,, Finally we IM 
<p+ P[. E'H 
]F h, + h,, II_ 
P[ý, ýh,, 
]. 
have c' <* C7 MM<p pLHj 
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cm, 
where si is firm i's pre-merger market share and e=-ý is the elasticity of p'H 
demand. Condition (9) shows how much less than the current price the merged 
firm's marginal cost must be, if price is to fall. 
Next we turn our attention to the profitability of the merger. A merger will 
not actually happen unless it is profitable. Consider the general case where the 
first m finns are merging. We can define the gain (G) from this merger as 
G=-it, 
where hrm is the post-merger profit of the merged firm, and the second term on 
the right hand side is the sum of pre-merger profits of all merger participants. 
For a merger to be profitable, we need G>0. Before the merger, firm i 
produces h, p -P 
, 
with a profit function given by ir, = phi - c, (h). After 
p 
P-C 
the merger, each remaining firm j produces h, 
-l, with a profit of 
7E j= Phj - cj (hj). The gain from merger is given by 
G= p4. 
-mpzh I c, (h) - c. (4 
i-I il+li-I 
(10) 
Thus the condition for a privately profitable merger among the first m firms is 
c, (h) 
- 
c. (h. )] > 
[(mpj 
h, ) 
- 
(11) 
The left-hand side of the above inequality is the potential cost saving from the 
merger, while the right-hand side reflects the potential losses in revenue. 
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However with general demand and general cost specifications, it is difficult to 
analyse the above condition expliCitly. 8 Since the main analysis in this chapter 
and the next concern the effects of trade policies on merger incentive, we need 
to examine the issue of merger profitability explicitly. So let now consider 
other horizontal merger models that relax the assumptions of general demand 
and general cost functions. 
Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983) analyse a horizontal merger in a 
context of Cournot oligopoly with a linear demand and identical firms. In this 
model we assume a linear demand given by D=A-p, where A is a positive 
constant. There are n identical firms and each finn has an identical constant 
marginal cost of c, and a profit function given by n= (p - c)h. By solving the 
profit maximisation problems, we get the equilibrium price, each firm's 
optimal output, and each firm's profit as 
p= 
A+nc 
; h, =p-c= 
A 
-C; ir=(h)' = 
FA-c]2 
n+l n+l 
[n+l I 
Next consider a simple merger between two firms, firm I and firm n. We 
assume that a merger does not generate cost synergies, and simply leads to a 
shutting down of one of the merger participants (and suppose that fin-a n will 
be shut down). Then the market equilibrium price is simply that which would 
obtain in the absence of firm n. Thus the post-merger price (P) is 
8 Farrel and Shapiro (1990) model focuses mainly on the welfare implication of a merger. Their 
model give a simple condition for a net positive welfare effect of a privately profitable merger 
on outsiders (non-participating firms) and consumers as Z, 
Go 
%is, > s, 
, 
where s,, iE0 is 
a market share of each outsider firm, s, is a market share of the insider and Ai is defined 
above in equation (4). 
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. 
A+(n-l)c 
n 
It follows immediately that the changes in price, output for each remaining 
firm, and industry output, as a result of this merger are given b 
Ap=p-p= h; Ahj = Ap =hj=1,..., n -1; AH = AD = -ý (14) 
nnn 
It is clear from the above results that a merger will lead to the increase in price 
as the total industry output falls, but each remaining firm will produce more 
output. The post-merger profit of the remaining firni j (j, -n) is given by 
P, 
Then the increase in profit for each remaining firm is 
n-cl, 
Alri 
= 
ýrj 
-; ri =[. ýn c]' _FA-cl' = (2n+l)(A >0 (15) L-n +1 j n'(n + 1)' 
The above result shows that the merger between two identical firms will lead to 
the increase in profit for each remaining firm. Thus each of the non-participant 
firms will definitely benefit from the merger. But for the merger participants 
(firm 1 and n), the merger gain (G) is the difference between the increased 
profit of firm 1 and the forgone pre-merger profit of firm n, that is 
G=Arl, 
-rl = 
(2n+l)(A-c)' (A-c)' 
- 
(2n +1- n')(A 
nn2 (n +1)2 (n +1)2 n2 (n +1)2 
The above equation implies that a merger will be profitable if n<3.10 That is 
in Salant et al (1983) model, symmetric firms have no incentive to merge (two- 
=A-nc 
A-(n-I)c A-c 
=h ; hj-hj=(P-c)-(p-c)=Ap; P-P 
n+l n n(n+l) n 
h_ 
=_h 
fl-H=(n-I)Ah-h=(n-1) h 
nn 
15 
firm merger) unless there are initially 2 firms and the two merge into a 
monopoly. This result is not surprising, since the merger in this model offers 
only the increased profit from the anti-competitive effect without any 
efficiency gain. In addition the merged firm has to share any gain from the 
anti-competitive effect equally with the non-participating firms. In most case, 
this gain from the anti-competitive effect is too small to offset the loss from the 
pre-merger profit of the closed down firm. 
A similar result also arises in the multi-firin merger case. Now suppose that 
that firms I through m (for m< n) merge into a single firm. In this case the 
post-merger equilibrium price is" 
.= 
A+(n-m+l)c 
p 
n-m+2 
(17) 
The post-merger profit for each remaining firm is (; q 
- 
c)2 
A-c Then 
_n -m+ 
21 
the merger gain in this case is 
C]2 [n+l (18) 
The above equation implies that the merger gain will be positive if 
(n 
-1)' > m(n -m+ 2)'. By using numerical examination, Salant et al show 
that if there are six or fewer firms, a profitable merger must include all the 
firms in the industry. If 7 ý: n ý: 11, at most one firm can be excluded from a 
merger if it to be profitable for the participants. Again this result demonstrates 
that the condition for a profitable merger is very restrictive and this sort of 
10 From equation (16), the merger gain will be positive if 2n +I-n2>0, and this condition 
will be met if n<3. 
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combination (which leads to a profitable merger) is unlikely in real world 
mergers. 
However if a merger leads to a large fixed cost saving, a normal merger of 
symmetric Cournot firms may be profitable. Recall the two-firm merger case in 
the industry that there are at least 3 firms. Then a merger between firm I and 
firm n will result in a loss of L (L =G< 0). 12 Now assume further each firm 
faces a positive fixed cost of F in addition to the identical constant marginal 
cost. The inclusion of the fixed cost assumption does not affect the equilibrium 
price and outputs, but the pre-merger profit of each firm will be 
7C, =[-ý-C ' -F. 13 A merger between firm I and firm n will lead to a closure 
nn +11 
of one of the merging partners (again suppose it is firm n). Then the profit of 
-C the merged firm is given by z^l 
]'-F. 
The gain from this merger is 
ir, 
- 
ir, 
-; r,. =L+F GF =^ (19) 
Then this merger will be profitable if, F, the fixed cost saved by shutting down 
a firm is bigger than L. In this case, a merger of identical firms could be 
profitable if the fixed cost saving is large enough. 
Perry and Porter (1985) consider a merger of asymmetric firms. In their 
analysis, firms are assumed to be endowed with different capital base, and a 
merger involves the taking over of capital assets of a target firm. In this model 
1 This price is simply that which would obtain in the case where m- I fmns depart the market. 
12 Since L= 
(2n +1-n 2 )(A 
_ 
C)2 
then L<O for n>-3. 
n2 (n +1)2 
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the expansion of the capital base of a merged firm will lead to the reduction of 
its marginal cost. This can be done specify a marginal cost function of firm i as 
MCj 
-- 
d+ h 1. where d denotes the intercept of the marginal cost function, and 
Si 
si :ýI denotes the share of capital endowment available to firm i. A merger of 
two firms will lead to the addition of capital stocks of the two parties involved. 
With the above marginal cost formulation, the merged firm will have lower 
cost function as its capital base expands. 14 Thus a merger in this model not 
only has the anti-competitive benefit to the merged firm, but also the efficiency 
gain as a result of the reduction in its marginal cost. Unlike Salant et al. (1983) 
result, finns in this case will often have an incentive to merge. 15 
1.3 Horizon Mergers in Open Economies 
The second foundation of our main analysis comes from the literature on 
mergers in open economies. Recently there have been several works that study 
the effects of trade liberalisation (in the light of success of negotiations under 
GATT and WTO) on mergers. The main concern in this research area is 
whether freer trade should be accompanied by more lenient competition 
13 The inclusion of a fixed does not change the first order conditions of the profit maximization 
problems. Hence the post-merger equilibrium price and outputs will be the same for any value 
of F. 
14 For example, if firm I and firm n merge, the new share of capital endowment of the merged 
h 
firm will be S, + S,.. Then a marginal cost function of a merged firm is MC. =d+M 
Si +Sn 
and this function has a lower gradient than both pre-merger marginal cost functions of the two 
parties. 
There are also other approaches which show similar result that firms often have incentive to 
merge. For examples in Deneckere and Davidson (1985) which assumes Bertrand competition 
with differentiated products, and in McElroy (1991) which allows conjectures variation in the 
post-merger stage. 
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(especially merger) policy. The literature that discuss this issue includes Dixit 
(1984), Ross (1987), Long and Vousden (1995), Collie (1997), Falvey (1998) 
and Hom and Levinsohn (2000). 16 We will begin with Dixit (1984) and Collie 
(1997), which examine the links between mergers and trade policies in an 
international oligopoly model. 
We consider a model where there are two countries 
- 
home and foreign 
(where variables are denoted with asterisk). Each country has a small number 
of firms (n domestic firms and n* foreign firms) producing a homogeneous 
product and the entry of new firms is not possible. The firms compete in 
Coumot oligopoly fashion in the domestic market, and for simplicity it is 
assumed that all consumption of this product occurs in the home country. " It is 
also assumed that each domestic firm has a constant marginal cost c and a 
fixed cost F. Similarly each foreign firms has a constant marginal cost c* and 
a fixed cost F*. On the supply side, home firms each sell h units and foreign 
firms each sell h* units of output in the domestic market; hence, domestic 
production is H nh, foreign exports (domestic imports) are H* = n*h*, and 
total sales are XH+H. On the demand side, the inverse demand function 
is given by p p(X), and it is assumed that p'(X) < 0. The home 
government maximises national welfare by using a specific tariff t and a 
production subsidy s, while the foreign government is assumed to be passive. 
16 Other works in this area include Fracois and Hom (2000), which looks at different 
competition policies in the open economy framework, while Richardson (1999) analyses trade 
and competition policies in a framework of free trade area. Barros and Cabral (1994), Head and 
Ries (1997), and Kabiraj and Chaudhuri (1999) all focus on the welfare effects of mergers in 
C en economies. 
IT This is similar to considering one of two segmented markets. 
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A horizontal merger will be modelled as an exogenous reduction in the number 
of finns. 
We begin the analysis by considering profit functions of domestic and 
foreign firms which are given by 
7t, =(p-c+s)h-F; *=(p-c*-t)h*-F* 
. 
71 
Assume that the marginal revenues are strictly decreasing, p'+ hp" <0 and 
p'+h*p"<0.18 This assumption together with the decreasing demand 
function (p'(X) < 0) and a constant marginal cost (c'= c*'= 0) ensure that the 
profit functions have negative second order conditions and thus are concave in 
h and h*. 19 With concave profit functions we can find the unique Cournot 
solutions by solving the first order conditions: 
0 -In 
=P+hp'-c+s (20a) ah 
cl; r* 
= P+h*p'-c* 
-t (20b) ah* 
By equating the above two first order conditions to zero, we can solve for the 
initial equilibriums of domestic price, home firms' and foreign firms' outputs. 
However we are more interested in the effects of trade policy variables (t and 
s) on mergers (in this case the reduction in number of symmetric firms), then 
18 Collie (1997) assumes less restrictive conditions of (n+l)p'+Hp"<O and 
(n* + I)p'+ H*p" < 0, which ensures the 'global' concavity of the profit fiinctions. These 
conditions allow the firms' output to be strategic substitutes or complements whereas the usual 
conditions assumed above imply that firms' output are strategic substitutes. 
19 The SOCs are 
2=pF+ 
hp" + p'< 0 and 
cl2; ro 
=pp+ h*p pf + P, < 0. 2 (ah* )2 
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we must carry out the comparative static analysis of the system (20a) and 
(20b). Totally differentiate the first order conditions (20a) and (20b) to obtain 
ds 
0 
[ný 
+ p' n*ý 
Pldh 
= 
-1 0 -ýh -ýh* dt 
ný* n*ý* + dh*- A 
Ldn*j 
where ý =p'+hp"<0 and 0*=p'+h*p"<0. The determinant of the matrix 
on the left hand side of system (21) is fl=(no+n*o*+p')p' which is 
positive. 20 Then the solution of the system (21) yields the comparative static 
results for effects of trade policy variables, number of home and foreign firms 
on the Coumot output of domestic and foreign firms: 
[dh]= I *0*+p' 
dh* Q 
-no* 
or 
d 
dhý] Q 
ds 
-n*O, ][-l 0 -Oh -Oh* dt 
no+p 01 
-O*h -O*h*- dn 
_dn 
.1 
-n*ý -ýhp' 
ný+p' 4*hp' 
ds 
-ýh*pl dt 
-ýWp' A Idn" 
(22) 
And for the industry output by home fin-ns H= nh, and the total output by 
foreign firms H* 
= n*h*, the comparative results are obtained by totally 
differentiate H and H* (dH = ndh + hdn and dH* = n*dh* + h*dn*), which 
gives 
'0 Since 0,0* 
, 
and p' are all negative, thus the sum of the terms in the brackets is negative 
and this makes the product of the whole terms positive in sign. 
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[ dH]= 1 [-n(n*ý* + 
dH" 0 nn*ý* 
-nn*ý hp'(n *ý *+ p) 
n* (ný + p') 
-n*ý*hp' 
ds 
-nýh*p' dt 
h*p'(ný + p')- dn 
Ldn*J 
(23) 
Finally we will look into the effects on the total output (home and foreign) and 
its price. Recall that X=H+H* and dp=p-dX, then comparative static 
results for the effects on total output and on price are 
Pý 
-n 
dp Q 
[- 
np 
hpl 
n*p' h(p)2 
ds 
h*p' dt 
h* (pr)2_ dn 
Ldn*J 
(24) 
The above comparative static results (22) 
- 
(24) show the effects on output 
and on price as a result of the changes in home government policies and the 
number of finns. A subsidy increases the production of home firms, while it 
decreases the production of foreign firms. A tariff, on the other hand, reduces 
the production of foreign firms but it increases home firms' production. At the 
aggregate level, an increase in subsidy raises the total output of the good and 
hence reduces the price. An increase in tariff reduces the total output and 
therefore increases the price. For the effects of mergers we consider the effects 
of an exogenous reduction in the number of firms. As the number of home 
firms changes, we find a national merger in a home country (dn <0) and a 
national merger in a foreign country (dn* < 0) each raises the output of every 
surviving firm in each market, but the total output in each market declines and 
the price goes up. 
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With this model, Collie (1997) shows that we can analyse the welfare 
effect of the changes in number of home and foreign firms when domestic 
govemment employs optimal trade policies. The domestic welfare measure is 
given by the sum of consumer surplus, producer surplus and the net 
government revenue: 
W= V(p) + nit + (tH* 
- 
sH) = V(p) + (p - c)H - nF + tH* (25) 
where V(p) is the aggregate indirect utility function. Then we can find optimal 
tariff and subsidy rates for the home government by maximising domestic 
welfare (25) with respect to t and s. By taking the optimal trade policy 
variables into consideration, Collie shows that the overall effects of domestic 
and foreign merger are given by 
dW= aW 
, 
aW dt' aW ds' 
A an at A as A 
and 
dW aW aW dto aW dso 
am at dm as dm 
By examining the comparative static results (obtained by totally differentiating 
the first order conditions) of the domestic welfare maximisation problem 
together with the results previously obtained, Collie (1997) finds that when the 
domestic country pursues an optimal trade policy, it will always worse off as a 
result of a foreign merger. The optimal response of the domestic country to a 
foreign merger is to decrease (increase) the tariff, if demand is concave 
(convex), and to increase its production subsidy. The optimal response to a 
domestic merger is to leave the tariff unchanged and to increase the production 
subsidy so that the domestic industry output remains unchanged. 
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The above approach by Dixit (1984) and Collie (1997) shows how the 
changes in trade policies variables and the number of firms affect the Cournot 
equilibrium. More importantly this approach can give the implications for 
optimal trade policies in the light of mergers 
. 
21 However by modelling a 
merger as an exogenous reduction in the number of firms, we cannot examine 
the direct effects of trade policy on mergers. 22 Moreover by assuming 
asymmetric firms, the above model also fails to tackle the issues of merger 
incentives. Although the above model shows that national mergers (both in 
home and foreign countries) lead to increased profits for the remaining firms 
(as both the price and the output of each surviving finn increase as a result of a 
reduction in a number of firms), it does not, mean that mergers are profitable to 
the group of merging firms. We have demonstrated in the domestic merger 
review section (Salant et al. 1983) that a merger of identical firms in 
oligopolistic competition is unprofitable unless firms are merging into a 
monopoly or there is a very large fixed cost saving. Since the issue of merger 
profitability is essential to the main analysis we will now turn our attention to 
the approach that models merger explicitly. This can be done by incorporating 
the conventional merger literature into the open economies context. 
21 Hom and Levinsohn (2000) also use similar approach to examine the links between trade 
policies and the optimal domestic concentration level via the analysis of a reduced form 
welfare formula. 
22 In a similar setting of international Cournot model with symmetric home firms and 
symmetric foreign firms, Ross (1988) examines the indirect effect of a change in tariff policy 
on a merger. This is done by taking the view that a change in tariff will lead to a change in 
foreign firms' marginal cost. Then we can find out how a reduction in foreign firms' marginal 
cost (as a result of tariff reduction) changes the effect of a merger (a reduction of number of 
firms) on price by examining the terms 
dP 
and 
P 
dndc* dn*dc* 
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In Barros and Cabral (1994), the domestic merger model of Farrell and 
Shapiro's (1990) is extended to the open economies context. This analysis 
focuses on the external welfare effect of mergers and the rule for approving a 
merger in open economies. However there is little emphasis on merger 
incentive in Barros and Cabral's model. Gaudet and Kanouni (2000) examine 
how the removing of a tariff (at different levels) affects the profitability of a 
domestic merger of symmetric firms that saves a fixed cost. However in this 
model, a small trade liberalisation will have a limited impact on merger 
incentive. In Neven and Seabright (1997), a simple version of Perry and 
Potter's (1985) model is applied to the open economies context. They focus on 
a cross-border merger of two asymmetric firms that results in a lower cost for a 
merging firm as the two parties combine their capital assets together. 23 it 
appears that there are some incentives to undertake a cross-border merger when 
trade costs (as a result of a tariff) are high. However the cross-border merger 
will be less profitable as trade costs are reduced. 
In a simpler way of modelling a merger of asymmetric firrns in open 
economies, Long and Vousden (1995) focus on firms with different 
technologies (and hence with different marginal costs). It is assumed that there 
are n+2 domestic firms and m foreign firms competing in Cournot fashion to 
supply a good to two segmented markets (home and foreign). For domestic 
firms, there are n identical firms but the other two firms have different 
constant marginal costs. For foreign firms, all m firms are identical. A merger 
will result in the adopting of technology of the lower cost firm, i. e. the 
23 Recall that in this type of model, there is a direct link between the size of capital base and the 
25 
participant with higher cost will be closed down. With linear demand a merger 
of two finns will be profitable if the cost-reduction effect (which depends on 
the difference in marginal costs of the two firms) is sufficiently high. Long and 
Vousden then examine the effects of tariff liberalisation on a domestic merger 
of the two asymmetric firms and on a cross-border merger. A change in tariff 
will change a range of cost differences that make mergers profitable. It turns 
out that the unilateral tariff reduction will encourage domestic mergers which 
primarily concentrate market power (mergers with low cost-reduction effects). 
However the equal bilateral tariff reductions will encourage domestic mergers 
which primarily reduce cost (mergers with high cost-reduction effects). On 
cross-border mergers, Long and Vousden consider two types of merger. The 
first type is a cross-border merger which supplies each national market from a 
local plant, and this type of merger will be discouraged by both unilateral and 
bilateral tariff reductions. The second type of cross-border merger that Long 
and Vousden consider is a merger which leads to a closed down of a home 
firm's plant (higher marginal cost). Unilateral tariff reduction will encourage 
type II cross-border mergers which have lower cost saving effects, while 
bilateral tariff reductions will encourage type II cross-border merger which 
have large cost-saving effects. 
Falvey (1998) also considers mergers among firms with different 
technologies from both domestic and foreign countries. This model focuses on 
mergers of a low cost firm and a high cost firm (which will result in a closed 
down of the high cost firm) from the same or different countries. Set in a 
marginal cost. 
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context of linear demand, constant marginal cost, and Cournot competition, 
Falvey's model gives relatively simple outcomes of several types of mergers 
under a tariff regime (which is imposed by the domestic country). As our 
original analysis of mergers and quota policy in chapter 2 is the extension of 
Falvey's model, we will examine this model in more details in the next section. 
1.4 The Effects of Tariff on Mergers 
We consider a model of international oligopoly comprised of two 
countries: home and foreign. Each country has a small number (n, n* --- 3) of 
firms producing a homogeneous product supplying both home and foreign 
markets and entry of new firms is not possible. 24 Competitions in both markets 
are assumed to be Cournot. Each firm faces constant unit cost and no fixed 
costs. 
25 Unit costs differ across firms with ck > ci if k>i. The home 
government can impose a small specific tariff of t per unit, which implies that 
the cost of firm i* of selling in the home market will be c, * +t. It is also 
assumed that there are no transport costs. As demonstrated by Falvey (1998), 
we can make two alternative assumptions about the linkages between the two 
national markets: an integrated world market, and segmented markets. In the 
case of integrated world market, arbitrage between markets is possible (if the 
difference in prices in the two markets exceeds the relevant tarifo and it will 
link the prices between the two countries. A change in tariff will affect the 
24 To ensure that after the merger we do not end up with a monopolist. 25As previously discussed, the equilibrium price and outputs will be same for any value of a 
fixed cost. However a fixed cost will affect firms' profits and hence the potential gains from 
mergers. 
27 
equilibrium in both markets. 26 In the case of segmented markets, on the other 
hand, we can treat the two markets independently. And the change in tariff will 
only affect the equilibrium in the home market. We will focus our attention 
only on the segmented markets case as this will simplify the extension of this 
model in chapter 2 to include the examination of quota policy on mergers. 
Let hi, fi (h;, fi*) denote the sales of each home (foreign) firm in the home 
and foreign markets respectively. Assume that demands for home and foreign 
markets are linear and given by 
D= A 
-P; D* =A* -P* (26) 
where A and A* are positive constants, and p and p* are domestic and foreign 
prices respectively. Market clearing requires that 
D=H+H*; D* 
=F+F* (27) 
where H=yh,, H*=I: hi*, F=Efl, and F*=Efi*. 
Let first consider the case of free trade equilibrium (i. e. t= 0). Then 
domestic and foreign firm profit maximization problems are 
Max (p-ci)hi+(p*-ci)fi. Max (p-c; )h: +(p*-cl*)fl* 
hi)fi 9 h:, fl* 
(28) 
26 In this case of integrated market, we would model a two-stage game. In the first stage, firms 
choose their outputs in each market, taking each other firm's outputs as given. In the second 
stage, arbitrage activity occurs if the first stage results in a price differential between the two 
markets that exceeds the relevant tariff. 
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dp d dp* 
= 
dp* 
= Taking = ap -- -1 (this reflects the assumption that firms Ai dh; df, dfi* 
choose the quantities to produce independently in the Cournot model), we can 
find each firm optimal output by solving FOC = 0, this gives 27 
h, 
=p-ci; f, =p*-ci; h: =p-c;; fl* =p*-ci* (29) 
The equilibrium profits for home and foreign firms are 
)2 (h*)2 +( *)2 (hi)2 + (fj J. f 
(30) 
Substituting the optimal outputs into the demand functions (26), gives the 
equilibrium domestic and foreign prices: 
A+C+C* A*+C+C* 
P= N+l ;p N+l 
(31) 
where C=Ec,, CZc; 
, 
and N=n+n+1. Noting that the difference 
i-I P-l 
between the two free trade equilibrium prices is 
a=p 
-p= N+l 
Then this term, a, also represents the difference in sales between the two 
markets by each firm. 28 
Next consider a two-firin merger case. Again assume that the merger does 
not generate cost synergies. Then cost minimization by the new merged firm 
implies the abandonment of the relatively incfficient participant's technology. 
27 We can confirm that the solutions of the first order conditions are the unique Coumot 
equilibriums since the second order conditions are negative, 
Y7r 
-17C 
i 0i=0= 
-2. )2 (af (6hi i)2 (ah; )' 2 I afi ) 
28 Given the definition of a, we can write fj = hi +a and fl* = h: + a. 
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With this lock-up merger, the post-merger equilibrium is that which obtains 
with the closure of one of the merger participants. 
A National Merger in the Home Countly under Free Trade Regime 
To illustrate, consider the merger between firm I and firm n. As it will 
become clear later, this merger is likely to be the most profitable of the 
potential mergers. The merger results in the departure of firm n, then the post- 
merger equilibrium outputs of n 
-I home firms and n* foreign firms are given 
by 
I 
fo 
-cj,, ýj =P*-cj, j:;, 
- 
n; 4, * =P-c 
, 
P* 
-C, hj =p 
where i denotes the post-merger equilibrium value of variable x. Summing 
these optimal outputs and then substituting into the demand functions, we get 
the post-merger prices: 
. 
=A+C+C*-c. ., =A*+C+C*-c. pN ;pN 
Then the effects of a merger on equilibrium outputs and prices are 29 
Ahj 
= 
Ahj* 
= 
Ap, j; & n; Ap =h'; Afj = Afi* = Ap*, j#n; Ap* = 
L"- (32) 
NN 
where Ax =i-x indicates the discrete change in the equilibrium value of 
variable x as a result of merger. This merger results in the increase in sales (in 
both markets) of each of the remaining (N-1) firms. The sales of each firm rise 
29 It folloWS that Ahj =(P-c, )-(p-cj)=Ap, j # n; 
Ah: 
=(P-c; 
-t)-(p-c; -t)=Ap; 
liý I 
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by one Nth of the departing firm's original sales. Then it follows immediately 
that the total outputs fall (as there are only N-1 finns left) and prices rise. 
Next we investigate the effect of this merger on finns' profits. The change 
in profit of the home firm j (j ;, 
-- 
n) is given by'O 
Airj 
=Aphj +[P-cj]Ahj +Ap*fj +[P* -cj]Afj 
Since equilibrium prices and firm's optimal outputs increase as a result of a 
merger, then it is clear that firinj's profits will be increased as a result of a 
merger between firm 1 and firm n. 31 The expression for the change in profit for 
each foreign firm is also derived similarly. After substituting the expressions 
for Ahj, Ap, Afj, and Ap*, we can derive simple expressions for Airj and 
Air, * as 
Airj 
=Ap[2hj +Ap]+Ap*[2fj+Ap*]; 
An; 
= 
Ap[2h; + Ap] + Ap* [2f, * + Ap* ] (33) 
Given Ap and Ap*, which depend only on the initial output of the departing 
firm, expressions (33) show that the most efficient firm (i. e. the largest firm) 
Ap 
= 
A+C+C*-c,, A+C+C' 
- 
A+C+C* 
_c, = 
hP1 
. 
And the results for N N+1 N(N + 1) NN 
Afj, Af, and Ap* are derived similarly. 
30 We can break down the change in finnj's profits from each market into two components. 
The first component is the change in profits resulting from the change in price on the original 
output. The second component is the change in profits resulting from the change in output at 
the new (post-merger) price. 31 We can rearrange the expression for the change in firm j's profits to get 
h Airj 
= 
[Aphj 
+ [p 
- 
c,, + [c,, 
- 
cj + 
[Ap"I 
-C +IC', -Ci I j +[p' JL 11 nn 
ý11 I 
With this expression we can investigate the sources of firmj's increased profits. For each 
market, he increased profits are coming from a transfer form consumers' urplus, atransfer of 
profits of the departing firm, and a relative efficiency gain from shutting down firm n. 
31 
has the largest potential profits and hence the greatest incentive to initiate this 
merger. 
For the merger between firm I and firm n to happen, a merger gain (G) 
must be positive. We define the merger gain as the increased profits of a 
remaining participant less the loss profits of a departing participant. In this case 
An, 
-7E,,, or 
p) + Ap* [2f, + Ap* [(h. n)2] G(l, n) = Ap[2h, +A )2 + (f, 
2h 
" [h, 
- 
h. 
- 
g(N)] + 2f " [f, 
- 
f, 
- 
g(N)l NN 
G(l, n) = 2ApR(l, n)+2Ap*R*(I, n) (34) 
N 1- 
where R(l, n)=hl-h,, g(N); R*(I, n)=fl-f,, g(N); g(N)=[ -Tl>l; 2N 
g'(N) > 0. The merger gain consists of domestic and foreign gains. Considering 
the tenns R(l, n) and R* (1, n), we can show that 
R(l, n) 
- 
R*(I, n) = ct[g(N) 
-1] 
This result implies that the gain from merger is more likely in the smaller 
marker, in the sense that if merger would make neither a profit nor a loss in the 
32 larger market it will generate profit in the smaller market 
. 
Since determining 
the influence of differences in market size is not the main objective, we will 
henceforth assume that the two markets are approximately equal in size 
(A Pt; A*) and thus the merger gains from the two markets (under free trade) are 
equal. 
32 ]3Ut the merger induces larger price increase in the larger market, so that the magnitude of 
any gain could be larger there. We can show that 
sign {2ApR(I, n) 
- 
2Ap*R* (1, n)) = sign {a [g(N)[hn + f, I- [h,, + f, 
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Equation (34) provides a condition on the relative firm sizes for a profitable 
merger (for example a positive merger gain in the domestic market requires 
h, 
>g(N)). Given the initial outputs of the discontinuing partner, the larger hn 
the required initial output of the continuing partner if the merger is to yield a 
net gain. Therefore we expect this type of merger to involve large and small 
firms; the largest and the smallest firms in particular. To expand on this point 
we can look at the conditions on firms' sizes which will yield a maximum 
merger gain. Since the two markets are symmetric we need to consider only the 
effects of the merger in the home market. Given h, the optimal merger partner 
for firm n is the most efficient firm, firm 1.33 But given h, 
. 
the optimal partner 
for finn I needs to have an output of 2g(N) . 
34 Thus a sufficient condition for 
a merger to involve the largest and smallest firms is that h, > 
h' 
. 
And a 
merger between firm 1 and firm n with h, = 2h,, g(N) is the best merger (i. e. 
this will lead to the maximum merger gain). 
Initial Equilibrium under Tariff Regime 
Next we consider the situation where the home government impose a small 
specific tariff of t per unit on imports. With the assumptions of segmented 
33 This is because. dG 
= 
2hp, 
> 0. dhi N 
34 Since ýG = 
2[hý 
-2h,, -9(N)I, 
and 
d2G 
=_. 
4-g(N) 
< 0, then h 
h, 
AnN (dhn )2 Nn 2-g(N) 
will give the maximum merger gain for a given h, 
, 
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markets and constant marginal costs, the tariff set by the home government will 
affect only domestic price and outputs. The tariff acts as a unit cost increase for 
foreign firms supplying the home market, and the new equilibrium price in the 
home market is given by 
- 
A+C+C*+n*t n*t 
N+l -, V N+I 
(35) 
Then the effects of the change in tariff on domestic price, finn outputs and 
profits are given by 
dp- n* 1h dp- A 
dt N+l dt dt dt dt 
d3F, 
= 
2ýj 
- 
dp 
> 0; and 
d" 
'-= 2Ti* 
.[ crp -I<0 (36) dt dt dt dt 
The above results confirm that a tariff set by the home goveniment will 
increase a domestic price and domestic sales of each home finn, but it will 
35 
reduce domestic sales of each foreign firm. And the profits of each domestic 
firm will increase, while the profits of each foreign finn will decrease as a 
result of a tariff. 
[TAI A National Merger in the Restricting (Home) Countjy 
Now consider a national merger in the restricting country, in particular the 
merger between firm I and firm n (which is potentially the most profitable). 
This merger leads to the closure of the least efficient firm, firm n. The effects 
of this merger on equilibrium outputs and prices are 
35 In this case of linear demand, a tariff increases domestic sales of each home firm by the same 
amount and decreases domestic sales of each foreign firm by the same amount. In a non-linear 
demand case Collie (1998) shows that the domestic sales of a larger (smaller) than average 
34 
An* ATj 
=ATi* =6ýij; 1-- n; Ap7= 
h" 
; Afj =Afi* =Ap*, j: # n; -f,, 
This merger case is similar to a domestic merger case under free trade that we 
have discussed earlier. Then the relevant expression for the merger gain is from 
(34): 
n) = 
2h" 
n) + 2f" 
- 
R* (1, 
NN 
(37) 
where k(l, n) = T, - T. - g(N) and R* (1, n) = f, - f, - g(N) 
- 
It is worth noting 
that the merger gains from the two markets are no longer equal. The tariff 
affects only the home market, and it increases domestic sale of a smaller firm 
more proportionately than that of a larger firm (a tariff increases the sale of 
each firm by the same absolute amount). Thus the merger gain from the home 
market under the tariff is different from the gain under the free trade, while the 
merger gain from the foreign market remains unchanged. We can show that 
2h 
" jT(l, n) 
- 
2h" R (1, n) =2 n*t 
-h,, g(N)]+[h, +n. 
t ][1-g(N) 
NNN N+1[' N+l 
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The above result implies that a merger that made neither a profit nor a loss 
under the free trade is unprofitable under the tariff regime. However if this 
merger was already profitable under the free trade, the merger gain under the 
tariff may increase. 
Next we investigate the effects of a small discrete change in tariff on the 
merger profitability. Since the tariff affects only the home market, we focus our 
attention only on the merger gain from the home market. The result of the 
foreign firm will fall by more than that of the average foreign firm if demand is concave (convex). 
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finding in the home market should indicate the overall impact of the merger 
profitability, unless the gains in the two markets are significant in magnitude 
and opposite in sign. However these circumstances are ruled out by the 
assumption that the markets are similar in size. We find that 
dG(l, n) 
-2 
k(l, n) ýEp + ý-hn [I 
- 
g(N)] dp dt N dt N dt 
(38) 
For k(l, n) :50 which includes all marginal mergers (where k(l, n) =0 and 
hence the gain of this merger is zero initially), a lower tariff increases the 
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merger gain from the domestic market. Because the lower tariff generates the 
same absolute decrease in outputs of both participating firms, the tariff 
reduction decreases the pre-merger domestic output of firm n more 
proportionately than the pre-merger output of firm 1. Hence the condition for a 
positive merger gain is easier to be met (for the case where the two firms found 
it unprofitable to merger before the tariff reduction). But if mergers were 
initially more than marginally profitable (i. e. for which T(l, n) > 0), then the 
effect of the tariff reduction on a merger gain from the domestic market is 
ambiguous. For example, if a merger (1, n) was initially the best merger for the 
home market i. e. T, = 2g(N)T,,, then a lower tariff decreases the gain from this 
merger. 
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[TB] A National Merger in the Non-restricting (Foreignl Count 
36 Since g(N) > 1, 
dp 
> 0, and k(l, n): 5 0, then we have 
dG (1, n) 
<0 dt dt 
31 In this case we have 
dUQ, n) 2h-,, dp- 
>Oforh, =2-g(N)-h,. dt N dt 
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A national merger in the non-restricting country between firms 1* and n* 
will lead to the closure of fin-n n*. And the changes in prices and sales of the 
remaining firms are 
h 
=A =, äf AP7= Ah, =Ah*=', j#n; j#n P fi JN 
The gain from a merger between firm 1* and n* is 
2+ 2f 
" 
NN 
(39) 
where 
-T. *g(N) and R*(1", n*)=fl*-f. *g(N). And the effect 
of a change in tariff on this merger gain is given by 
d-G-(I*, n*) 
=2p+2T, 
*, [I 
_ 
g(N) 
dp- (40) 
dt NI dpt dt . 
'E 
- 
11 
N 
The above derivative is positive for jT(I*, n*): 5 0. A tariff encourages national 
mergers in the non-restricting country, provided that those mergers were 
initially non-profitable in the home market (including marginal mergers). This 
is because a tariff reduction increases the home market sales for each oreign 
firni by the same amount. In effect it increases the pre-merger market share (in 
the home market) of firm n* more proportionately than those of firm I*, thus 
the condition for a profitable merger between the two becomes more difficult 
to be met after a merger. But the profitability of some already profitable 
mergers may rise as a result of a tariff reduction; the best merger 
hj* 
= 
2g(N)h, *, ) for example. " 
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[TC] An Intemational Merger that closes a finn in the Restricting Count 
Assume that firm I* is more efficient than firm n, thus firm n will be 
closed down after the merger. The post-merger prices are identical to the case 
[TA]. The gain from this merger is 
ýhn 
n) + 2f" R* (1% NN 
where k(l*, n) = ý* 
- 
T. g(N) and R* (1*, n) = fl* - f. g(N). Then 
dG(I*, n), 
= 
2 2T. dp- 
-T(I*, n)! 
Lp 
+. ýLP 
-1 g(N) (42) dt N dt N 
[[dt ]-dt I 
which is negative for T(I%n):! ý 0, i. e. for those mergers that were initially 
unprofitable in the home market including a marginal merger case. Thus a 
marginally unprofitable national merger in a foreign country will become 
profitable after a tariff reduction. This is because a tariff reduction decreases 
pre-merger domestic sales of home firm n, but it increases pre-merger domestic 
sales of foreign firm I*, and thus makes the condition for a positive merger 
gain easier to be met. Again it is possible that the profitability of some mergers 
that have already been profitable may reduce as a result of tariff reduction, 
though it is less likely since here a tariff reduction increases the merger gain of 
the best merger case ( Tl* = 2g(N) T. ). 39 
dG(I*, n*) 2T,, * p With h, = 2g(N)h:, we have ýL-l <0. dt N[ dt 
3 dU(I*, n) 2T dp-_, ] 9 For Tl* = 2g(N)T., we have dt N dt < 0. 
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[TD] An Intemational Merger that closes a firm in the Non-restricting 
cognta 
For an international merger between firms I and n* that leads to firm n* 
being closed down, the post-merger equilibriums are identical to the case [TBI. 
The merger gain is 
2 h,, ' R(l, n*)+ 2f: R*(I, n*) (43) NN 
where R(l, n*) =)TI 
- 
T. *g(N) and R*(I, n*) = f, -f. *g(N). Then 
dG(l, n*) 2 dp dp 
: --jý(1, n*)[ýdEp 
_ 
1] + 2T,, 
J 
-I]g(N)l (44) t dt N dt NL dt rdt 
The above derivative is positive for jý(I, n*): 5 0 i. e. for those mergers that 
were initially unprofitable in the home market including a marginal merger 
case. Thus a marginally profitable merger will become unprofitable as a result 
of tariff reduction. Some mergers that have been profitable may also find their 
merger gains decrease as a result of tariff reduction as in a case of the best 
merger ( T, = 2g(N) T, *, ). 40 
1.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter we have reviewed literature that examine the interactions 
between mergers and trade policies. A common approach to this topic has been 
to model a merger as the exogenous reduction in the number of identical firms 
and to see how this interacts with the trade policies. That approach, for 
40 dG(l, n*) 2 
-. 
dp- 
-h->0 for h, = 2g(N)h:. dt N" dt 
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example, can show how the mergers affect the welfare of the country that 
pursues optimal trade policy (Collie 1997) or show how the tariff liberalisation. 
increases or decreases the degree of the price effect of mergers (Ross 1988). 
However by modelling mergers in that way we ignore the fact that a merger is 
a private decision which would be taken if it is profitable for the participants. 
There is an alternative approach which treats a merger explicitly as a decision 
of private firms. This alternative approach, an example of which is set out in 
this chapter, is done by employing the range of available models in the general 
(domestic) merger literature. 
By investigating the model of a domestic merger setting in the Cournot 
framework we can show that identical firms have no incentive to merge unless 
the participants collectively have a large share of the market, or there is a large 
fixed cost saving from the merger (Salant et al 1983). However there are 
greater incentives for asymmetric firms to merge for example if the merger 
results in the increase in the share of tangible asset which in turn reduces the 
marginal cost of the merged firm (Perry and Porter 1985). There is a simpler 
way to model a merger of asymmetric firms by assuming that each firm 
possesses different technologies reflected in different marginal cost. Long and 
Vousden (1995) and Falvey (1998,2001) use this assumption in the open 
economies context. 
Setting in a simple international Cournot model with two segmented 
markets, linear demand, and constant marginal costs, Falvey (1998) examines 
the effects of tariff liberalisation on merger profitability and welfare. In this 
model the conditions for a merger to be profitable to participants depend on the 
relative si7e of the merger participants. The tariff makes the relatively 
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inefficient home firms less attractive as a merger partner to other firms. This is 
because the tariff increases the pre-merger profits of the (potential) departing 
firm, and the potential losses are likely to outweigh the gains to the surviving 
partner (via the price increase and the efficiency gain). Thus when the tariff is 
reduced, it makes the cost of closing down the relatively inefficient home firm 
cheaper. The tariff has precisely the opposite effect on the relatively inefficient 
foreign firms, i. e. it reduces the profits of these firms and makes them more 
attractive as a merger partner. Thus any reduction in tariff will reduce this 
distortion, and hence decrease the potential gains from merger that closes down 
the relatively inefficient foreign firms. 
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CHAPTER 2 
QUOTA POLICIES AND MERGERS 
2.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter we have reviewed the literature on trade policies 
and mergers especially on the effects of tariff liberalisation on merger 
activities. However the reduction in trade barriers in recent year has not 
confined to tariff liberalisation alone. Other widely used trade barriers that 
have been encouraged to be reduced (as a result of trade negotiations via 
GATT and WTO, and various free trade areas) are quantitative restriction 
policies such as quotas and voluntary export restraints (VERs). The effects of 
liberalising quantitative restrictions on merger activities remain to be 
investigated. By extending Falvey's (1998) model of tariffs and mergers, this 
chapter is set out to investigate the implications of quota liberalisation for 
merger profitability. 
A quota policy imposed by the domestic govemment directly distorts the 
volume of foreign imports, and this distortion is likely to affect merger 
incentives. The analysis in this chapter will help us to understand how a quota 
policy affects profitability of different merger cases. The results of this finding 
would contribute to the debate of whether freer trade help or hinder mergers. 
Moreover we can compare the results of this analysis (quota and mergers) with 
those of Falvey's model (tariff and mergers). Since the tariff and quota policies 
are different in nature, it is possible that tariff liberalisation and quota 
liberalisation may have different effects on profitability of some merger cases. 
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We employ a simple partial equilibrium model of international Cournot 
oligopoly competing in two segmented markets with linear demands. Then we 
consider the effects of a discrete change in quota policy on profitability of 
several merger cases. We focus our analysis on mergers of a low-cost firm and 
a high-cost firm. These merger partners can be from the same or different 
countries. The main analysis is presented in section 2.2. In section 2.3 we 
compare the merger profitability under the tariff and the quota regimes. 
Summary and conclusion remarks are presented in section 2.4. 
2.2 Quota Policy and Mergers 
Here we extend Falvey's (1998) model by introducing a quota policy 
imposed by the home government. We consider a partial equilibrium model of 
international Cournot oligopoly previously discussed in section 1.4. Briefly the 
model consists of two segmented markets: home and foreign. Each country has 
a small number of firms (n, n*ý: 3) producing a homogeneous product to serve 
in their own market and export to the other market and the new entry of firm is 
not possible. Each firni has different technology reflecting by different constant 
marginal cost. Linear demands in the two markets are given by D=A-p and 
p*, and assume that the two markets are approximately equal in size 
(A; tý A*). The home government, in this case, imposes a quota on foreign 
imports. Assume further that any entity through which imports are undertaken 
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in free trade is fully integrated with the foreign producer and thus all the rents 
from quota restriction are captured by the foreign producers. ' 
In this analysis we model a quota rule based on Article XIII of the GATT. 2 
That is either the allocation of trade shares should be agreed by all the suppliers 
of the product concerned, or the import right should be proportional to the sales 
during a "previous representative period". For the sake of the analysis of this 
simple model, we will concentrate solely on the previous representative period 
rule. Although the term "previous representative period7' is not properly 
defined, in practice a three-year period, during which trade was unrestricted, 
has generally been taken to be "representative". Here we suppose that the 
previous representative period is the one under free trade. 
Then under the quota system, a foreign firm i* is allowed to export up to 
qh:, where q, 0:! ý q: 5 1, is a quota rate, and h, * is the free trade equilibrium 
domestic sale of firm i*. Domestic and foreign firm profit maximisation 
problems in this case are 
Max c, )h, + (p* 
- 
ci)fi 
TI, f, 
and 
Max c; )hi* + (p* 
- ý:, fi* 
S1. hj* :5 qhi* 
(45a) 
(45b) 
1 This avoids the inefficiencies that would arise if a second independent profit maximising 
entity intervened between home consumers/retailers and the foreign producer. 2 Briefly, Article XIII requires that all exporters be covered by restriction (paragraph 1), and 
that the distribution of trade aim at approaching as closely as possible the shares that might be 
expected to obtain in the absence of the restriction (paragraph 2). The actual allocation of trade 
shares can be by agreement with all parties having a "substantial interest" in supplying the 
product concerned or, "where this method is nor reasonably practicable", in proportion to the 
shares during a previous representative period (paragraph 2(d)). 
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where j5, denote the domestic price and domestic sale of firm i (i*) 
under the quota regime. Since the two markets are segmented the quota policy 
does not affect the foreign market equilibrium. For the home market, the 
optimal response of an unconstrained (domestic) firm is to increase its output 
in the face of the reduction in sales of foreign firms, and the quota of each 
foreign firm is proportional to the optimal free trade output, the quota 
constraint is binding. Then equilibrium sales under quota regime are 
hi 
= 
j5 
- 
cl; f, = p* 
- 
c,; h, * = qhi*; fl* = p* - ci* 
The above results give the home market quota-induced price and the foreign 
price of 
-=A+C-qH* 
=P+ 
[I-q]H* 
. 
=A*+C+C* (46) p 
n+l n+l 
;p N+l 
where p= 
A+C+C* 
is the free trade domestic price. Then the effects of a N+l 
change in quota on the domestic price, sales in the domestic market and the 
finns' profits are 
dp- p dh * crp 
<0 
ýfi II* ýh 
<0; =hi*>0; 
-= 
2hi < 0; dq n+l dq dq dq dq dq 
d; Fi* [j5 
- 
c; ]h; + qh: 
dp- 
dq dq 
(47) 
By restricting the volume of foreign imports, a quota raises the domestic price. 
Each domestic firm responds to the restriction of foreign firms' sales in 
domestic market by increasing its own output. The tightening of a quota then 
helps to increase the profit of each domestic firm. But for each foreign firm, the 
effect of a tightening of a quota on the profit is ambiguous. However we can 
45 
determine a profit-maximising quota (qjO) for each foreign firm from (47), 
which gives 
qo =I+ 
n+l 
.- 
hl*_ 
22 H* 
(48) 
Equation (48) also implies that the larger foreign firm prefers a less restrictive 
quota. 
Next we consider the effects of quota liberalization (i. e. the loosening of 
the quota) on merger profitability. Again we consider a lock-up merger 
between two asymmetric firms. As this merger creates no cost synergies, the 
merged firm adopts superior technology and continues producing at a low cost 
plant and closes down a high cost paInt. We have demonstrated in section 1.4 
that the merger between the largest firrn and the smallest firm is likely to 
generate the largest gain. Hence we will direct our attention to the four merger 
cases which involve the largest and the smallest firms from the two countries. 
[QA] A National Merger in the Restricting Count 
Here we consider a merger between the most efficient domestic firm (firm 
1) and the least efficient domestic firm (firm n). In effect, this merger will lead 
to the departure of firm n. In the domestic market, the post-merger price 
(denote by superscript m) is 
PM 
= 
A+C-qH* 
n 
Then a change in domestic price as a result of this merger is given by 
A+C-qH* ch sp . 
-P= 11 = 
P-C. 
= 
il (49) 
n(n + 1) nn ?I 
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Noting that the above domestic price change is larger than the corresponding 
tariff outcome (which is one Nth of firm n's domestic pre-merger sale). This is 
because under the quota regime, the foreign firms are unable to expand their 
sales in response to the domestic price increase. The post-merger price in the 
foreign market is given by 
A*+C+C* c. 
NN 
And the change in foreign price is 
Ap p *m 
-p =A*+C+C* 
c. P0 -Cn 
- 
fn 
(50) 
N(N + 1) NNN 
With results (49) and (50), it is easy to derive the changes in sales of each 
remaining firm: 
hn 
ý-f. Ahi 
= 
3p j#n; Afj =, äfi p 
--, 
j#n; Ah, * =O 
The merger does not affect the domestic sales of foreign firms because of the 
quota restriction. 
This merger will be profitable for the participants if the gain, G(l, n), is 
positive. As before, the merger gain is defined as the increase in profits to the 
continuing firm 1 minus the loss in profits of the departed firm n. T at is 
G(l, n) = Aiýj 
where AýF, is given byAp7[AT, +Ap7]+Ap*[Afj+Ap*] and jý. =(T, )' +(f, )', 
then 
G(l, n) = 
2h" T,, g(n)] + ý-f" [f, 
- 
f,, g(N)I, or 
nN 
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n) 2h" n) + 
2f 
" R*(I, n) (51) 
nN 
n 
where g(n 2- 2n > 1, R(l, n) = h, - h,, g(n), R* (1, n) = f, - f. g(N). 
Equation (51) implies that the profitability of this merger depends on the 
relative shares of sales of the two merger participants. The merger gains from 
the two markets are identical under the free trade (as we assume equal market 
size), but the two are different under the quota regime as the quota affects only 
the equilibriums of the home market. However we do not expect a small trade 
intervention to make the two gains significant in magnitude and opposite in 
sign. It is also worth noting that for T, = 2T,, g(n), the merger will generate the 
maximum gain from the home market. 3 
Next we examine the effects of quota liberalization on the profitability of 
this merger. Again we focus our attention on the merger gain from the home 
market since the quota only affects the home market. Then we have 
dG(l, n) 2 
. 
k(l, n) + 2h" [I 
- 
g(n)] dp dq n dq n dq 
2r+- 
-- hl h. 
-2hg(n)]dp (52) 
n dq 
3 dG 2h For a given h. 
. 
firm I is the optimal partner (since 
-- 
= ýw ý" >0). And for a given h 
2-A, 
n 
dG 2rh, 
-2h,, g(n)] dG 4g(n) h, we have An = ý`J n and =-n<0. Then 
h. 
= 2g(n) Will 
give the maximum erger gain form the domestic market. 
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While the sign of the above term is ambiguous in general, it is positive for any 
mergers that were not initially profitable (i. e. for which k(l, n) < 0). 4 Thus the 
loosening of the quota (dq>0) would increase the profitability (from the 
home market) of the merger between the most and the least efficient home 
firms that was just marginally profitable. This is because the loosening of a 
quota decreases the sale of the least efficient domestic firm more 
proportionately (the sales of both merger participants decrease by the same 
absolute amount), and hence makes the size of the continuing partner relatively 
large enough to turn the merger profitable. But for mergers which were 
originally more than marginally profitable, the loosening of the quota may lead 
5 
to a fall in the merger gain; the best merger (TI = 2Tg(n)) for example. In this 
case the merger gain in the home market was at the maximum level before the 
change in the quota. By raising a quota, it reduces the potential merger-induced 
price increase and the potential increase in domestic sale of the continuing 
partner and these outweigh the smaller loss in profits of the departing firm. 
[QB] A National Merger in the Non-Restricting CoR Mt 
In this case we consider the merger between the most efficient foreign firm 
(finn I*) and the least efficient foreign firm (firm n *). When this merger takes 
place, we expect firm n* to exit both markets and we suppose that the quota 
Recalling that 
dp 
<0 and g(n) > 1), then 
dd(1, n) 
>0 for R (1,0. dq dq 
dG(l, n) 2h,, dp- For h, = 2h,, g(n), 
-=---<0. dq n dq 
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rights (to export to the home market) of both partners pass to the merged firm. 
Thus after the merger, the merged firm is allowed to serve the home market up 
to q(hl* + h, *, ). With this new quota constraint the profit maximisation problem 
of the merged firm is 
Max (j5m-cl*)T, *M+(P*M-cl*)fl*' st. T, *m :5 q(hl* + h*) 
h -*M *M 
n (53) 
I, fl 
where Tl*m and fl*m are the quota induced domestic sale and the foreign sale 
of the merged foreign firm. 
With the assumption of segmented markets we can treat the profit 
maximisation problems in the two markets separately. The quota only affects 
the home market and the corresponding Largrangian for the profit 
maximisation problem is given by 
+ A[q(hl* + h, *, )
- 
Tl*' ] (54) 
Taking the usual Cournot conjecture dp- 
-I and ruling out the case where 
the home market sales of the merged firm are non-positive, we have the 
following first order conditions: 
aL 
--; = = (- - c, *) - hl*' -A =0 (55a) 
*M p ah 
, 
aL 
=*+h. *) 
-0 (55b) aA q(h, 
aL 
=0 (55c) 
aA 
If the quota constraint is binding, i. e. X>0, then condition (55b) must hold 
*M 
with strict equality and we have hI=q (h. * + h, *, Then the total sales in the 
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home market by the foreign firms are unchanged from the pre-merger 
equilibrium, and so too the post-merger domestic price (i. e. j5). Writing 
A+C-H* 
- 
A+C-qH* j5m-c; 
=j5-p+p-c, * and using p= and p=- - 3. 
n+l n+l 
we can substitute the above FOCs to obtain 
-q][-+ h, *]-qh n n+l 
Thus the quota constraint is binding for quotas more restrictive than 
H*+h, *[n+ll 
H* + [hl* + h, *, ][n + 1] 
(56) 
Since the quota constrains the ability of foreign firms to respond to the 
potential merger-induced changes in the home market, the potential anti- 
competitive gain (form higher price) for the merged firm will be limited if the 
quota is so restrictive. In such case the merged firm will find it is more 
profitable to capture only the efficiency gain by utilising the combined quota 
right of the two partners. The'merger gain in this case is given by 
G(I n*) =A i-rl* 
where A; -r, *=(P-cl*)qh, *, +Ap*(2f, *+Ap*) and ; F: =(P-c, *, )qh: +(f. *)'. 
Then we have 
2* G(I*, n*) = [c. * - c, * ]qh. * + -: --ý-"R* (1* n*) N 
(57) 
The merger gain in the home market results from the transfer of the less 
efficient partner's (firm n *'s) quota allocation to the more efficient partner 
(firm I *). Thus this merger always yields positive gain from the home market. 
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The effect of a small change in the quota on the gain of a merger of this 
type where the quota constraint continues to bind is given by 
dG(I*, n*) 
dq = 
(c: 
- 
c; )h: (58) 
which is positive for all constrained mergers. This result is not surprising as the 
higher quota rate means that the merged firm can achieve a greater efficiency 
gain by switching more production from firm n* to firm I *. Thus the loosening 
of a quota will raise the potential profitability of this merger further. However 
if the quota rises above q^, the quota constraint will not be binding on the 
merged firm. Then the effects of a small change in the quota on the merger 
gain may be different from this binding case. 
If the quota constraint is not binding on the merged firm, then imports to 
the home market fall as a result of this merger and the home price increases. 
However analysing this case is complicated because the home sales of the 
continuing partner are constrained by the quota pre-merger, but not post- 
merger. 6 The merger induced price increase is not simply proportional to the 
domestic sales of the closing partner, but it is given by 
h +h2*][q-4] q[h; +h, *, I-h, *' [n+l+ AP 
=F-p=- 
-- 
I 
n+l .= 
n+l 
n+2 
(59) 
The gain from this merger is then 
20 
-c, *Ih, *' -[P-c, *]q(h, * +h, *, )+[c, *, -c, *]qh, *, +ZL-"R*(I*, n*) N 
(60) 
H* So that h. * = Ap7 + qhl* + [I 
- 
q] [- + hý* I> Ap7 + qh, *. 
n+l 
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To consider the effects of changes in the quota on the profitability of this 
merger, it is useful to write the gain in the home market as a function of q-i. e. 
GD(I*, n*) = y(q) 
I-q 2h* 
where J=; Y(l) = ým ý" [h, 
- 
h: g(n + 2)]; r(4) = [hl* - h:, ] ^ h. * >0 and 1-4 n+2 q 
B=h,, 
' h 
+[I-q^]n H* > 0. If the quota is set near to the free trade 
n+2[n +2n +11 
volume of imports (q -- 1,8;: z 0), then the gain in the home market, 
GD(I*, n*) = r(I), is what one would expect from a merger under free trade 
(see equation 34 in chapter 1) for the case where n+l firms are free to respond 
to the price increase. This term can be positive or negative in general. If the 
quota is set close to the binding level (pý 4, J; zý I), then the gain in the home 
market, dD(l*, n*)=y(4), is positive and arises largely from the transfer of 
quota to the more efficient partner as in (57) 
- 
the case where the quota 
constraint is binding. For quotas in between, the merger gain in the home 
market is a weighted average of these two extremes, minus a positive term. But 
one can show that y(4)-B ý,. 0 7, so that if y(l) ý! 0, there is a gain from this 
merger at all tighter quotas. Otherwise (i. e. y(l) < 0), the merger may only 
become profitable once the quota is sufficiently restrictive. 
The effects of a change in the quota on the profitability of this merger can 
be derived from (61). We have aG 
= 
aG a8 
and 
M<0, 
then 
aq M aq aq 
1»0 
n+2 n+2 
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(62) 
Two observations can be made concerning (62). First, 
aG 
is increasing in 8, W 
and, since Y(I) >08, we know that 
ý-G is positive for high values of J 
ag 
(i. e. 8 -2: 1 ). Hence for q:! ý 
aG 
< 0, i. e. a loosening of the quota 22 aq 
lowers the profitability of the merger. For the quota that is originally less 
aG aG 
restrictive than 
1-I, 
- 
and hence 
- 
have ambiguous signs. Second, 2W aq 
since y(4)-B>O, 'G is always positive if y(l): 50. Recalling that the 
ag 
merger gain in domestic market is the weighted average of the two extremes 
(y(l) and y(4)), minus a positive term. The larger quota increases the 
weighted average of y(l), while it reduces the weighted average of 
y(q) (which is always positive). Thus the loosening of a quota will tend to 
reduce the merger gain, except where the merger under a quota set at a near 
free trade volume was profitable (y(l) > 0), in which case the small increase in 
quota may reduce the merger gain for some range of quotas while it may 
increase the merger gain for the other range of quotas. 
[QC] An Intemational Merger that closes a finn in the Restricting Country 
h, *, {h*[n 
-2+ 2q^]+ h, *, [[n - 2][1-4]- 
1 ]) >0 
n+2 ' n+2 
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An international merger between the most efficient foreign firm (firm I*) 
and the least efficient home firm (firm n), again sees firm n exits both markets. 
The effects of this merger on prices are similar to the case [QA], but the merger 
gain in this case is given by 
G(1*, n) = Air, * 
-; F. 
")2 +(f where Air, * = Ap7-qhl* + Ap* [2f, * + Ap* )2; AP7 = 
L; 
n 
V* 
- fl, Aj 
--. 
then 
N 
2f, R(I*, n) +-R*(I*, n) (63) 
nN 
where K(I*, n) = qh, * 
- 
nh-n 
. 
The expression for the gain in the home market 
reflects the fact that the quota prevents the continuing partner from increasing 
its sale to the home market in response to the price increase. It is worth noting 
that for a given quota, the merger gain in the home market is likely to be 
profitable if the continuing partner is large and the number of home firm is 
small. This is because a large firm I* can benefit more from the merger- 
induced price increase in the home market, while a small number of home 
firms (which all but one will respond to the initial price increase) imply a small 
output expansion, and hence large price effects. 
Changing the quota will only affect the merger profitability in the home 
market 
- 
i. e. 
dG(1*, n) k(l*, n) dp- 
+ 
L" [hl* 
-n 
ýLp (64) 
dq n dq n dq 
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which is positive for mergers that were initially unprofitable in the home 
market (where k(l*, n): 50), thus a loosening of the quota increases the 
profitability of this merger. This is because higher quota reduces the domestic 
sales of the less efficient home partner and increases the domestic sales of the 
more efficient foreign partner (thus increases k(l%n)). However for some 
profitable mergers, especially where T, * (= qh, * )> 2T,, 
,a 
less restrictive quota 
will lead to a fall in the merger gain. A less restrictive quota increases R(1*, n), 
but it also reduces the price effect 
h" ) of the merger. In these cases the 
n 
smaller increase in post-merger price becomes more significant, and will 
reduce the overall merger gain in the home market. 
Given that the merged firm is prevented by the quota from expanding its 
domestic sales from the lower cost foreign source, it might contemplate 
production for domestic sale using firm n's inefficient technology. This would 
not happen however, since the profit margin on a unit of domestic production 
is less than the reduction in revenue on firm imports 
(qh, dp- 
= -qhl* ), if the merger was profitable in the first place (which requires An 
qh, * > h,, ). 
[QD] An Intemational Merger 
-that closes a 
firm in the Non-restricting 
Countly 
We would expect a merger between the most efficient domestic firm and 
the least efficient foreign firm, to see the departure of the latter from both 
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markets, and we assume that the merged firm retains the quota rights (but does 
not use them as we shall see). In this case the changes in domestic price is 
given by 
-qh, 
*, 
AP7 
=- 
n+l 
(65) 
It is worth noting that the merger-induced price change in this case is larger 
than it would have been if the foreign firm were able to respond to the price 
increase. The merger gain from this merger is given by 
GQ, n*) 
where Ajý, = Ap7(2ý1 +, Ap7) + Ap* (2f, + Ap*) and 7-r: = (j5 - c, *, )qh, *, + (fn 0)2, 
then 
_q n R(l, n*)+ R*(l, n*) 
n+l N 
(66) 
where R(l, n*)=2h, +dp'-[n+l][j5-c: ]. The effects of a small change in the pR 
quota on the profitability of this merger is given by 
dG(l, n*) h, *, jý(I, n*) + qh: ' [2! Lp +h (n + 1)! Lp dq n+l n+l dq n+l dq 
h: 
- 
qh* R(l, n*)+ -" [h,, +[n-I]H*] (67) 
n+l [n + 11' 
The above derivative is positive for k(l, n*) ýt 0. Thus a loosening of the quota 
leads to an increase in the profitability of any merger that was not initially 
unprofitable. The less restrictive quota increases the sales in the home market 
of the departing partner, and hence increases the merger-induced price effects. 
But the less restrictive quota may not increase the potential loss of profit of 
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finn n*, it depends on whether the initial quota happen to be set at the profit 
maximising value as given in (48). 
The merged firm would not wish to continue importing output from firm 
n *, because the profit from selling an additional unit from this source (P-c: ) 
It may, is less than the loss on home produced sales 
dp 
dh, *, 
however, constrained by use-it-or-lose-it provisions of the quota regime. If 
these provisions apply, then failure by the merged firm to employ its quota 
entitlement will see those rights redistributed to other foreign firms, who can 
be expected to exercise them. In such a case the merged firm might as well 
continue to import from the foreign source and accept the profits that would 
otherwise go to its foreign competitors. Any potential gain from this merger 
would arise only in the foreign market, and would not be affected by a change 
in the quota. 
2.3 Comparison of the Effects of Tariff and Quota on 
Mergers 
In this section we compare the effects of tariff on mergers (Falvey, 1998) 
with the effects of quota on mergers. We begin with the initial equilibriums 
under the tariff and the quota regimes. Because of the assumption of segmented 
markets, both the tariff and the quota affect only the equilibrium in the home 
market. Recalling that the initial domestic prices under the two regimes are 
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Tariff Quota 
Domesti n*t A+C+C*+n*t [I-q]H* A+C-qH* 
= f N+l N+l =P+ P= n+l n+l 
c Price 
Both the tariff and the quota lead to a fall in the volume of imports (in the 
home market) and hence lead to the increase in the domestic price. By relating 
the above tariff-induced and quota-induced prices, we can find a tariff and a 
quota that lead to the same domestic price. In such case we require 
n+l n 
(68) 
If the above condition is satisfied, both regimes will lead to the same total 
volume of imports. For the home firms, they may be indifferent to the regime 
employed as we can always find tariffs and quotas that satisfied equation (68). 
However the two regimes affect the sale of each foreign firm differently. The 
(specific) tariff reduces each foreign firm's export (to the home market) by the 
same absolute amount. The quota, however, reduces each foreign firm's export 
proportionate to the original (free-trade) size of firm. Using condition (68), we 
can show that when the two regimes are equivalent, the more efficient foreign 
firms export relatively more under the tariff regime and the less efficient 
foreign finns relatively less 
- 
that is 9 
9 Substituting t =[1-q][ 
N+l 
11 
H* 
into 
n+l n* 
Ci n*t 
(n + I)t h=p +-- c; 
-t = hl* we get N+l (N+1)' 
H* H* hi= h* 
-[l -q]- = qh: +[l -q][h: --]. NN 
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qh: +[I 
- 
q][h: 
- 
H* (69) 
N 
As a foreign firm i* has different domestic sales under the two regime, its' 
profits in the domestic market would also be different. We havelo 
;r =[T-c; ][I-q][h, --]-th. * iiNI (70) 
Equation (70) implies that most foreign firms, with the possible exception of 
relatively large firms", would prefer the quota regime. The other argument for 
foreign finns preferring the quota to the tariff is the rents-capture argument. 
Under the tariff, the home government captures the rents in form of tariff 
revenue. Under the quota, however, it generates rents for the exporters. 
Next we compare the potential merger gains under the two equivalent 
regimes. With the assumption of segmented markets, both the tariff and the 
quota affect only the home market. Thus we consider only the merger gains in 
the home market as the gains in the foreign market for each merger case are 
identical under the two regimes. 
(A) A National Merger in the Restricting Countjy 
The equivalent tariff and quota regimes lead to the same volume of imports to 
the home market, and hence the same domestic price. Thus the pre-merger sale 
in home market of each home firm is the same under the tariff and the quota. 
But the merger-induced price increase is higher under the quota as we have 
hh AP7-AP7= "- ">O for hn 
= 
h. initially. This is because under the quota 
nN 
10 -* - 
c, * 
- 
c; ]qh: = [j5 
- 
c; I [Ti* 
- 
qh: 
60 
regime only n-I domestic firms (as oppose to N-1 domestic and foreign firms 
under the tariff) can increase their sales in the home market in response to the 
initial price increase as a result of a closing down of firm n, the foreign firms 
are forbidden to increase their exports by the quota restriction. From [TA] the 
merger gain in the home market under the tariff is given by 
2h 
- 
2h 
. 
LR(l, n) = ýww" [h, -h. g(N)], while [QA] gives the merger gain in the home NN 
2h 
- 
2h 
under the quota as ýWwm R(l, n) = ýWýpl [h, -h,, g(n)]. The difference between the 
nn 
merger gains under the two regimes is then given by 12 
ä(1, 
n) n) 
nN 
[i7,2nN 
The potential profitability of this merger is higher under the equivalent quota 
regime as the merger-induced price increase is larger. 
(B) A National Merger in the Non-restricting Countr 
In this case, we are dealing with two foreign firms, thus the pre-merger sales in 
the home market of both participants are different under the two equivalent 
regimes from the start. While the merger induces a price increase in the home 
market under the tariff, the home price is unchanged by the merger under the 
quota, if the quota constraint continues to be binding on the merged firm. The 
merger gains in the home market under the tariff and under the quota (binding 
Equation (70) will have a positive sign if the term [h* 
H* ] is positive and big enough. N 
12 
2n *- 2n* (N + n)(N d(l, 
n)-U(I, n)= h, T,, + [ng (N) 
- 
Ng (n)] 
=-T, T. +I 
nN nN nN nN 2nN 
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case) are given respectively in [TB] and [QB] as 
2h" [Tl* 
- 
T,, *g(N)l and N 
[c. * 
- 
c, * ]qh. *. Then the difference in merger gains under the two regimes is 
given by 
13 
-* -2[T,, * I' 2h"* I [h h*]+ 
. 
[g(N)-l]>O (72) 
NnN 
Since g(N) >I and qh, *, > T,, * (as we have shown in (69) that a less efficient 
foreign firm exports relatively less under the equivalent tariff regime), then the 
above term has a positive sign. That is, where the regimes are equivalent, the 
merger gain under the quota regime is larger than the gain under the tariff 
regime if the quota constraint continues to be binding on the merged firm. 
If the quota constraint is not binding on the merged finn, then the merger 
gain in the home market under the quota regime is a weighted average of the 
gain where the quota is set near the free trade volume and the gain where the 
quota is set close to the binding level, minus a positive term. 14 Comparing this 
merger gain with the gain under the equivalent tariff regime is difficult in 
general. However we can make two observations. First, if the two equivalent 
13 Since [c, *, 
- 
c, * then 
2h* 
n*) 
- 
U(I*, n*) [c, *, 
- 
c, * ]qh, *, 
- 
[h h *g(N)l 
[T* 12 
]2_ 2h, *h,, * 
+2" g(N) qhl*h, *, 
- 
q[h *NN 
14 Specifically the gain is given by [I 
- 
J]y(l) +J- y(4) 
- 
8[1 
- 
5]B, where J= 
I-q 
1-4 
2: [h, * 
- 
h, *, g(n + 2)]; y(4) = [hl* 
- 
h, *, ]q^h, * and 
B h*' H* h' + [I 
- 
4]n 
- 
>0. 
n+2[n+2 n +1] 
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regimes are set near the free trade level (t zý 0, q sze I), this merger is more 
profitable under the quota. This is because, while the initial sales of the 
participants are almost the same, fewer firms can respond to the price increase 
under the quota. Second, once the policies become sufficiently restrictive 
(q ; ze 4 ), the merger will be more profitable under the quota as suggested by 
(72). These two observations lead us to presume that the merger will be more 
profitable under the quota. 
(C) An Intcmational Mergcr that closes a finn in the Rcstricting Country 
Using the results from [TC] and [QC] we can show that the difference between 
merger profitability under the quota and under the tariff is given by 15 
q 2h, h?, G(l n) 
-G (1*, n) = h,, [- - 
n IV N' 
(73) 
which has ambiguous sign. In this merger case the output of the closing firm is 
the same in each regime, which means that its lost profits are the same. The 
merger-induced price increase is greater under the quota (again because under 
quota fewer firms can respond to the initial price increase), but the home sales 
of the continuing firm (firm I *) are higher under the tariff regime. The overall 
comparison of profitability is therefore ambiguous. 
(D) An Intemational Merger that closes a finn in the Non-restricting 
Country 
In this case the merger-induced price increase is higher under the equivalent 
quota regime because the output of the closing inefficient foreign firm is higher 
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(as suggested by equation 69) and because all other foreign finns are not 
allowed to respond to the price increase. At the same time the profits of the 
departing firm are higher under the equivalent quota regime. Thus in general 
we cannot compare the potential merger gains under the two equivalent 
regimes. 
2.4 Conclusions 
In this chapter we examine the effects of quota and quota liberalization on 
profitability of potential mergers in open economies by extending Falvey's 
(1997) model. Setting in a simple international Cournot model with linear 
demand and constant marginal cost, we can summarise this chapter's main 
results of mergers under the quota compared with the results of mergers under 
the tariff (Falvey 1997) in the following tables. 
Case Merger gain under Comparison Merger gain under quota 
tariff 
(1, n) 2h- ýL[hj 
-h,, g(N)] 
< 2h 
, 
g(n)] ! 
-[h, -h N , n 
(1*, n*) 2hT* n h: g(N)] 
< 
< 
* ]qh: (binding) or [C,, C, n 
N (presumption) [I - 5]y(l) +8- y(q^) - J[1- (5]B (not binding) 
(1 n) 2hn [h* 
-hng(N)] 
ambiguous h" [qhl* 
- 
Jn] 
N n 
is 
2hn qh* 2h 2hn N [qhl* 
- 
nh,, ]- ýw w [h h,, g(N)I=h., ["-' 
--"' -h,, +ýww (-T- 
nNnNN 
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2h 
" [TI 
- 
T,, *g(N)l ambiguous qh* qh* Pýn [2h, + -'w w" 
- 
(n + cn*)] 
N n+l n+l 
Table 1: Comparison of the merger profitability under-the tariff and the quot 
re imes 
Case The Effects of Tariff 
Liberalisation on Merger Gain 
(dt < 0) 
The Effects of Quota 
Liberalisation on Merger Gain 
(dq > 0) 
(1, n) at the margin at the margin 
(i n*) at the margin (+) if binding 
if not binding 
(1*, n) at the margin at the margin 
(l, n*) at the margin at the margin 
Table 2: The effects of tariff and quota liberalisation on merger profitabilit 
The quota, which is allocated in proportion to the free trade sales, increases 
the sales of home firms (it raise each home firm's sales by the same amount) 
and it decreases the sales of foreign firrns (each firm by the same proportion) 
relative to free trade. Comparing with the tariff we find that the price effect of 
the merger under the equivalent quota is larger since the foreign fin-ns are not 
allowed to increase their outputs in response to the close down of a fin-n. Then 
65 
we find that merger gains for national mergers under the quota are larger than 
those under the equivalent tariff regime, but the comparison leads to 
ambiguous outcomes in international mergers. 
Unlike the tariff reduction which encourages mergers that involve the 
inefficient firm in the restricting country, the loosening of quota encourages 
almost all merger cases. The quota protects the inefficient firm in the 
restricting country and renders it as a less attractive merger partner. Thus the 
quota liberalisation which removes this distortion will encourage mergers that 
involve the closing down of the inefficient home firm. For the national merger 
in the non-restricting country, the loosening of quota will increase the potential 
merger gain (if the quota constraint is binding) because it allows the efficient 
foreign firm to export more to the home market by taking over the quota of the 
inefficient partner. However if the quota constraint is not binding the quota 
liberalisation may in some cases reduce the merger profitability of a national 
merger in the non-restricting country. For the international merger that closes 
the relatively inefficient foreign finn, the loosening of quota will increase the 
merger-induced price and hence it will increase the potential profits of the 
surviving merger partner, and this effect is likely to outweigh the higher cost of 
closing down the less efficient foreign partner. 
It is worth noting that the results and implications of Falvey (1998) and this 
model depend crucially on the assumption of market-concentrating merger. If 
the more efficient firm can transfer its superior technology to its merger target, 
the decision to close down the pre-merger high cost plant may not be optimal. 
Ryan (2002) shows that when technology transfer option is available, tariffs 
and quotas affect the merger profitability differently from our case of market- 
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concentrating merger. In this case, the merger between the low cost firm and 
the high cost firm lead to the transfer of technology from the low cost plant to 
the high cost plant and the merged firm produces from both plants. Tariffs and 
quotas in this model both make the inefficient firm in the restricting country 
become more attractive as a merger partner. This is because both trade policies 
increase the pre-merger sales of the inefficient home firm more 
proportionately, and this increases the potential gain from transferring 
technology form the low cost firm when a merger occurs 
- 
in contrast to our 
case of market-concentrating merger where trade policies protect the inefficient 
home firm by increasing the compensation the predator firm needs to pay. 
67 
CHAPTER 3 
TARIFF v QUOTA WHEN FIRMS HAVE THE OPTION OF 
DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
3.1 Introduction 
Tariffs and quotas are the main alternative methods of reducing foreign 
imports below the free trade level. The two policies are different in nature, 
while tariffs distort relative price of foreign goods and hence reduces import 
volumes; quotas directly distort import volumes to a certain level. There have 
been considerable works that focus on the question of whether the two policies 
result in equivalent economic effects. It is well understood that under perfect 
competition with a homogeneous product, any tariff has an equivalent quota 
(and vice versa) in the sense that these two equivalent regimes lead to the same 
volume of imports and the same domestic price. The only difference between 
the two is, perhaps, the distribution of the revenue from these trade distortions. 
Tariffs directly generate extra revenues to the government, while quotas 
generate extra revenues to the holder of the quota right. If the domestic 
government holds a competitive auction to sell the quota right, it would 
generates identical revenue as in the tariff case. However Bhagwati (1965) 
shows that the tariff-quota equivalence breaks down, if we introduce some 
elements of monopoly. For example, if we have a monopolist domestic 
producer, the two polices will not be equivalent. The quota regime that leads to 
the same level of imports (as the tariff regime) will induce higher domestic 
price than the tariff regime. While these two cases of perfect competition and 
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monopoly are informative, much of international trade is conducted in markets 
that lie somewhere between perfect competition and monopoly. Our main 
attention is on Cournot oligopoly case. It can be demonstrated that the tariff- 
quota equivalence is holding in case of Cournot competition (Hwang and Mai, 
1988). This is because the home firms take the output of the foreign firms as 
given whether there is a tariff or a quota. If the two policies lead to the same 
volume of imports, the home firms will react with the same output and hence 
leading to the same price. So we have tariff-quota equivalence in Cournot 
oligopoly case. 
While the introduction of imperfect competition may reflect a more 
realistic approach to the question of tariff-quota equivalence, modem day 
international trade often involves large multinational players who act 
strategically. A large foreign multinational firm may choose investing directly 
in the home market if it is more profitable than exporting, which is subjected to 
home country trade barriers. Levinsohn (1989) consider the tariff-quota 
equivalence when the competition is oligopolistic and open to direct foreign 
investment (DFI). He finds that the optimal trade policies for a domestic 
country is to set the largest tariff or the smallest quota that do not induce DFI 
production, This is because DFI production is welfare worsening for a 
domestic country in this model. However it could be argued that foreign direct 
investment can have positive welfare effects on the domestic country, and DFI- 
inducing trade policies could be optimal. Brander and Spencer (1987) show 
that when FDI increases domestic employment, the optimal tariff policy for a 
country with unemployment is a tariff that induces investment. Tariff-jumping 
foreign investment can also be beneficial to the domestic country if there exists 
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capital taxation (Dehejia and Weichenrieder, 2001) or if the profits of 
multinationals' subsidiaries are taxed by the domestic government (Svedberg, 
1979). Moreover Levinsohn's result is fairly narrow, since it focuses only on 
comparing optimally set policies, DFI-inducing trade policies might occur in 
the equilibrium anyway. If we allow strategic interaction among countries 
involved, the equilibrium outcome could be a trade policy that induces foreign 
direct investment. For example, the equilibrium outcome of investment- 
inducing VER in a custom union model is demonstrated in Flam (1994). 
Levinsohn's result and its implication also do not reflect situation in the 
real world. Most governments are welcoming foreign direct investment and it 
is happening anyway. Since the possibility of DFI production affects the ability 
of the domestic government to set tariff and quota differently, it would be more 
useful to broaden the comparison beyond the no DFI-inducing levels. In the 
main analysis in this chapter we compare the tariff and the quota regimes when 
the market of Cournot and DFI production is possible. Our results show that 
the tariff-quota equivalence is not straightforward as in Levinsohn's result. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the 
review of tariff-quota equivalence in a perfect competition, monopoly, and 
Cournot competition. In section 3.3 we examine the tariff-quota equivalence in 
Levinsohn (1989) model. We analyse the tariff and quota regimes under 
Coumot competition where the possibility of direct investment exists in 3.4.1 
and 3.4.2, and then we make the tariff-quota equivalence analysis in section 
3.4.3. Summary and concluding remarks are given in section 3.5. 
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3.2 The Equivalence of Tariffs and Quotas 
In this section we look at the equivalence of tariffs and quotas under 
different market assumptions. We demonstrate the equivalence under the 
perfect competition and the non-equivalence under the monopoly. In the last 
subsection we provide another example of tariff-quota equivalence under 
Coumot duopoly. 
3.2.1 Perfect Competition 
Price 
pp 
Quantity 
Figure I 
The equivalence of tariffs and quotas under perfect competition can be 
illustrated by Figure 1. Consider a market for good A, where schedule D 
represents a linear demand in the home market, schedule sd the domestic 
supply, schedule s* the perfectly elastic foreign supply. Under free trade, the 
equilibrium price is given by the world price PF at which the gap between 
demand and domestic supply, given by ab, is met by foreign imports. The total 
xF XT CT CF 
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domestic consumption is CF 
, 
but only XF of good A is supplied domestically. 
Next suppose that the domestic government impose a specific tariff of t on 
foreign imports, the new foreign supply curve is schedule s*'. The vertical gap 
between s* and s*1 is equal to the tariff rate. In this case the tariff-induced 
equilibrium price is given by pT (Pý: ý. pf ). Domestic consumption is now 
reduced to CT 
, 
but domestic supply is increased to XT, with the reduced foreign 
imports equal to the distant ce. 
Now suppose that a quota (q) equal to the distant ce of foreign imports is 
now imposed instead of a tariff. Assume further that the foreign firms utilise 
the quota fully, the total foreign supply is equal to the distant hb (which is 
equal to ce). Then the residual demand (i. e. the total demand minus foreign 
supply) facing domestic firms, is represented by the kinked schedule ghbi. It is 
clear from the above diagram that at the initial free trade price there is a gap 
between the residual demand and the domestic supply. In order to clear the 
market, the price of good A must rise from the initial free trade level (P) to PT 
where all the residual demands are met by domestic supplies. Under this quota 
regime, we also have the domestic consumption level of CT, the domestic 
production of XT, and the foreign imports of ce, as in the tariff regime. 
Thus under perfect competition, the tariff regime and the quota regime are 
equivalent in terms of the equilibrium domestic price and the volume of 
imports. However the two regimes may not be equivalent on the issue of 
revenue. Under the tariff regime the home government captures the tariff 
revenue, which is represented by the shaded rectangular in the above diagram. 
Under the quota regime the home government can capture all the quota rents 
(which have the same size as the tariff revenue) if it sells the quota licences at 
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auction. Thus in theory an auctioned import quota can be equivalent in its 
revenue (and also welfare effects) to that of a tariff. But if the quota licences 
are simply issued (for free) to importers, then these importers, who may be 
domestic or foreign-based firms, get all the quota rents. In this case the two 
regimes are not equivalent in their revenues, however their welfare effects 
could be the same if the importers are all domestic owned firms. 
3.2.2 Monopoly 
Price 
pT 
ýF 
D 
XQ XF XT CQ CT C, Quantity 
Figure 2 
Bhagwati (1965) shows that a natural equivalence between tariff and quota 
breaks down once monopoly elements are introduced. For example consider a 
simple case of domestic monopolist. A domestic monopolist will perceive and 
react to tariff and quota imposed on competitive foreign firms differently. 
Figure 2 illustrates this case. Schedule D is the domestic demand, and schedule 
s* is the perfectly elastic foreign supply. There is no supply schedule for a 
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domestic monopolist, but instead there is a marginal cost schedule MC. Under 
free trade the local monopolist cannot exercise any monopoly power, since at 
any local price higher than PF consumers will demand only imports. In this 
sense free trade forces the local monopolist to act in the same manner as a 
competitive market. The residual demand (total demand minus foreign supply) 
perceived by the local monopolist is the kinked schedule nbk. Since the 
marginal revenue equals price when demand is horizontal, the condition MR = 
MC is satisfied at point a. The total consumption under free trade is CF, of 
which XF are supplied by the local monopolist and the rest are imported from 
foreign firms. Under a tariff regime the foreign supply schedule will shift to s*' 
after a specific tariff of t is imposed on imports. Provided that the tariff is non- 
prohibitive, the local monopolist will again act competitively with the foreign 
firms. Under the tariff regime the residual demand becomes the kinked 
schedule mek, and the marginal cost meets the marginal revenue at point c. 
The tariff-induced price is V (PT > p) and the total consumption is CT (CT < 
CF) 
, 
but the domestic output is higher at XT (XT > XF) with the foreign imports 
equal to distant ce. 
Next we consider the quota regime that leads to the same level of imports. 
Suppose the government imposes a quota of q= ce = jb on foreign imports and 
assume further that the foreign firms utilise the quota right fully. Under the 
quota regime the residual demand schedule becomes the kinked schedule ijbk 
(resulting from the aggregate demand minus the volume of imports under the 
quota system). Then MR is the associated marginal revenue with this residual 
demand. As shown in the above diagram, the marginal revenue intersects the 
marginal cost at point f leading to a price of pQ (pQ >V> PF) 
, 
domestic output 
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of XQ (XQ < XF < XT), and total consumption of CQ (CQ < CT < CF). 1 These 
results under the quota regime differ from the results under the tariff regime 
because we no longer have zero demand for domestically produced goods for 
price higher than V. In essence the quota regime allows the local monopolist 
to exercise its dominant market power, whereas the monopolist has to act 
competitively under the tariff regime. This is because a quota system renders 
the supply of imports inelastic at the level imposed by the quota, whereas a 
tariff system allows a perfectly elastic supply of imports at a world price plus 
the tariff. 
3.2.3 Cournot Competition 
Thus far we have the equivalence of tariffs and quotas in a perfectly 
competitive environment, but the non-equivalence if monopoly elements are 
introduced. However, much of international trade is conducted in markets that 
lie between the two extreme cases. We now examine the equivalence of tariffs 
and quotas under oligopolistic market. Hwang and Mai (1988) use a 
conjectural variation approach to examine the equivalence of tariffs and quotas 
under duopoly. 2 Consider a duopoly model in a domestic country where a 
home firm and a foreign firm compete to supply a homogeneous good. The 
inverse demand is given by 
P= P(h + h*), P'< 0 
1 To attain this result we implicitly assume that the domestic firm cannot export at the world 
price. If, however, the home firm can export at the world price, its production will be at point a 
and its domestic sales will be at s. 2 Other works in this topic include Itoh and Ono (1982), which examines the tariff-quota 
equivalence under price leader oligopoly, and Krishna (1989) which considers the equivalence 
under the Bertrand competition. 
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where h (h*) is the amount of production by the domestic (foreign) firm. 
Suppose that the home government imposes a specific tariff t on imports, then 
the home firm's and the foreign firm's profit functions are 
ir = P(h + h*) -h- C(h); ; r* = P(h + h*) - h* - C* (h*) - lh* 
where C(h) and C* (h*) are the total cost for the domestic and the foreign firm 
respectively. Then the first order conditions for the home firm's profit 
maximisation problem is given by 
ý! 
=P+h[I+A]PP-Cl (1) ah 
where A= 
dh* is the conjectural variation. Similarly the first order condition A 
for the foreign finn is 
air* 
- 
P+h*[l+X]P-C* I 57h (2) 
where V=A.. For simplicity we assume that the conjectural variations are A 
fixed and the same for both firm, i. e. 'I = 'V .3 We also assume that both the 
second-order and stability conditions are satisfied so that the global uniqueness 
of the equilibrium exists. 4 Then the equilibrium solutions are obtained by 
equating the first order condition with zero, i. e. 
3 The value of the X reflects a firm's con ecture on another firm behavior. If A=0 then the j 
Cournot equilibrium is obtained. If A> 0, then the solution is more collusive than the 
Cournot outcome (we get the collusive equilibrium if A=I). If X<0, the solution is more 
competitive than the Cournot one (we obtain the quasi-competitive if A= -I). 
4 For the home firm's profit maximisation problem we assume that P'+hP":: 90 and 
C' 
-P>0. Thus the second order condition, 2P'+ hY 
- 
C' 
, 
is negative. Similar 
conditions are also imposed on the foreign firm's profit function. 
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f 
[P-Col 
OT 
=_[P-C 
* 
-tl 
[I + X]P' 
h [1 + A]PY 
are the equilibrium outputs of home and foreign firm under the tariff. 
Next suppose that the home government impose an import quota instead of 
the tariff. Consider the case that the quota permits the same amount of import 
as the tariff, i. e. h OT 
, 
and assume that the quota is always binding. Denote the 
sale of the home firm under the quota regime as T, thus the quota-induced 
price is P= P(T +h *T) 
. 
The home firm's profit is now given by 
i 
=P(ý+h *T). 
ý_ 
Then first order condition for this profit maximisation problem is 
dif 
=P+T[I+A]pr_Cp A 
(4) 
Again we can obtain the equilibrium value of quota-induced sales of the home 
firm, TQ, by solving FOC = 0. To compare the two equivalent regime we 
evaluate the first order condition (4) at T= h" 
. 
Using the result in (3) we 
obtain 
di 
= 
Ah Ty (5) dhij. 
hr 
which has the same sign as X since P'< 0. Then it follows that [TO -hTI and 
[P 
- 
P] have the same sign as X. 5 
5 Given that we have a negative second order condition, 
djý 
=0 implies that the dhlý-W 
T 
equilibrium sales of the home firm under the quota Q) has the same value as h, since the 
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If the two regimes have equal imports, then the equilibrium prices under 
the two regimes are equal for the Courtnot equilibrium (A=O). The 
equilibrium price under the quota is lower than under the tariff when the 
equilibrium solution is more collusive than the Cournot one (A > 0). And the 
equilibrium price under the quota is higher than under the tariff when the 
equilibrium solution is more competitive than the Cournot one (x< 0). For the 
Coumot equilibrium case, the home firm takes the foreign firm's output as 
given under the tariff regime and this conjecture is precisely what happens 
under the quota (as the permitted imports are set at hT). Thus the two regimes 
yield identical equilibrium outcomes. 6 If A>0, the home firm under the tariff 
acts on the perception that the foreign firm will increase output in response to a 
change in its own output. But under the quota the home firm's perception on 
the foreign firm behaviour must change. Thus the equilibrium price under the 
quota (which yields equal imports) is lower as finns behave relatively less 
collusive than they do under the tariff. The result is reversed in the case where 
the equilibrium is more competitive than the Cournot one (X< 0). 
condition for optimal solution is met. If >0, then 
T 
must rise above hT in order to dýIW-hr 
d7r T 
yield the maximum profit. If dý T. hr 
< 0, then hQ must be smaller than h 
6 On the issue of revenue comparison, it is similar to the perfect competition case. In theory the 
auctioned import quota could be equivalent in its revenue to that of the tariff. If the quota is 
awarded (for free) to importers then the revenues from the two regimes are not equal. 
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3.3 The Equivalence of Optimal Tariffs and Quotas 
Levinsohn (1989) examines the equivalence between tariffs and quotas 
when the market is imperfectly competitive and open to direct foreign 
investment (DFI). In this model a foreign firm may avoid the effects of a 
domestic country's trade policies by producing in its subsidiary plant in the 
domestic country. Levinsohn shows thdt if the optimal tariff neglecting the 
possibility of DFI is profitably jumped, then the optimal cum-DFI tariff is 
equivalent to the optimal cum-DF1 quota. Although the presence of DFI affects 
the tariff setting significantly different from its effect on the quota settingý, the 
non-equivalence of tariff and quota is ruled out by the finding that DFI is 
welfare worsening for domestic country since it undennines optimal rent 
extracting trade policies. The equivalent tariff and quota in this case are the 
largest tariff and the smallest quota that do not provoke foreign firms engage in 
DFI. 
We can demonstrate Levinsohn's result by using a simple model of 
international Cournot model with the possibility of direct foreign investment. 8 
Since the main objective of this model is to compare the effects of two trade 
policies imposed by the home government, we will focus our attention to the 
home market alone. Suppose that there are n identical domestic firms and n* 
identical foreign firms producing homogeneous goods to serve the home 
market and the entry of new firm is not possible. A home firm and a foreign 
7 The presence of DFI in this model constrains tariff setting to a certain level after which no 
revenue would be collected since the foreign firms would switch from exporting to DFI. 
However the possibility of DFI does not constrains the choice of quota since the foreign firm 
would always keep exporting even though they may engage in DFI. 
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firm have different technology reflecting by different constant marginal costs, c 
and c* respectively. A foreign firm may engage in DFI production, which 
represents an increase in output but it is not an increase in the number of firms. 
The cost of DFI production is represented by a new marginal of yc*, with 
;y>1. This higher operational cost may reflect the additional cost due to 
unfamiliar production condition or the imperfect transfer of technology. Like 
Levinsohn's model we assume that the set up cost for the DFI production and 
the transport cost for the production in the foreign country are both equal to 
zero. We then compare tariff and quota policies imposed by the domestic 
government. 9 The home government sets a trade policy to maximise national 
welfare ffl upon finns' profit maximisation. In this case the national welfare 
is the sum of consumer surplus, domestic profits, and the tariff revenue or the 
licence revenue from quotas. Assume that demand in the domestic country is 
linear and given by 
D=A-p 
where A is a positive constant. The market clearing condition requires that 
D=nh+n*h* 
where h (h*) is the output of each home (foreign) firm. 
Lets first consider free trade equilibrium. Under the free trade regime each 
home and foreign firm maximise its profit: 
8 In the original model, Levinsohn considers a case of international oligopoly (with conjectural 
variations), general demand, and constant marginal cost. 9 In this simple model we only consider tariff and quota policies. In Levinsohn's model, the 
tariff/subsidy and the quota/subsidy regimes are considered as in Dixit (1984). However 
Levinsohn demonstrates that the main results do not change when the production subsidy is set 
to zero. 
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Max (p-c)h 
and 
Max (p-c*)h* 
h h* 
By taking 
dp 
= 
dp 
= 
-1, we obtain the free trade Cournot equilibrium outputs A Th* 
by solving the above profit maximisation problems, which give 
h=p-c and h* =p-c* 
Thus the free trade equilibrium price is given by 
, 
A+nc+n*c* 
n+n*+l 
(6) 
Under the tariff regime, the home government imposes a specific tariff of t 
on foreign imports. The tariff acts as a unit cost increase for the foreign firms 
supplying the home market. Then the tariff-induced equilibrium output for 
each firm and the tariff-induced equilibrium price (j5) are 
h=ýi-c and h* =T-c* 
- 
A+nc+n*c*+n*t F n*t P= 
n+n*+l 
=p 
n+n*+l 
(7) 
If the tariff is set too high, a foreign firm may switch to the DFI production in 
order to jump the tariff. The DFI option yields a cost of yc*, while the export 
option yields a cost of c* 
- 
t. Cost minimisation and constant marginal cost 
assumption imply that a foreign firm will switch from the export option to the 
DFI option if 
> (8) 
That is a foreign firm will switch from the export option to the DFI option if 
the saving from tariff is greater than the increase in marginal cost from 
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choosing DFI production-10 In the case where all foreign firm choose the DFI 
option, the equilibrium outputs and the DFI-induced equilibrium price ( ^) are P 
given by 
h=p-c and h* =P-yc*; 
. 
A+nc+n . 7c .F n*(7 
-I)c* P= 
n+n*+l 
=p + 
n+n*+l 
(9) 
The above expression shows that once the foreign firms switch to the DFI 
option, the change in tariff no longer affects the domestic price, because none 
of the foreign firms choose the export option. 
For the domestic government, it sets a tariff to maximise domestic welfare, 
which is given by the sum of consumer surplus, aggregate domestic firms' 
profits, and tariff revenue. Let's first ignore the possibility of DFI, then the 
domestic welfare function is given by 
W=+ n[T]'+ n*i-h* (10) 
The above welfare function is concave in t, thus the no-DFI optimal tariff (to) 
can be found by solving 
dW 
=0.11 The solution t' is also the cum-DFI di 
"' This condition can also be derived independently by comparing the foreign firms' profits 
from the two options. This profits differential is given by 
yc*)L Q5 
- 
C* 
- 
t)T*. After substituting C P 
PF+h yc*, and pF +n 
(y 
- 
I)c 
we have 
n+n +1' n+n*+l ' 
n+I [t 
-(y -I)C*][L + T. ]. Then the profit from DFI option is higher 
n+ n* +1 
OT iT* > 0) if I> (Y 
- 
I)C*. 
The total derivative of domestic welfare with respect to tariff is given by 
dW dp- dp n 
-D + 2nT + n*Ti *+ n*t(dp - 1) =- [nT, + (n + t)] dt dt dt (n+n +1) 
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optimal tariff if it is no greater than (y 
- 
1)c*. If to were greater than (y - I)c*, 
it would induce all foreign firms to switch to DFI option and it would no longer 
affect the equilibrium price, P. No revenue would be raised at this tariff rate. 
Since the domestic welfare is concave in t (i. e. dW evaluated at any tariff dt 
lower than to is positive), then the cum-DFI optimal tariff in this case is the 
maximum tariff that does not induce DFI production, or t mý (y 
- 
I)c* 
- 
Next consider the quota policy, under this regime the domestic government 
imposes a quota instead of a tariff on imports. As in Levinsohn's model we 
assume that quotas are auctioned to foreign producers and the home 
government collects the entire licence revenue. Assume further that the quota 
allocation is in proportion to each foreign firm's sales in the home market 
under the free trade. Because the permitted sales by foreign firms are 
proportional to their optimal free trade sales, the quota constraint is binding. 
Lets q, 0: 5 q: ý 1, be a quota rate, then each foreign finn produces qh* to export 
to the home market. Each home firm maximises its profit by producing 
h= 
J6 - c. Then initial quota-induced equilibrium price is given by 
-=A+ nc-qn*h* F [I-q]n*h* p 
n+l 
p 
n+l 
(11) 
In the case where DFI production is possible, a foreign firm profit function 
becomes 
*R *= (P 
- 
c* 
- 
Oh* + (P 
-7c*)g* where h* :5 qh* 
The second order condition is 
d'W n*(2n'+ 4n + n* + 2) 
dt2 
=_ (n + n* +1)2 10 
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where I is the quota's licence fee and F is the DFI production. Since the quota 
constraint is binding (k = qh*), a foreign firm maximises its profit only with 
respectto 9*. The profit maximisation, then, implieS12 
a* 
ag* =0 =J5 -yc* - qh* - 
9* 
Thus the condition for a foreign firm to start DFI production Qj* > 0) is that 
(, b 
- 
yc*) 
- 
qh* >0 (13) 
The first term on the right hand side of the above inequality reflects the optimal 
output for a foreign firm were it to choose the DFI option alone. If the 
permitted amount to export is less than that shadow DFI-only optimal output, 
the quota only option is no longer optimal. A foreign firm can then improve its 
profit by producing additional output via the DFI production. 
Once the foreign finns start their DFI production in addition to the 
production in the foreign country under the quota, the equilibrium price (P), is 
given by 
P= A 
-n(P-c)-n*(g* +qh*) 
Substituting V=p- yc* 
- 
qh* into the above equation, we get the cum-DFI 
equilibrium price, 
-+ nc + n*yc* F n* (y - I)c* P= 
n+n*+l 
=p + 
n+n*+l 
(14) 
The above expression shows that a further reduction in a quota rate will not 
raise the equilibrium price from this level. This is because the foreign firms 
With negative second order condition this welfare function is concave in t. 
12 Noting that 
a'5 
= 
-1. 
a3* 
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will fully compensate a reduction in the allowed export by an increase in DFI 
production (so that the total output is equal to the shadow DFI-only optimal 
output). Next we can find the maximum price a foreign firm would be willing 
to pay for a quota licence by making a comparison with the tariff case. Since 
the quota licence fee acts in a similar way to the specific tariff, the maximum 
price for a quota licence is (y 
-I)c*, (were it greater, the DFI-only production 
would be more profitable). However the difference between the tariff and the 
quota regime is that the DFI production does not constrain the choice of the 
quota. The DFI-induced quota does not prevent the home government from 
getting quota licence revenue, although the price for a licence fee it received 
remains constant at (y 
- 
I)c*. 
The domestic welfare function under the quota is given by 
fp 
=+ n[h]'+ l(n*qh*) (15) 
where the last term of the above equation is the revenue from quota licence. 
Lets qO be the no-DFI optimal quota, this quota would also be the cum-DFI 
optimal quota if it does not induce DFI production. In this case we can use 
Hwang and Mai (1988) result to prove that the optimal tariff is equivalent to 
the optimal quota. If qO induces DFI, then the above welfare function implies 
that the optimal policy is to set a quota such that revenue [(y 
- 
I)c* ]n*qh* is 
collected but no DFI is provoked (since a positive DFI production implies a fall 
in qh *, while the licence fee remains at I= (7 
- 
I)c* and the equilibrium price is 
constant in q at J6 =pF+ n+n*+l 
). This is exactly what the cum-DFI 
tariff, tzzý (y 
-I)c*, accomplishes. That is, if the no-DFI tariff is profitably 
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jumped, then both the maximum tariff and the minimum quota that do not 
induce DFI are the cum-DFI optimal policies, and the two are equivalent. 
Ellinsen and Wameryd (1999) also derive a similar result in a political 
economy model. In this model the government chooses trade policies to 
maximize domestic firms' profit, and the optimal level of protection will be set 
just low enough to limit foreign direct investment. However in this model a 
particular form of quota, VER, is preferred to a tariff since it leaves export 
rents with a foreign firm and hence it is a more effective tool make a foreign 
firm to stay at home. The non-equivalence of tariff and VER in this sense is 
also found in Konishi et al (1999). In this model both a home firm and a 
foreign firm exert political influence on domestic trade policy by contributing 
some of their profits to the domestic government. If the domestic government 
weights dollar contributions more than domestic surplus, it prefers a VER that 
just deters FDI over a tariff that just deters FDI (again FDI in this model 
reduces domestic welfare). This is because a VER generates more 
contributions. 
The Levinsohn's tariff-quota equivalence might break down if we alter 
some of the assumptions in the model. Firstly as demonstrated in Levinsohn's 
article, increasing marginal costs may lead to the tariff-quota non-equivalence. 
With increasing marginal cost functions, DFI and foreign local production 
might coexist even if the tariff is greater than the marginal cost differential. 
Using a numerical counterexample, in a setting of a Coumot duopoly and a 
specific demand and cost functions, Levinsohn shows that the optimal 
tariff/subsidy is not equivalent to the optimal quota/subsidy. And in this 
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specific example both sets of optimal policies lead to the coexistence of DFI 
and foreign local production. 
Secondly Levinsohn's optimal policies are derived from conventional 
welfare functions, which do not address the potential benefits of direct foreign 
investment to the home country. If the welfare gains from the DFI to the home 
country (such as increased employment, transfer of technology, or tax revenue) 
are considered, then the optimal trade policies might encourage DFI activity. 
For example in Brander and Spencer (1987), foreign direct investment 
increases employment in the domestic country. In this case the optimal tariff 
for a country with a presence of unemployment leads to foreign direct 
investment. Svedberg (1979) illustrates that the optimal tariff may be the one 
that induces foreign direct investment if the profits of a subsidiary are also 
taxed. A similar conclusion is also reached in Dehejia and Weichenrieder 
(2001), which shows that tariff jumping direct investment is beneficial to the 
receiving country if mobile capital is subjected to taxation. If the optimal trade 
policies induce foreign direct investment, then tariff and quota may no longer 
be equivalent. 
Thirdly, the equivalence result can break down if we do not have identical 
foreign firms. The main analysis in the following section shows that, when we 
have heterogeneous foreign firms, a tariff that just deters DFI is not equivalent 
to a quota that just deters DFI. Thus if the optimal trade policy is the one that 
just prevents DFI, the two regimes will yield different price and imports. If the 
optimal policy is the one that yields some DFI production, the two regimes 
may yield different price, imports and welfare level. 
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Another shortcoming of Levinsohn's model is that the equivalence result is 
fairy narrow. This is because it focuses only on optimally set policies. The 
equilibrium outcome of a trade policy that induces FDI, though might not be 
the first best solution, may occur anyway as a result of strategic interaction. For 
example, Flam (1994) demonstrates that the equilibrium outcome of a trade 
policy (VER) in a customs union is the VER that allows FDI. In this model, 
which has Japan producing cars under VER agreement to supply two members 
of the EC, FDI is the result of uncoordinated policies of the two competing EC 
members. VER alone benefits the car producing EC member, and hurts the 
non-producing EC member, however FDI reverse these effects. Motta (1992) 
analyses the interactions between a home firm's entry decisions and a foreign 
firm's direct investment decision (export v FDI), and finds that tariff-jumping 
FDI can be welfare improving if no local firms would have entered the market 
under the free trade. 13 Since it is possible that the equilibrium outcomes could 
be trade policies that induce foreign direct investment, then it might be more 
useful to broaden our analysis to include the comparison of tariffs and quotas 
that induce DFI. 
3.4 Tariff v Quota when firms can invest abroad 
In this section we use a simple model to analyse the nature of tariff and 
quota policies when it is open to DFI. However we leave the question of the 
optimal trade policies open. This is because the solutions for optimal trade 
13 However, similar to Smith (1987) and Campa et al (1998), a tariff has no definite impact on 
the choice of the foreign firm between export and FDL High tariff may lead to less FDI when a 
home firm's entry decision is taken into account. 
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policies depend on how we define the welfare functions. DFI has potential 
welfare benefits to the domestic country, and these benefits (employment, 
technology transfer, or tax revenue) could outweigh the loss of tariff revenue or 
the loss of quota licence revenue. Moreover in our main analysis we consider 
the case of heterogeneous foreign firms. Unlike the above case of identical 
foreign firms, there would be a certain range of trade policies that induce some 
but not all foreign firnis to take DFI production. It would be interesting to 
closely examine this range of tariff and quota policies. 
Here we use a model of international Cournot model similar to the one in 
the previous section (3.3) but with a different assumption about foreign firms. 
In particular, we consider a case of two heterogeneous foreign firms. We 
assume that a foreign firm 1* is more efficient than a foreign firm 2*. We 
maintain all other assumptions, which include a linear demand curve 
A- p), n identical home firms, constant marginal costs, no new entry, and 
no transport cost. We can then replicate some results from the previous section. 
The equilibrium free trade price (PF) 
, 
and outputs are now given by 
F= A+nc+c*+c*. h=p F-C; h, * 
= 
PF 
-c; p 
n+3 9 
where c; is a constant marginal cost of a foreign firm i, and c; < c2* 
- 
(16) 
The domestic government has two trade policy options, a tariff or a quota. 
For a foreign finn, DFI production is possible. The DFI production represents 
an increase in output but it is not an increase in the number of finns. As in 
section 3.3 we assume that there is no set up cost for the DFI production, but 
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the marginal cost of DFI production is higher than the marginal cost of 
producing from the original plants in the foreign country. The marginal cost of 
DFI production for each foreign firm is given by yc, *, with r>I- Unlike the 
previous section (3.3), the cost of DFI production for each (foreign) finn is 
now different. The marginal cost of DFI production is lower for a more 
efficient foreign firm (since yc, * < yc*, ). 
3.4.1 Tariff 
Again suppose that the home country imposes a specific tariff of t on 
foreign imports. This specific tariff acts as a unit cost increase on goods 
produced in the foreign country. Each foreign firni has two methods of 
supplying the domestic market, the export option or the DFI option. For each 
foreign finn, the cost of the export option is c, * 
- 
t, while the cost of the DFI 
option is yc;. Similar to condition (8) in the section 3.3, cost minimisation and 
constant marginal cost imply that a foreign firm i will switch from the export 
option to the DFI option if 
> (y 
- 
I)cj* 14 
The above condition is a simple comparison of costs between the two options. 
When a foreign firm switches to the DFI option it no longer pays a tariff (t), 
but its marginal cost increases by (y 
- 
I)c;. Therefore it would be more 
profitable to switch to the DFI option if the marginal cost increase is smaller 
than the saving from not paying the tariff. We can then derive the pattern of 
14 Again this condition can also be derived independently by comparing the profits from the 
two options. 
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home market entry decisions by the two foreign firms and the equilibrium 
prices for any tariff rate. The results can be illustrated by the following 
diagram. 
p 
p PI 
p P2 
P2 
pI 
t2 tp2 tpl 
Figure 3a 
In the above diagram we show the relationship between tariff rate and 
domestic price. The kinked schedule j5 shows us the projected tariff-induced 
price if the DFI production were not possible. In such case, the equilibrium 
price is given by 
j5=p F+. 2t with 
dp- 
=2 >0 (18)15 
n+3 dt n+3 
If DF1 production were not possible, profits maximization would yield hc and 
h: C; 
- 
t. And by substituting these optimal outputs into the demand function we get 
A+ nc + q* + c; + 2t F 2t 
n+3 n+3 
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However in this case there would also be a certain range of tariff that prohibits 
foreign firm(s) from exporting to the home market, if a tariff is set very high, 
There would be a prohibitive tariff t ", which prevents firm 2* from exporting, 
and a prohibitive tariff tP', which prevents both foreign firms from exporting. 
16 
The kinks at tP2 and tp' represent the withdrawal of firni 2*'s production and 
the withdrawal of both foreign finns' production, respectively. 
If DFI production is possible, the relevant equilibrium prices are 
represented by the kinked schedule ^. To rule out trivial outcomes where DFI P 
production would never occur, we shall assume that the switchover tariffs are 
less than the prohibitive tariffs. In general we observed that the equilibrium 
prices when DFI is possible are no higher than the no-DFI equilibrium prices, 
and ^  is lower than j5 once a foreign firin start DFI production. P 
If t<?, where P (y 
- 
1)c; 
, 
then both foreign firms choose the export 
option and the equilibrium price is given by pF+ 
2t 
. 
If tj >t>t2, 
n+3 
where t' = (, Y'- I)c;, then it is more profitable for firm I* (but not firm 2*) to 
switch to the DFI option. The equilibrium price in this tariff range is given by 
16 Prohibitive tariffs imply that the optimal solution for a foreign firm's output would yield a 
non-positive outcome. Then a tariff that makes firm 2*'s optimal output equal to zero is 
t P2 = 
n+3 h*. A tariff that makes firm I* 's optimal output equal to zero, when the less 
n +1 2 
PI ýC22 -C efficient foreign firm (2*) has already produced nothing, is tn *3 hI-". And 
n+I n+I 
t Pl t p2 n+2 
11 >() n+l 
[C2 
- 
Cl 
92 
*+t ýL= 1 9)17 I 
=p 
F+ (Y 1)01 
with >0 
n+3 dt n+3 
Unlike the identical foreign firms case, a tariff that induces some DFI 
production in this model can still be used to limit foreign imports. But since 
only firm 2* is now exporting to the domestic market, the (positive) effect of a 
tariff on domestic price is smaller than the effect in the no-DFI case. More 
interestingly, an increase in tariff is now helping to increase the optimal output 
and consequently the profit of the more efficient foreign firm (firm 1*). 
If t ý,. t2 
, then both foreign finns choose the DFI option. There would be 
no import; all the goods are now produced inside the domestic country. The 
equilibrium price is now given by 
F*+C; ) 
with 
dA2 
=0 + 
1)(cl 
n+3 dt 
(20)18 
Thus in this case, a small increase in tariff has no effect on domestic price, and 
consequently on firms' optimal output and profits. 
It is also worth noting that the role of the prohibitive tariffs in the no-DFI 
case and the role of the switchover tariffs are very different. The prohibitive 
tariff prevents foreign firm(s) from exporting to the home country, and it 
requires a smaller prohibitive tariff to prevent the less efficient foreign finn. 
17 01-" With a foreign firm P chooses the DFI option, its' optimal output is ýj =P yCl 
, 
where S, 
S, is firm I*'s DFI production. While other firms' optimal outputs are as before, i. e. 
L= 
-1 10 p-C and L*=P- C2 
- 
t. The equilibrium price is then given by 2 
A+nc+ yc, * + C2 +t 
=pF + 
-I)CIO +t 
n+3 n+3 
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The switchover tariff, on the other hand, induces foreign firin(s) to abandon the 
export option in favour of the DFI option. That is a foreign finn does not stop 
supplying the domestic market (i. e. the switchover tariff simply makes a 
foreign firm to change the location of production). And it requires a smaller 
switchover tariff to induce the more efficient foreign firm to switch production 
option. 
We can now summarise foreign firms' home market entry decisions, the 
equilibrium prices, optimal outputs, and profits for any tariff rate as follows: 
[Tl] If t< t', t' = (r 
- 
I)c, *, both foreign firms choose the export option. 
a) The equilibrium price is p F+_ 2t 
, 
and ýLp =2>0. 
n+3 dt n+3 
0* 2n+2 2n+2 b) Total imports are R+ T2=h; +h2--t. and < 0. 
n+3 t n+3 
c) Total domestic outputs are 77 =A. =n[h+ 2t ], and dH = 2n > 0. 
n+3 dt n+3 
if 
= 
(p 
_ 
C)I, C* 
_ 
t)2 d) Profits are i, and 
dZ p dz 2ý! ýn > 0, ' =2ýi*[ýLP-1]<0. dt dt dt dt 
If tl ý,. t : ý, t2 
, 
t2 [T2] 
=(r-I)c2, firm I chooses DFI, but finn 2 chooses 
export. 
pl 
= PF + 
(Y. 
-. 
I)cl* +t1 
a) The domestic price is and ýL =>0. 
n+3 dt n+3 
" In this case the optimal outputs for home firms and the two foreign firms are 
il 
-C 
and The equilibrium price is then ýi =P, -Yci. 
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(n +2)t-(y 
-I)c, * 
=_n+2 , ýO. b) Total imports are 1W = h2* = h* -[] and 
±OL 
2 n+3 dt n+3 
c) Total DFI production is hl* 
-[ 
(n + 2)(y 
- 
I)c, * 
-t] and 
n+3 
dS 1 
dt n+3 
(Y 
- 
OCIO +t d) Total domestic outputs are H' = nh = n[h +3], and 
dfil n 
dt n+3 
e) Profits are c)', yc, * )', 7i *2=(^'-c* 
-t)', and P2 
A dp 
> 0,2 
Cit, 
= 
2ýl* dp > 0, d" = 2h, * [4 - l] < 0. -=2h S, dt dt dt dt dt dt 
[ If t :, T3] '. t2 
, 
both foreign firms choose DFI. 
a) The domestic price is P2 =P F+ 1)(Cl + C; 
) 
and 0. 
n+3 dt 
b) Total DFI production is ý2= ^* + ý2* = h, * + h* 
-[ n+1 0 S, 2- (Y - 1)(CI + C2)] 
n+3 
and 
dP 
= 
0. 
dt 
c) Total domestic outputs are ft' = nL =n [h + (y - 1)(c; + c; ) ), and 
n+3 
dfi2 
0. 
dt 
j= (p2 _ C)2, ýt * LTE 
=dij =0. i =( _7C* d) Profits are _h2 1)2 , and dt dt 
-2 A+ nc+yc* +*F (Y - 1)(C* + C; ) I YC2 
=p+I 
n+3 n+3 
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Before we move to the analysis of a quota policy, it is worth mentioning 
the case of positive set up cost for DFI option. Suppose that a foreign finn i* 
needs to pay a fixed cost of (Fi*, Fj* < F; *) for setting up a subsidiary plant. The 
involvement of a fixed cost implies that we can no longer find the switch over 
tariff by comparing the marginal costs of the two options. Here we need to 
compare the profits from the two options. For firm 1*, the DFI option yields 
of 7^C (pl *)2 profit 
_yCj -F, *, while the export option yields profit of 
Since a fixed cost does not affect the equilibrium outputs and 
prices we can use the above results to derive the profits differential tenn 
(* 
-i: ); 
.. 
-. 
=n+2 (21 
-711 - [t - (y - 1)cl* ] »' - 7c, *) + (P - c, * - t)] - F, * 
n+3 
The above condition implies that at the original switchover tariff t' = (r - 1)c, *, 
firm I* is no longer indifferent between the two options. This is because at this 
tariff rate the export option yields higher profit than the DFI option (as 
-F < 0). The new switchover tariff for firni I* requires that the 
original profits differential when there is no fixed cost (the first tenn on the 
right hand side of equation 21 a) is big enough to cover the fixed cost F, *. For 
firm 2*, it will compare the DFI profit of 7^r, * = (P' 
- 
yc2)' and the export profit 
of -* = (hI 
_ 
C* 
_ 
t)2 R22. The differential in profits from the two options is given 
by 
n+2 A2oAI* 
- (7 
- 
l)C21 RP 
- 
74) + (P 
- 
C2 Fý (21b) 2 -7E2 = 
n+31t 
0 
Again the original switchover tariff t' = (r 
- 
I)c2* can no longer induce firm 2* 
to switch to the DFI option. Thus the presence of the positive fixed set up costs 
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will delay foreign finns' decisions of switching to DFI, as the new switchover 
tariffs would be higher. 
p 
1 .1 tt 
Figure 3b 
The above figure shows the new schedule for DFI-induced price, P. It 
demonstrates that t' is no longer the switchover tariff for finn I*, if the DFI 
production incurs a fixed cost, F, *. Lets P be the new switchover tariff (i. e. a 
tariff that makes i, * 
-7C 1* = 0). Then for t<P, firm I* chooses the export 
2t 
option and the equilibrium price is given by j3 = p' +-. When a tariff is 
n+3 
just above the new switchover tariff, P, there is a sudden drop in the 
equilibrium price when firm I* switch its production to DFI. For t>P the 
(Y 
- 
I)CI* +t equilibrium price is now P' = pF +3. The discontinuity in the 
equilibrium prices is confirmed by the fact that P' < j5 for t=P> (y 
- 
I)c, * 
- 
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Similarly a fixed cost F, * will delay firm 2*'s decision to switch to DFI 
^2 
production until t=t >(y-I)c*. Again there is a downward jump in 2 
equilibrium prices at this tariff rate. 
3.4.2 Quot 
Now suppose that the home government imposes a quota instead of a tariff 
on imports. Like section 3.3 we assume that the quota allocation is in 
proportion to each foreign firm's sales in the home market under the free trade. 
And since the foreign firms' sales under the free trade are optimal, the quota is 
binding. Unlike the section 3.3, here we assume that there is no quota licence 
fee so that the analysis is also applicable to VER case. 
Unlike the tariff case where a foreign finn has to choose either export or 
DFI options, the quota regime allows a foreign firm to choose both options. 
This is because, under the quota regime without a licence fee, the export option 
is always the least costly method of supplying the home market. However if the 
quota is too low, a foreign firm may gain from starting additional DFI 
production. Since the quota is binding, a foreign firm choose the DFI 
production output (ý; ) to maximise profit. Thus the profit maximisation for 
eac oreign fimi is 19 
Max (J6 
- 
c; )qhi* + yc; )g, * (22) 
19 If the quota were not binding, a foreign firm would maximize its profit with respect to both 
the production in the foreign country and DFI production (ý; ). That is 
Max (P-c; )h; + (jb-yc; )ý; St. ý, *: 5qh: 
X 
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where q, 0: 5 q: 5 1, is a quota rate, h; is the optimal free trade output of foreign 
fin-n i*, and P is the quota-induced equilibrium price. By taking -LP = -1, the ds- * 
profit maximisation implies that 
aft; 
=0=, b-yc, * -qh; -3; or 3; =P-yc; -qh, * (23) 
agi 
The above condition implies that a foreign firm will start DFI production 
Qi* > 0), if 
yc, *) 
- 
qhi >0 (24) 
The term (, b-7c; ) reflects the optimal output for a foreign firm were it to 
choose the DFI option alone. If the permitted amount to export is less than that 
shadow DFI-only optimal output, the quota only option is no longer optimal. A 
foreign firm can then improve its profit by producing additional output via the 
DFI production. 
If (P 
- 
yc; ) 
- 
qhj* :! ý 0, then the additional DFI production would not benefit 
foreign firms. In such case each foreign firm only supplies qh, * to the domestic 
market, while the optimal output each domestic firm is the usual h=P-c. 
Thus the no-DFI quota-induced equilibrium price is 
P= 
A+ nc-q(h, *+h; ) 
=PF + 
(I 
- 
q)(h, * + h2* 
n+l n+l 
(25) 
The above expression clearly shows that a quota raises the equilibrium price 
from the free trade level, and the smaller quota rate the higher equilibrium 
price. However a foreign firm may not stick to the production in the foreign 
99 
country alone. For firm 1 *, it will start DFI production (Y, * > 0) if 
(P-yc, *)-qh, * >0. Lets q' be the quota rate that triggers firm 1* to start 
engaging in the DFI production. Since at q=q, we have s, * = 0, then we can 
use (23) and (25) to derive 
ql 
(n + 1)(y 1)c, ' 
(n + 2)hl* + h2 
(26) 
Thus for a quota rate that is more restrictive than q' (i. e. for q< q), firm I* 
starts engaging in the DFI production in addition to its original production in 
the foreign country. We can then check whether finn 2* would start DFI 
production at this quota rate by substituting q= q' into condition (23). We then 
find that at q=q1 
P-yc*2- q'h* - 
(y 
-1) [c, *(hl* + (n + 2)h2*) - 2- (n + 2)hl* + h2* 
C*2((n + 2)hl* + h2*)] <0 
Thus at q= q' 
. 
where firm I* start the DFI production, it is not optimal for 
finn 2* to engage in the additional DFI production. 
Now lets q' be the quota rate that triggers finn 2* to start engaging in the 
DFI production. Then a quota rate in a range of q' >q> q' induces only firm 
1* to produce additional DFI output. The optimal outputs for firm I* are 
Tj* 
= qh, * and 3, * = P' - Xj - qh, * 
. 
It is worth noting that the total output of firm 
(ýj*+3, *=P'-7c, ) is equivalent to the DFI-only optimal output. Each S, 
domestic firm produces the usual ý= P' 
-c and firm 2* only produces from its 
foreign production of h-2* = qh, *. Then the equilibrium price in this case is 
given by 
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(I 
- 
q)h2 A+nc+yc, *+qh2 + (y - l)Cl p2=pF +-  (27) 
n+2 n+2 
The above expression implies that for q' >q> q', a DFI-inducing quota still 
affects the equilibrium Price. Similar to the above method of finding the 
expression for q', we can substitute the expression for Pl (27) into condition 
(23), and find that 
2 (y [(n + 2)c*2-c, *] (28) (n + 3)h2* 
Since h* >h * and c* <C * we can also confirm that q' >q2 as 121 2) 
qi 
-q 2 
(r-I){[(n+2)h, * +h; ][(n+2)c; 
-cl*]-[(n+3)h; ][(n+1)c1*11 >o [(n + 3)h2* ][(n + 2)hl* + h; ] 
That is, as the quota rate is lowered the more efficient foreign firm will engage 
in the DFI option before the less efficient foreign firm. 
For q< q', both foreign finns engage in the additional DFI production and 
the optimal outputs are 
p2 p2 p2 
_C; _XI -qhl*, T2 = qh2 s- X2-qh* qh* ;22 12 
Then the equilibrium price is given by 
P2= A+ nc +yc; +7c; 
= 
PF + 
(y 
- 
1)(Cl* + C; ) (29) 
n+3 n+3 
This price is identical to the equilibrium price where the two firms totally 
switch to the DFI production (and no exports) 
. 
20 Thus the change in the quota 
rate no longer affects the price. 
20 But in this case the profits to the foreign firms must be higher since they still supply some 
outputs from the lower cost plants in the foreign country via the quotas. 
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p 
q. 0 
P2 
pI 
Figure 4 
In the above diagrams we show the relationship between the rate of quota 
(shown as 1- q) and the equilibrium domestic price. The schedule P"'d'7 shows 
the case where DFI production is not possible. The equilibrium domestic price 
steadily increases as the quota rate becomes more restrictive until the quota rate 
is set at zero. The kinked schedule P shows what happen to the equilibrium 
price when DFI production is possible. Like the tariff case, the quota-induced 
equilibrium prices when DFI production is possible are no higher than the no- 
DFI equilibrium prices, and P< P"f' once there is some DFI production. At 
the quota rate q= q' 
, 
there is a kink in schedule jb, as finn 1* starts additional 
DFI production. A quota can no longer control the total output of firni P, but it 
is still an effective policy to control the total output of finn 2*. Thus for 
q' >q>q 2, a reduction in q still increases the equilibrium price. For quota 
I-ql I-q 2 q=O l-q 
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rates that are less than q', both foreign firms will find it is optimal engage in 
additional DFI production. And in this range, a quota no longer affects the 
equilibrium price, since the total outputs of each foreign firm remain constant. 
However a quota still decides how much a foreign firm will produce the DFI 
output. 
We can summarise equilibrium outcomes for each range of the quota rate 
by the following results. 
[Q1] If q> q1, q1 (n + Wy - lX* 
, 
both foreign firms choose export-only. (n + 2)hj* + h2' 
a) The domestic price is pF+ (I - q)(hl* + 
h2 
and < 0. 
n+l dq n+l 
dM 
* +h; 0. b) Total imports are q(h, * + h*) and = h,2 dq 
c) Total domestic outputs are H= nh +n (1 - q)(hl* + h2*) and 
n+1 
dfl n(h, * + h2* <0 
dq n+l 
d) Profits are 1? = (p - c)', i; = (p 
- 
c; )qh; and 
L 7c p 
=2h2L < 0, dq dq 
di 
' 
dq = --ý': -(nh* - h*) > 0, n+l dq 
(iih2* 
- 
hl* 
n+I 
[Q2] If q' >q> q', q' 1)[(n + 2)c2* -c, *] 
, 
firm 1* chooses export and (n + 3)h2* 
DFI but finn 2* chooses export-only. 
a) The domestic price is p+Q- q)h2* 
+ (y 
- 
I)c, * 
and ('P =- 
h2 
<0. 
n+2 dq n+2 
b) Total imports are q(h, * + h2*) and 
dM I 
=hl* +h* > 0. dq 2 
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;, 
-. 
[(I-q)[(n+2)h, *+h; ]]-[(n+l)(y-l)lcl* 
c) Total DFI production is S=s, = 
n+2 
and 
dS (n+2)h, +h2 < 0. 
dq n+2 
n[(I 
- 
q)h; + (y 
- 
1)c, * d) Total domestic outputs are nh +-n2 
+2 
1 
and 
dfl' nh; 
=-2<0 
dq n+2 
e) Profits are i= (jb' 
- 
c)2,11* = (y 
- 
1)c*qh, * + yc, *)', i, * c2*, )qh2* 
di dp' di; 
and -2h 0 )c; h, * + 2(p'-yc, *) 
dV I 
=(Y-l qq dq d T- dq 
*[(n +I)h; +(y 
-1)c, *] dii*2 
= 
h2 
> 0. 
dq n+2 
[Q3] If q<q, both foreign firms choose export and DFI production. 
a) The domestic price is =P+(r-1)(c, + c'). and 
dp 2 
=0. 
n+3 dq 
b) Total imports are q(hý* + h2*) and dM = hl* + h2* > 0. dq 
c) Total DFI production is ý2= S-* + F* = (I 
- 
q)(hl* + h2*) 
- 
n+1 (7 
- 
1)(Cl* + C; ) 12 n+3 
and 
dS 
= 
-(hl* + h2*) < 0. dq 
d) Total domestic outputs are ft2 = nh+ n 
(y 
- 
1)(c, + C2) 
and 
dft2 
= 
0. 
n+3 dq 
e) Profits are iE = (p2 _ C)2, it; = (y 
- 
I)c, *qh; + (p2-yc*, )2 and 
di 
= 
2(i)2 
- 
c) 
dp2 
= 
0, ýýI 
= 
(y 
- 
1)c, *h, * > 0. dq dq dq 
104 
The presence of the set-up costs also affects the above equilibrium 
outcomes in the same way as in the tariff case. If there is a positive set up cost 
(Fl* > 0), we need to compare a foreign firm's profit from the export and DFI 
option with a profit from the export-only option. For firm 1*, the profit from 
taking the additional DFI production together with the allowed export is now 
given by ii c, *)qh, * + yc, *)ý, * 
- 
F. If fin-n 1* chooses the export- I s, 
only option, its profit is simply ff *= (P 
- 
c, *)qh, *. We can show that if foreign 
finn I* starts engaging in additional DFI production at q= q' (i. e. s, * ;: ts 0 and 
P1 sze P), the profit from producing in two countries is now lower than the 
profit from exporting alone. Although the presence of the set up cost does not 
affect the optimal solution for the DFI production, the new switchover quota 
rates are now more restrictive than the original switchover quota rates (qland 
q 2). 2 1 That is the presence of a set up cost delays a foreign firm's decision on 
engaging in additional production in the home country. There would also be a 
downward jump in equilibrium prices once a foreign firm starts the additional 
DFI production. This is because a foreign firm, in this case, no longer starts 
producing DFI output from zero. 
3.4.3 Tariff-quota equivalence when DFI production is possible 
First consider the case where the DFJ production is not possible and a tariff 
te is not prohibitive to both foreign firms (i. e. 
, 
tP2) 
. 
Hwang and Mai (1988) 
prove that in the case of Cournot competition we can find a tariff and quota 
21 In this case a foreign firm switches ftom export-only option to export and DFI option. 
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that lead to the same volume of imports and consequently the same increase in 
the domestic price. Using the expressions for the no-DFI tariff-induced 
equilibrium price, T (from equation 18) and the expression for the no-DFI 
quota-induced equilibrium price, j5 (from 25), we can find the condition for the 
equivalent tariff and quota regimes as 
( n+3) I (1-q) 2n+2 (hl* + 
h2* (30) 
(It is worth noting that if tP2 <t< tP1, only the foreign firm 1* exports to the 
home market. The condition for the equivalent regimes will be 
[(I 
- 
q)(n + 2)(hl* + h2*)]-h2*). The sales of an individual foreign firm under 
n+I 
the equivalent tariff and quota regimes arc different. By substituting (30) into 
the expressions for optimal solutions under the tariff and the quota, we obtain 
hi* 
= qhi* + (I 
- 
q)[h; 
-2 (31) 
which implies that firm 1* (the more efficient firm) exports relatively more 
under the equivalent tariff regime, and firm 2* (the less efficient firm) 
relatively less. The optimal outputs and profits of a home firm are the same 
under the two regimes that are equivalent in price. If the DFI option becomes 
available to the foreign firms, the condition(s) for equivalent tariff and quota 
regimes will become more complicated. And at some point we find that there is 
no tariff and quota that lead to the same amount of imports and the same 
domestic price. 
Price Equivalence 
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Lets first focus our attention to the tariff and quota regimes that lead to the 
same domestic price. Recall that under the tariff regime, firm I* switches from 
the export option to the DFI option at the tariff rate P, while finn 2* switches 
to the DFI (hence both foreign firms choose the DFI option) at t2 
. 
Under the 
quota regime, firm 1* starts the DFI production together with the production in 
its original plant in a foreign country at the quota rate q', while finn 2* does 
the same when the quota equals to q'. We can summarise the domestic prices 
and their corresponding tariff and quota rates at these points in the following 
table. 
Table 1: Corresponding tariffs and quotas at certain prices 
Price Corresponding Tariff Corresponding Quota 
P=Y, 
tql (n + 3)(hl* + h; ) Ry 
- 
I)cl* 
* * 
ql 
(11 + 1)(Y 
- 
I)C' 
2[(n+2)h, h ] +2 (n + 2)hl* + h* 2 
tl P tI (y 
(l (11 + 1)(Y I)cl* q (n + 3)h2* 
P=P (2 P 92 t2 (y 
- 
DC2 
2 
=I- 
(y 
- 
1)[(n + 2)c*2 -c, *] q (n + 3)h2* 
0 (y 
- 
I)c, [h, * + h2 
-tj 2(y - I)c, * where p+; p =P+ [(n + 2) hl* + h2* ] n+3 
t2 
-q2 -1)(Cl +C2) 22 
=p =P+- 
n+3 
22 The corresponding tariff rate at P ql is obtained by equating 
ql (y 
- 
I)c, * [ h, *+ h; I 
=P+ 2 with the tariff-induced price that does not induce DFI, [(n + 2)hl* + h; 2 
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By comparing j5ql Tt2 pq2 and we can establish that 
p q1 <T tl < Tt2 (= pq2 ) or equivalently tql <t'<t' and q'>q">q 
2.23 In the 
following diagram we plot the tariff-induced equilibrium price and the shadow 
quota-induced equilibrium price against the tariff. 
p 
p q2 
=p q2 
^ tl p 
p ql 
tql tIt2= tq2 
Figure 5 
T=P+ 
2t 
; while the corresponding quota rate at p= j5t' is obtained by equating 
n+3 
TP+ 2(; v - I)c, * with the expression for quota-induced price when firm P also 
n+3 
engages in the DFI option, i. e. PI =P+ 
(I 
- 
q)h; + (y 
- 
I)c, * 
n+2 
23Since Tt, 
_ýqj = 
[(n + 1)(, v I)c, * I [hl* h; I>0, 
then T11 >P qI 
. 
For tq' and t', we [n + 3] [(n + 2)hj* + h2* ] 
can show that 2[(n + 2)h* + h2*] > (n + 3)(hl* + h2 2 hence D, 
(n + 3)(hl* + h; ) 2 tql 
'cý tI. 4.1 - 
I)C, 
or 
2[(n+2)hl +h*] 7 
(Y 
2
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The schedule 13 shows the tariff-induced equilibrium price when DFI 
production is not possible (here we ignore the prohibitive tariffs). When DFI 
production is possible the kinked schedule acde represents the tariff-induced 
price, and the kinked schedule abde represents the shadow quota-induced 
price. The above diagram shows that under the quota regime firm P starts DFI 
production in additional to export production at the quota rate equivalent to I q, 
(hence the kink of the shadow quota-induced price schedule at point b). Under 
the tariff regime, firm 1* starts switching from the export option to the DFI- 
only option at a tariff rate t' (the kink at point c of the tariff-induced price 
schedule). Once the tariff and the corresponding quota rates are more 
restrictive than t2 = tq2 . both foreign firms engage in DFI production under 
both regimes. Then the conditions for price equivalent tariff and quota regimes 
are as follows: 
[1] For t< t" or q> q', which implies p< -I' 
, 
both foreign firms under P 
both regimes supply the home market by exporting only (this can be 
represented by section A in figure 5). The condition for equivalent tariff and 
quota regime is the one that we established in (30): t= (I 
- 
q) n+3 )(hl* + h2* ).
The equivalent regimes in this range would lead to the same price and the same 
volume of imports. 
[2] For t" <t< t' or q' >q> q", which implies T" <p< 15", firm P 
under the quota regime produces both the outputs from its original plant in a 
foreign country (using a quota) and from the subsidiary plant (DFI production). 
However the corresponding equivalent tariff rates at this quota range are lower 
than the switchover tariff t', both foreign firms under the tariff regime choose 
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the export option (as shown by section bc of the tariff-induced price schedule). 
The condition for equivalent regimes can be obtained by equating the no-DFI 
tariff-induced equilibrium price, j5 (from equation 18) with the quota-induced 
price when finn 1* produces both DFI and export outputs (27), which gives 
n+3 [(1 
-q)h2* +(7 -1)cl* ý(n 
+ 2) 
(32) 
At the same level of price, the total outputs produced by the foreign finns 
under the two regimes must be the same. Thus the total imports under the quota 
regime are smaller than those under the price-equivalent tariff regime since 
firm I* under the quota also produces DFI outputs from its subsidiary plant. 
[3] For tI <t< t2 or q" >q> q', which implies j5,1 <P< j512 (= P92), firm 
P engages in the DFI production under both regimes. Using (19) and (27) we 
obtain the condition for price equivalent regimes for this case as 
[(n + 3)(1 
- 
q)h2* + (y 
- 
I)c, * 
n+2 
(33) 
In this case the DFI outputs produced by firm 1* are larger under the price 
%* A10 
equivalent tariff regime (since under the tariff we have 91 =p-X, 
. 
while 
under the quota we have s, * = P1 -yc, * - qh, *, and h' = P' for equivalent 
regimes). Therefore there are more total imports under the price equivalent 
quota regime (so that the total outputs produced by foreign firms are the same). 
2 [4] For t> t' or q<q, which implies p both foreign firms 
under both regimes engage in the DFI option. Thus any tariff and quota rates 
are equivalent in price. However the two regimes are different in terms of the 
composition of the total outputs by the foreign firms. There is no import under 
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the tariffs, but there are some imports under the quotas unless q=O. 
Conversely the DFI production is larger under the tariff regime. 
Imports Equivalence 
M 
tql tIt2= tq2 tq. o 
Figure 6 
In the above figure we show the level of total imports (M) under tile tariff 
regime, and the shadow level of total imports under the quota regime. Under 
the quota regime, the quota constraint is always binding, i. e. a foreign finn 
always exports to the home country. Thus the volume of imports (q(h, * + h2*)) 
declines steadily as the quota rate becomes smaller. This can be represented by 
schedule af which shows a steady decline of the total imports as a quota, which 
is represented in the diagram by the corresponding equivalent tariff, becomes 
more restrictive. There would be no imports if the quota rate were sct to zero. 
III 
Under the tariff regime, a foreign firm may not always choose the export 
option. The total imports under the tariff regime can be represented by the 
discontinued schedule ab-cd-ef in the above diagram. For t<t, we would 
observe a steady decline in imports as a tariff rate become higher (section ab). 
Then there would be a sudden drop in imports at t= ti, after which we would 
see a further steady decline in imports until t= t' (section cd), and there 
would be no import if t> t2 (section ef). 
Thus for t<P, the condition for the imports equivalent regimes is 
q)(, n +3 )(hl* + h2*) 
n+2 
(34) 24 
This is the same as the usual equivalence condition (30). Noting that for 
Iql <t< tI 
, 
the domestic price under the imports equivalent quota regime will 
be lower than the price under the tariff regime. This is because, under the quota 
regime, firm I* is now starting to produce DFI outputs in additional to the 
usual export outputs. 
For t' <t< t', the condition for the imports equivalent regimes becomes 
t=n+3[(l-q)h*, 
-qh, *]+ 
1 (y-I)cl* 
n+2 n+2 
(35)25 
For t> t', there is no import under the tariff regime, and we need q=0 under 
the quota regime to reach the same result. It is worth noting for a given tariff 
24 This condition is obtained by equating the volume of imports under the tariff, 
, 
U=hl* +h; 
- 
2n+2 
t, with the volume of imports under the quota, q(h, * + h2* 
n+3 
25 Similarly we equating the volume of imports under the 
.I. (n+2)t-(y-I)c, " tariff, M= h2 
+3 
with the volume of imports under the 
quota, q (h, * + h; ). 
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we can find an imports equivalent quota, but for some quotas it is not possible 
to find the corresponding tariff rate that lead to the same volume of imports. 
Tariff v Quota: The effects on DFI production 
S 
gh 
t 
Figure 7 
We show how the tariffs and the quotas affect DFI production (S) in tile above 
diagram. The discontinued schedule ac-de-gh represents the total DFI outputs 
under the tariff regime and the kinked schedule bni represents the total DFI 
outputs under the quota regime (again we convert the quota rates into the 
corresponding (no-DFI) equivalent tariff rate). Under the tariff regime, there is 
no DFI production if tariffs are less than t' (represented by section ac in figure 
7). Once the more efficient foreign firm switches to the DFI option (P <t< t2 ), 
DFI outputs take a big jump and then increase steadily as the tariff increase 
(section de). However once both foreign firms switch to the DFI option 
t ql tIt2= tq2 tqoo 
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(t> t2), tariffs no longer affect the DFI production (section gh). Under the 
quota regime, when the more efficient foreign firm produces both export and 
DFI outputs (for ý>q> q' or equivalently t, I <t< t2 ), DFI production 
increases from zero and rises steadily as the quota rates become more 
restrictive (section bf). For the quota rates that are more restrictive than q', or 
equivalently t ,. tq2 = t', both foreign fin'ns produce both export and DFI 
outputs. Unlike the tariffs, the quotas in this range still affect DFI production 
(section fli). The above diagarn also shows that, with the exception of the 
quotas in the range q' >q>q2 or equivalently tqI , ct t .: C t2, the total DFI 
production is larger under the tariff regime. 
Tariff v Quota: Foreign firms' profits 
Tariff/ Quota Profits under the tariff Profits under the quota 
tql /q> q' =(T-C, -01 c, *)qh; 
djfi* 0 < (lit * >=<o > 0, 
L" 2 
dt dq dq 
tql <t< t1l As above i 1* (y - I)c, *qh, * + (j)' - yc, *)' 
tl q >q>q 7C 2 *)qh, *(P 2 C2 
(al 
>=< 0, 
d2 
>0 
dq (Iq 
I <t<t2l t (p, *)2, 7cl '2 = Ol 
_ 
C2 
_ 
t) 2 As above 
2 q >q>q di 1* >0, 
dý2 
<0 2 
dt dt 
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22 
=(p2 
_7C*)2 t>t / q<q i 
±e: 
-i = dt 
i 1* = (y - I)c; qh, * + (P2 - yc; )' 
di 1* 
dq 
Table 2: Foreign firms' profits under tariff and quota regimes 
In table 2 we summarise the equilibrium results of foreign firms' profits 
under the tariff and the quota regimes and the effects of a small change in trade 
policies on these profits. Since we assume that there is no quota licence fee, the 
total profits to both foreign firms under the quotas are higher than those under 
the price-equivalent tariffs. However the results of the effects of a small change 
in a tariff/ a quota rate on foreign firms' profits are more interesting. Normally 
a rise in a tariff will hurt foreign finns' profits, but an increase in a tariff can 
increase the profit of a foreign firin if it has already switched to the DFI option, 
while the other foreign firm chooses the export option. If both foreign finns 
switch to the DFI option, their profits are no longer affected by a tariff. 
The effects of a decrease in a quota rate on foreign firms' profits are more 
complicated. In the case where both foreign firms export (under the quota), a 
reduction in a quota harms the more efficient firm's profit, but its effect on the 
less efficient firm's profit is ambiguous as 
di h; (? ih2* 
- 
hj*). A reduction dq n+I 
in a quota can increase the profit of the less efficient firm, if, for example, there 
is only one home firm. This can be explained by the fact that a smaller quota 
may shift firm 2*'s output to the collusive optimal. But once firm I*'s produce 
both export and DFI outputs, a smaller quota rate will definitely reduce firm 
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2*'s profit. This could be the result of a smaller price effect of a quota. Once 
firm I* engages in both export and DFI production, its optimal total outputs are 
the same as the optimal output of DFI-only production. Thus the profit to firm 
1* (fr, * =(y-1)c, *qh, *+(, b'-yc, *)') is equal to the profit were it to choose DFI- 
only production plus the cost saving from the export production. A reduction in 
a quota rate in this range, q' >q> q', increases the DFI-only profit but reduces 
the cost saving, thus its net effect on firm 1*'s total profit is ambiguous. In the 
case where both foreign firms engage in both export and DFI production, a 
reduction in a quota will reduces both firms' profits by reducing the cost saving 
benefits (since in this range, a quota no longer affects the equilibrium price and 
consequently 
3.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter we have investigated the equivalence of tariff and quota 
when foreign firms have the option of direct investment abroad. A simple 
partial equilibrium Cournot model was used to analyse this issue. We examined 
the decisions of two asymmetric foreign firms who can choose the export 
option, which is subjected to a tariff or a quota, and the direct investment 
option, which leads to the production in the home market at the higher 
marginal cost. We illustrated how the home market entry decisions of the two 
foreign finns affect the equilibrium outcomes. With the assumptions of lincar 
demand and constant marginal cost we were able to compare the two regimes 
explicitly. 
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If the tariff rises above certain levels, it will induce a foreign finn to switch 
from the export option to the DFI option. Under the quota regime, a certain 
restrictive quota will also induce a foreign firm to engage in the DFI option, 
however a foreign firm will not give up production from its original plant as 
long as the quota rate is more than zero. With the assumption that the new 
marginal cost for the DFI option depends on the technologies of the firm, the 
more efficient foreign firm will start producing DFI outputs before the less 
efficient fin-n as the trade policies become more restrictive. 
We can find the price equivalent quota for any tariff and vice versa. 
However the relevant formula for the price equivalent regimes will depend on 
the size of the tariff or quota. When the trade policies are not too restrictive 
(such that DFI production is not provoked), the equivalent tariff and quota I 
regimes are equivalent both in price and in imports volume. But once one or 
both policies start provoking DFI production, we may find tariffs and quotas 
that lead to the same equilibrium price but different volume of imports. 
The quota rate that starts provoking the more efficient foreign firm to 
produce the DFI outputs is less restrictive than the switchover tariff that 
induces DFI production. But once a tariff induces the more efficient foreign 
firm to switch to DFI production, the DFI outputs are generally larger under the 
tariff (as a foreign firm will abandon the entire production in its original plant). 
And once both policies induce both foreign finns to produce DFI outputs, both 
policies no longer affect the equilibrium price. However the two price- 
equivalent trade policies have different effects on the sizes of DFI production 
and imports. 
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For the import equivalence, we cannot always find the equivalent regimes. 
For any given tariff rate we can find the import equivalent quota, however for 
some quota we cannot find the import equivalent tariff. This is because the 
foreign firms always supply the home market via the export option under the 
quota, while the imports level under the tariff will drop down once a foreign 
firin switches to the DFI option and it will drop to zero once both foreign firms 
choose the DFI option. 
Unlike the Levinsohn (1989) model which concludes that the tariff and the 
quota are equivalent as the two would be set optimally at the same level (the 
most restrictive level which does not induce foreign firms to choose the DFI 
option), we broaden the comparison to include the case of DFI-inducing trade 
policies. The existence of multinational firms lead us to believe that it would be 
more useful to compare these two trade regimes across the whole range. The 
evidence from this model suggests that the two regimes are not always 
equivalent. 
Moreover the Levinsohn's equivalence of optimal tariff and quota policies 
does not hold anyway in our model of heterogeneous foreign firms. If the no- 
DFI optimal tariff is profitably jumped, the cum-DFI optimal trade policies can 
be found by comparing the (conventional) welfare levels of a) a policy that 
induces no DFI, b) an optimal policy that induces the more efficient forcign 
firm to engage in DFI and c) (if b is not possible) a policy that just deters the 
less efficient foreign firm from engaging in DFI. Our results show that tariffs 
and quotas are not equivalent (in price, imports and domestic welfare) in these 
three cases. 
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There are several interesting policy implications arising from the above 
analysis. Firstly the possibility of DFI production can limit the ability of tariffs 
and quotas to control foreign firms' outputs and equilibrium price, and it will 
affect the two policies differently. The range of quotas that have maximum 
effect on the domestic price is shorter than the range of the equivalent tariffs. A 
quota is a more effective tool in controlling foreign imports, but at some range 
foreign firms can produce addition DFI outputs, such that a quota has little or 
no effects on domestic price. Secondly, if there is a large positive welfare 
benefit to the domestic country from DFI production (for example, larger DFI 
production leads to larger employment in the home country), then the home 
goverriment may prefer a DFI-inducing tariff policy to a DFI-inducing quota 
policy. This is because in general tariffs can induce larger DFI production than 
the corresponding price-equivalent quotas (because foreign finns always use 
the quotas fully). However there is an exception when the quotas induce the 
more efficient foreign firm to start DFI production but the corresponding price- 
equivalent ariffs are not high enough to induce the more efficient foreign firm 
to switch to the DFI-only option. Thirdly, if the welfare benefits of DFI is 
largely in a fonn of a one-off spillover of superior technology and it does not 
depend on the size of the DFI outputs, then the quota needed to induce the 
more efficient foreign firm to invest in the domestic country is less restrictive 
than the DFI-inducing tariff. 
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CHAPTER 4 
OPTIMAL TARIFF AND THE FOREIGN FIRMS'CHOICE 
OF MARKET ENTRY 
4.1 Introduction 
During the last few decades when there has been spectacular growth of 
international trade flows, we also have witnessed the equally dramatic growth 
of foreign direct investment (FDI) activities. UNCTAD (1994) data reveal that 
a 26-fold increase in the total value of world exports during 1961-1990 was 
matched by a 25-times increase in the total value of world stock of FDI. The 
. 
implications of FDI and multinational firms on international trade cannot be 
ignored. The world economy is increasingly dominated by big multinational 
firms. One of these firms' obvious strategic decisions is whether to serve their 
target markets by exporting or taking up production in the protected markets 
via foreign direct investment (FDI). A multinational firm's decision will have 
important implications on trade flows, technology transfer, and of course the 
welfare of countries concerned. 
There exists a considerable literature which try to answer the question of 
why a firm chooses to become a multinational rather than an exporting firm. 
One of the most popular approaches to answer the above question is the OLI 
frame work developed by Dunning (1977 and 1981). 1 The OLI stands for 
ownership, location and internalisation advantages. This framework suggests 
that FDI will arise when three conditions are satisfied. The ownership 
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advantages (such as superior technology) allow firms to overcome the 
disadvantage of a foreign location. The location advantages (such as high trade 
barriers and large market size) make it more profitable to serve overseas 
market by local production rather than exporting. The internalisation 
advantages allow firms to exploit their ownership advantages internally rather 
than to deal with foreign partners via licensing or joint venture. 
Since the introduction of the OLI framework there have been plenty of 
alternative theoretical approaches. Significant alternative approaches include 
models of MNEs and trade in general equilibriurn2, the internalisation aspect of 
MNEs3 and the game theoretic approach of MNES. 4 The advantage of the game 
theoretic approach is that it shows the strategic role of FDL Smith (1987) uses 
a simple sequential game in a partial equilibrium framework to analyse the 
strategic interaction between a (potential) multinational foreign firm and a 
(potential) firm in the home country. The foreign firm (which can always make 
positive profits as an exporter) decides between the export option, which is 
subjected to a specific tariff and a transport cost, and the foreign investment 
option (i. e. becomes a MNE), which incurs a positive set up cost but goods are 
produced at the same marginal cost. The potential home firm decides between 
entering the market, which incurs the same set up cost as the MNE and an 
additional fixed cost (but it can produce goods at the same marginal cost as the 
'Similar themes are also found in Buckley and Casson (1976) and Rugman(1981). 
2 For examples Helpman (1984) and Helpman and Krugman (1985) consider the case of 
vertically integrated MNEs in general equilibriurn. While Markusen and Venables (1995) 
model horizontally integrated MNEs and the issue of transport costs. 3 For examples Horstmann and Markusen (1987) analyses the option of direct investment 
versus licensing and Horstmann and Markusen (1996) compare direct investment with 
contractual relations (contract initially with local agent and possibly invest later). 
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foreign firm), and not entering the home market. There are four possible 
outcomes: a foreign exporter as a monopolist, an exporter as a duopolist, a 
multinational as a monopolist and a multinational as a duopolist. Depending on 
the values of various parameters (among other things - the set up cost, the firrn 
specific fixed cost and the transport cost) and who is the first mover, the tariff 
policy by the home government may alter a foreign firm's investment decision 
(but there is no simple relation), or it may change the balance of power in 
favour of the home firm (i. e. higher tariff reduces a foreign firm's profits), or in 
some case it may have the indirect effect of reducing competition (i. e. it 
induces a foreign firm to invest but by doing so, it deter the entry of a home 
firm). 
Motta (1992) is the extension of Smith's (1987) model. Set in a sequential 
game between a foreign firm and a home firm, Motta's model also emphasises 
the size of the domestic market and the information cost incurred by a foreign 
firm when it sets up a plant in the domestic country. Like Smith's result, 
Motta's model also shows that the tariff (and also the market size) has no 
definite impact on the choice of the foreign firm between exports and FDI. This 
is because the tariff not only increases the cost of exporting, but it may also 
change the nature of competition. When the nature of competition changes a 
foreign firm may find it is more profitable to switch back to export even though 
the tariff has increased). In addition Motta also finds that the tariff-jumping 
FDI could be welfare improving if no home firm would have entered the 
market under the free trade. 
Apart ftom Smith (1987) and Motta (1992) which we discussed, other works using this 
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Although Smith (1987), Motta (1992) and similar work by Campa et al 
(1998) introduce a more subtle approach to the understanding of multinational 
foreign firms than a traditional analysis, we notice that these models ignore the 
active role of the welfare maximising government of the domestic country. The 
work in this chapter is aimed to explore this missing link by analysing the 
interaction between the potential multinational foreign firm and the welfare 
maximising government of the home country. This is done by using a simple 
sequential game to find out how the optimal tariff set by the government of the 
domestic country affects the foreign firm's direct investment decision and vice 
versa. Furthermore we investigate how the relative efficiency of the foreign 
firm affects the equilibrium outcome of the game. 
This chapter is organised in the following way. In section 4.2 we introduce 
a model of international oligopoly where a foreign firm and domestic firms 
competing to supply the domestic market in the Cournot fashion, while the 
domestic govenunent uses a tariff policy to maximise the domestic welfare. 
Then we consider two sequential games, first where the foreign firni decides 
the home market entry mode before the home government setting the tariff and 
the second case, where the domestic government moves first. In section 4.3 we 
extend the game by having two asymmetric foreign firms. Finally concluding 
remarks are given in section 4.4. 
approach are Horstmann and Markusen (1987a), Dei (1990) and Campa et al (1998). 
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4.2 The Model 
We consider a model of international Cournot oligopoly with n home firms 
and I foreign firm producing a homogeneous commodity to be sold in the 
home market, which has a linear demand given by D=A-p, where A is a 
positive constant. New entry is not allowed but we will investigate the 
implications of the number of the home firms (n) on the results of the model. 
Each firm has different technology given by different constant marginal cost. 
The foreign firm's (firm I*) marginal cost is c, *, the domestic firms' (firm I to 
n) marginal costs are q, 
..., 
c.. Furthermore we make a special assumption 
I pt 
that the average of the home firm marginal costs (ZF=-Zc, ) is constant. 
n j., , 
Although this assumption is not essential to the model, it will simplify the 
interpretation of some of the results greatly. We also assume that all fin-ns 
produce positive outputs under free trade. The government of the home country 
imposes a specific tariff of t per unit on imports. The foreign firni has two 
options for supplying the home market: the export option which is subjected to 
the tariff or the direct foreign investment (DFI) option which involves moving 
production to the home country and operating at a higher marginal cost 
(reflecting the additional cost due to unfamiliar production condition) of yc, * 
where r >1.5 To simplify the analysis we shall assume that the cost of setting 
up a subsidiary plant is negligible and equal to zero. 
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4.2.1 A foreign fin-n as a first mover 
In this sub-section we consider the case where the foreign firm makes a 
decision of (home) market entry option before the home government chooses a 
tariff. The sequence of action in this case is (1) the foreign firm chooses 
(irreversible decision) between export and DFI, (2) the domestic government 
decides the tariff level, and (3) foreign and domestic firrns decide the level of 
output. The following diagram shows a simple representation of this sequential 
game: 
A* 
D Export 
/\ 
Fl 
Govt set t= to 
+ve output output +ve output No output 0 
EP EN IP IN 
Fig. 1: A foreign firm moves first 
I-A 
It is worth noting that all the home firms still produce positive outputs in all 
four equilibriums since the tariff and the DFI option increase the price in the 
5 The 'direct investment' in this context is the setting up of a subsidiary in the protected 
market; it is one of the components of FDI activities. FDI include other activities such as 
acquiring a substantial control of firm(s) in the protected market. 
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home market from the free trade level but they do not increase the production 
costs of the home firms. Then this sequential game has four possible outcomes. 
(EP) is the case where the foreign firm chooses the export option, the domestic 
government sets the optimal tariff, and the foreign firm produces positive 
output. (EN) is the case where the foreign firrn chooses the export option, the 
domestic government sets the optimal tariff, and the foreign firm produces no 
output. (IP) is where the foreign firm chooses the DFI option, the domestic 
govenunent sets the tariff (which is virtually ineffective), and the foreign finn 
produces positive output. And (IN) is the case where the foreign firm chooses 
the DFI option, the domestic government sets the tariff (which is virtually 
ineffective), and the foreign finn produces no output. 
We solve this game theoretical problem by working backward. In the final 
stage, if the foreign firm chooses the export option, each unit of imports is 
subjected to a tariff of t. Then the foreign firtn's, profit function is 
7r, (p 
- 
c, * 
- 
t)h, *, where h is the sale in the home market. Taking 
I dhI* 
= 
-1 (the Cournot conjecture), the foreign finn's optimal output in this 
case is h*=p-c, *-t. The profit function for each domestic firm is 
; r, =(p-c, )h,, which gives the optimal output of h, =p-c,. Then tile 
equilibrium domestic price is 
A+C+cl* 
n+2 (1) 
where C=7nc In this final stage the foreign firin decides the levcl of Z-di=l i* 
output for exporting to the home market. If the foreign firm produces positive 
output in the final stage, then its payoff is ; r, * (t) = (p 
- 
c, * 
- 
1)2, where t is the 
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chosen tariff. However the foreign firm will not produce any output to export 
to the home country if the tariff set by the home country happens to be a 
prohibitive tariff, in such case the foreign firm's payoff will be zero. By 
examining its profit function, we find that the foreign firm will be better off by 
not producing if the price it gets from a unit sale is less than the per unit cost of 
producing and exporting to the home market, or p-c, * -t<0. By substituting 
the expression for the tariff induced price in (1) into the inequality, we obtain 
the prohibitive tariff rate (tp) which discourages the foreign firm from 
producing positive output as 
p A+C . 
--Cl 
n+l 
(2) 
Equation (2) implies that the size of the home market and the efficiencies of the 
home firms have a positive effect, while the number of the home firm and the 
efficiency of the foreign firm have a negative effect on the value of the 
prohibitive tariff. 6 The larger the market size the higher the price, and the 
higher margin for the foreign firm at a given tariff level, thus the higher level 
of tariff is needed to discourage the foreign firm from exporting to the home 
market. The higher costs of domestic firms also help to increase the price and 
thus have the same effect on t' as the market size. On the other hand the 
increase in the number of home firms leads to price reduction as there is more 
6 dt' 
=I >0; 
dt' 
=1 >0; 
dt' 
= 
-1 <0. For the effect of the change in n on dA n+I dc, n+1 dc, * 
tp we held C constant and write C= nF where F is the average of home firms' marginal 
costs, then we have 
dt P= (n + I)F 
- 
(A 
- 
nF) (A 
- 
F) 
<O, as A-F>0. dn (n +1)2 (n +1)2 
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competition, and hence helps to lower the prohibitive tariff level. The higher 
marginal cost of the foreign firm contributes to the increase in price, but it 
contributes more to the increase in the foreign firm's cost of production, thus 
leads to lower prohibitive tariff level. 
Next consider the case where the foreign firm chooses the DFI option. If 
the foreign firm wants to pre-empt the tariff by choosing the DFI option, its 
marginal cost becomes ycl* (where y>1). Then the foreign firm's profit 
function in the equilibrium is ; -r *)h, *. The optimal output for the I X, 
foreign firm from its subsidiary plant in the home country is h, * = J5 - yc, 
*, while 
the optimal output for each domestic firm is h, = j5 - c,. Then the equilibrium 
domestic price when the foreign firm chooses the DFI option is 
-A+C+, vcl* 
n+2 
And the payoff for the foreign finn if it produces positive output is 
1 
(*)2 
After choosing the DFI option, the foreign firm may produce nothing if 
P- rc; < 0, i. e. per unit cost of producing at the subsidiary plant is highcr than 
the equilibrium price. By substituting the expression for - from (3) into the P 
inequality, we can find the lowest value of v at which the foreign firni stops 
producing output from its subsidiary plant aS7 
7 Atc Fn+ll p From c, We have h >0 if 7 <y where =--Ln+2fc' 
n+2 
p A+C 
(n + I)c* 
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A+C 
(n + 1)c, * 
Thus for r> rp, it is no longer profitable for the foreign firm to produce from 
its subsidiary plant in the home country. Again an increase in the home market 
size and an increase in a home marginal cost raise the prohibitive level of the 
efficiency factor r, while the increase in the marginal cost of the foreign finn 
and the increase in the number of home firms lower the value of yp. 
8 
In the second stage of the game, the home govemment chooses the level of 
tariff. 9 The domestic government sets the tariff level optimally so that total 
domestic welfare is maximised. The total domestic welfare is the sum of 
consumer9s surplus, total domestic firm profits, and tariff revenue, that is 
n 
+ Ehi + th, * 
i-I 
(5) 
D) 2 
where = 
ý-ý is the consumer's surplus. Then the total derivative of 
22 
domestic welfare with respect to the tariff is given by 
dW 
= 
_DLP + 2h, 
dp 
+hl* +t( dp 
_l) dt dt dt dt 
8Api >0; 
2r p1 
>o- 
dy p A+C 
<0; 
*(n+1) dc, 1 dA c, cl* (n + 
äc-, 
* 
=--ýn-+1)(c, 
*)2 
(6a) 
drP 
=- 
(A-F) 
<0 A q* (n + 1)2 
9 Note that the tariff set by the domestic government is actually effective only if the foreign 
firm chooses the export option. But the optimal tariff level is needed to impose in either case, 
otherwise the action of the government would not be credible. 
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dp I Since a tariff raises the domestic price (- =-> 0), it unambiguously dt n+2 
reduces the consumer surplus component (-D dp < 0). For the domestic firms, dt 
n dp 
a tariff increases their profits 2hi 
-> 0) because the price is higher and dt 
each home firm produces more output in response to the initial increase in 
price. For the revenue component, there are two opposing effects of the tariff. 
Higher tariff increases the revenue for a given level of imports, but it reduces 
the volume of imports (h, * > 0, but t(. ýP- 
- 
1) < 0), i. e. the effect of tariff on dt 
revenue has ambiguous sign. Thus the total effect of an increase in tariff on 
domestic welfare has ambiguous ign. 
In equilibrium the market is cleared, the total consumption equals to the 
total sales by both domestic and foreign firm, i. e. D=H+h, *, where H hi 
is the total sales by domestic firms. Then we can rewrite (6a) as 
dW 
T=(2H+t-H-hl*)dp+(h, *-t)= 
H 
+(h*-t) (6b) t dt n+2 (n+2) 
Before we continue with the derivation of the optimal tariff, it is worth 
spending time looking at the three components of welfare more closely. Firstly, 
since the revenue function 
R 
=th* =t 
A+C n+l 
. 
n+l t (7) =t(p-c, *-t) 
---Cl - 
[n+2 
n+2 n+2 
130 
is continuous and concave in t (as the second order condition is negativelo), we 
can find the unique revenue maximising tariff by equating the first order 
condition to zero, which yields" 
R= A+C cl* tp 
2(n + 1) 22 
(8) 
The above result shows that the revenue maximising tariff is a half of the 
prohibitive tariff. Secondly, for the consumer's surplus and the home firms' 
profits components we find that there is no tariff that maximises these two 
components since we have a positive second order condition. 12 The derivative 
of ( CS + I-I) with respect to t is given by 
d(CS + rl) 
=-Ddp+2H±P-= 
1 [H-hl*] (9) 
dt dt dt n+2 
The sign of 
d(CS + rl) depends on the sales of the home and foreign firms. We dt 
can evaluate this derivative at t=0 for different values of n and find that 
d (CS + rl) 
>0 if there is at least one home firm and the total sales under dt 
It-0 
the free trade are larger than the (free trade) sales of the foreign finn. 13 Thus 
10 The second order condition is given by 
dR 
=_2[n +I] <0. dt n+2 
The first order condition is 
dR 
= 
A+C 
- 
n+l 
Cl 
_ 
2(n +1] t dt n+2 n+2 n+2 
cs + I-I 
D+ (hi)' 
, 
then we have 2 
d'(CS + rl) d dp 2n+1 
dt 2=nP -[dp -1 12 >0. 
[ 
dt dt 
]] 
dt [n+2 
13 If there is no home firm (n = 0), any positive tariff yields less welfare benefits for these 
two components (CS is decreased as the price rises and there is no domestic profits). If there is 
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the positive tariff will increase the net welfare benefits of consumer's surplus 
and total home firms' profits if the home country has a domestic industry that 
is big enough 
- 
so that the potential gain from the increase in profits outweighs 
the potential loss in consumer's surplus. 
For the optimal tariff that maximises the total home welfare, we obtain by 
equating the first order condition (6b) to zero. 14 That is 
hl* 
-t+H 
n+I 
Next we substitute hl* =p- c* -tH= np - C; p= 
A+C+c'+t 
. I n+2' into 
the 
above equation to obtain 
to = 
(2n+l) 
_ 
A+ (n-1) 
_ 
C- (n 2 +n+l) . 
(2n 2 +4n+3) (2n 2 +4n+3) (2n 2 +4n+3)-' 
to = 
(2n + 1) 
_[A -c . 3+ n(n - 
1) 
-[F - cj- (10) (2n' + 4n + 3) 1 (2n' + 4n + 3) 
The above expression for t' shows a formula for the tariff that maximisc 
domestic welfare, as a function of a market size (A), number of home firms (n), 
technology of home and foreign firms (C and *). It is worth noting that tile C, 
lower the foreign firm's marginal cost the higher the marginal tariff, i. e. the 
home government will tax the foreign firm more if it is more efficient. 
one home firm (n we have 
d(CS + I-1) I=C, * 
- 
C, > 0, it is negative (positive) if the dt 11-0 n+2 < 
foreign firm is more (less) efficient than the home firm. If we have at least two home 
d(CS + rl) I firms (n ý: 2), 
dt I t=O 
also has ambiguous sign 
- 
it is positive if 11 > h, * at t 0. 
14 This is because we have negative SOC, 
d'W 
=- 
2n 2 +4n+3 
< 0. dt2 (n + 2)2 
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The effect of the change in the number of home firms on the level of 
optimal tariff is given by 15 
dto (2n' + 2n 
- 
1) [2(A 
- 
J) + (c* 
- dn (2n 2+ 4n + 3)2 1 
The above derivative has ambiguous sign. An increase in the number of home 
firms might lower the level of optimal tariff (dt' /A< 0) if c, * ý: F or the 
magnitude of (c, * 
- 
F) is small. In these cases the revenue component is 
relatively small, an increase in a number of home firms will consequently 
reduce a domestic price, and then the optimal policy for the home government 
would be to increase the consumer's surplus part by lowering the tariff. 
However if c, * <U and the difference in technology between the two countries 
is large enough (such that 3E-c, * >2A), an increase number of home firms 
raises the level of optimal tariff. In this case the revenue part will be relatively 
large, and the welfare will be improved by raising the tariff in order to counter 
the loss in revenue as a result of a price decrease. 
It is interesting to compare this welfare maximising tariff with tile revenue 
maximising tariff. We find that 
t 0- tR [2n 
2 
+2n-II[A-E]-[2n 2 +3n+l][E-c*] 
2[n + 1] [2n 2 +4n+31 
dto [2n'+4n+31[2A+(2n-I)E-(2n+l)cl*]-[(2n+I)A+(? j'-ti)ZF (112 +? I+I)c, *][4? i+; 
A [2n' + 4? z + 3]' 
(4n'+4n-2)A+(2n 2+ 2n 
- 
I)c, * 
- 
(6n 2+ 3n 
- 
3)ZF 
(2n 2+ 4n + 3)2 
1 
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We find that if there is no home firm, tR ý,. tO . 
16 In this case there is no home 
firm's profit and the loss in consumer's surplus is minimised at t=0 (but there 
is no revenue here), thus the optimal tariff that takes into account of both 
revenue and consumer's surplus lies between zero and tR 
. 
For the cases where 
there is at least one home firm, the sign of 
(tR 
_tO) is ambiguous in general. 
17 
If the foreign firm is not more efficient than the average home firm, then the 
welfare maximising tariff is higher than the revenue maximising tariff. This is 
because the revenue component is relatively small (as the foreign firm is 
relatively small), while the home firms' profits component is relatively large. 
Thus at t" the home welfare can be improved by raising the tariff until t =to 
to increase the net gain from the CS + 1-1 component 18 which is larger than the 
welfare loss from the tariff revenue (as the tariff departs from the revenue 
maximising level). If the foreign firm is more efficient than the average home 
firm, then the sign of (12) is ambiguous but a small difference in technologies 
between the average home finn and the foreign firm and a large market size are 
likely to make tR< to . 
We have established that any tariff that is above the prohibitive tariff 
induces a foreign firm to produce nothing at the final stage. We can now 
compare the level of the optimal tariff and the prohibitive tariff and show that 
16 tR A-c *0A- C* 0R [A-c, *] For n =0,2 1 and t=31 thus t-t =-- 6< 
" Since A-U>0 (since A>p- otherwise there is no demand and p>c, as all home 
firms produce positive outputs), then the sing of (12) depends on the sign and the magnitude of 
C; 
-U. 
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tp 
-t 0= 
[n+21[A-ZFI+[n' +4n 2 +5n+21[ZF-c, *] (13) [n+l][2n 2 +4n+3] 
The above equation implies that if the foreign firm's technology is not inferior 
to the average home firm's (c, * :5 F), then the optimal tariff is not prohibitive 
(tP 
-to > 0). In such case the outcome of the foreign firm producing no output 
(EN) in the final stage (after the export option has been chosen and the optimal 
tariff has been set) is not possible. 
If the foreign firm is less efficient than the average home firm (c, * > F), 
(13) has ambiguous sign and could be negative. Although the larger foreign 
firm's marginal cost reduces the optimal tariff level, it lowers the prohibitive 
tariff level more. We might end up in a case that the foreign firm is too 
inefficient, a trade cost (although set optimally) will prevent it from supplying 
the home market. If the foreign firm does not have the DFI option, the home 
government needs to make a welfare comparison between the case where it 
allows the foreign finn to produce positive output by setting the tariff just 
below t" and the case where it prevents the foreign firm from supplying the 
home market (by setting the tariff above tp). It is possible that getting rid of 
the inefficient foreign firm may improve welfare. This is because a small 
foreign firm contributes relatively small tariff revenue and the entering of a 
relatively inefficient foreign firm does not lower the domestic price much. In 
such case it might be better for the home country to exclude the foreign firrn so 
is We have showed that 
d (CS + rl) 
>0 if the total sales of home industry are larger than the dt 
foreign firm's sales. 
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that the price is raised and the increases in profits are distributed exclusively 
among the domestic firms. 19 
Next we examine the first stage where the foreign firm makes a decision 
on the mode of home market entry. Anticipating that the home government will 
set a tariff at the optimal level ( I'), the foreign firm prefers the export option to 
the DFI option if the export option leads to higher profits. The profit from the 
export option is given by 7rl* = (h; )2 
- 
(case EP), or zero (EN), while the profit 
from the DFI option is given by ; -r, * =(h, *)' 
- 
(IP), or zero (IN). Then the 
difference in profits from the two options if the foreign firm produces positive 
output in both options is given by 
(hl* 
- 
hl*)(hl* + hl*) 
which is positive if (h, 
- 
h, )>0. And the difference in quantities sold from 
the two options can be expressed as 20 
h1*41* 
= 
n+1 [(y-I)c; 
- 
to] 
n +2 
From the above equation we can determine the switchovcr tariff: 
(r 
- 
DCIO (14) 
If the tariff rate is higher than il, the foreign firni is bcttcr off by choosing the 
DFI option as it yields larger prorit. It is also worth noting that in the case 
19 Lahiri and Ono (1988) show that under Coumot oligopoly, national wclrare increase if a firm 
with a sufficient low share is removed from the market. 20 
00 
hl* 
- 
hl* 
=p-c, * 
- 
to 
- 
(- )vl*) =-y- 1)cl -1- li+I 
- 
1)c 
-to 
n+2 
I)cl* 
- 
to = 
n+2 
ky 1 
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where efficiency factor of the DFI option is prohibitive i. e. y= yp, the 
switchover tariff equals the prohibitive tari ff 21 
Next we investigate the necessary conditions for each outcome to be the 
Nash-equilibrium, which are given in the following table. 
Equilibrium Solutions Conditions 
EP (i) to < I' < t" and y<y", or 
(ii) to < t" and y> y" 
IP (i) I' < to < t* and y< y", or 
(ii) to > tp and y< y' 
EN and IN to >tp and y>yp 
EP and IP to < tp, y< ypand to =t' 
Table 1: Conditions for Nash-cquilibrium solutions 
Let first consider tile case where tile foreign finn is not less cfficicilt than the 
average home firm (c, * In this case the optimal tariff is less than the 
prohibitive tariff (to <t"), thus we can rule out the cases whcrc the forcign 
firin produce no output in the final stage (cascs EN and IN). Thcn citlicr the 
case where optimal tariff is lower than the switcli-ovcr tariff (to <t) or the 
case where DFI option is prohibitivc (y > y"), will lead to the Ell case as the 
21 tI=[ 
(n + I)cl" 
- 
11c; 
=t 
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Nash-equilibrium. In this case the foreign firm chooses the export option when 
it anticipates that the optimal tariff will be set at a rate lower than the switch- 
over tariff, or in a trivial case where the alternative DFI option is prohibitive 
from the start. However if the foreign firm anticipates that the optimal tariff is 
higher than the switch-over tariff (I' > I') and the DFI option is not prohibitive 
(, v < y"), then the case IP is the Nash-equilibrium outcome. In this case the 
foreign firm does not choose to produce at its most efficient plant because the 
anticipated cost of export is so high and it can get larger profit by producing in 
the home market. In the case where to = t' (provided that y<y P), both EP 
and IP are the Nash-equilibria, i. e. the foreign finn, is indifferent between the 
wo options. 
If the foreign firm is less efficient than the average home firrn (c, * > ZF), we 
cannot rule out the cases where the foreign finn produces no output in the final 
stage. In this case the optimal tariff set by tile home government can be 
prohibitive and if it is anticipated to be prohibitive tile foreign rimi can pre- 
empt the home government by choosing the DFI option and produce positive 
output as long as y< yp, then IP is the Nash-cquilibriurn. If both the optinial 
tariff is cxpectcd to bc prohibitivc and the DFI option is prohibitivc, thcn the 
foreign finn is indifferent between EN and IN 
- 
it produces no output and gets 
zero payoff in either case. If the difference in the foreign firni's technology and 
that of the average home finn is not large, the optimal tariff may be lower than 
the prohibitive tariff. Then the Nash-cquilibrium outcome depends oil the rate 
of the optimal tariff relative to tile switch-ovcr tariff (provided that y< y", we 
get Ell if to <t; Ill if to >t'; Ell and IP if to =t'). 
138 
4.2.2 A home govemment as a first mover 
In this sub-section we consider the case where the home government 
moves before the foreign firm. The domestic government sets the tariff level in 
the first stage, and then the foreign finn will decide between export and DFI 
options, and then choose the level of output accordingly. In this case the home 
government makes a decision based on the anticipation that the foreign firm 
will respond optimally to its tariff. Let us first consider the case where the 
foreign firm is not less efficient than the average home firm (so that I' < t" 
and v <, vp). By using the results from the previous sub-scction we can easily 
work out the solutions for this game. 
If to < t', the home govemment can maximize the home welfare by setting 
the tariff at to. The foreign firm will then choose export option and produce at 
hl* (to). If to > t, the optimal tariff, to, is too high for the foreign firm. to 
choose the export option. The domestic government needs to make a welfare 
comparison between the case where a foreign firm chooses the export option 
and the case where a foreign finn choose the DFI option. Note that if the 
foreign finn chooses the DFI option there is only one equilibrium price, and 
hence there is only one welfare level. It is clearer if we consider the marginal 
case where a tariff is set at t= 11(i. e. the foreign firm is indiff6rcrit betwccii the 
two options). The domestic welfare is 
IV 
=+ hi + thl* 2 
when the export option is chosen, and it is 
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= 
(A -+ (16) 
2 i1 
when the DFI option is chosen. Since at t=t, we have p= j5 and h, = ýj. 
Then it is obvious that the domestic welfare under the export option is greater 
than the welfare under DFI option as a result of the extra component of tariff 
revenue. Thus at t= t' the domestic government prefers the foreign firm to 
choose the export option. Next we can check that the welfare at t= t' is higher 
than the welfare at any other lower tariff rates. Since the welfare function 
(when the foreign firm chooses the export option) is concave in t (as the second 
order condition is negative 
- 
see footnote 14), dW Idt evaluated at any tariff 
lower than t' is positive. Then the welfare at t' is higher than any other 
welfare at t< t'. The domestic government needs to set the tariffjust below t' 
to make sure that the DFI option is not chosen. Thus there would be no direct 
foreign investment if the domestic government moves first. 
Given our definition of the total welfare this result is not surprising, since 
the home government can only extract a foreign firm's profit under the export 
option. Unless there is other welfare benefits from DFI (perhaps a transfer of 
technology, a capital tax revenue from investment, or a tax revenue from 
profits of the multinational firm based in the home country), the home 
government will not try to induce direct foreign investment. It is also worth 
considering the case where the optimal tariff is prohibitive (t' > t') and the 
home government finds that it is welfare-improving to get rid of the inefficient 
foreign firm. However we would find that the home government cannot 
effectively use the prohibitive tariff to prevent the foreign firm from supplying 
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the home market as the foreign firm has the alternative DFI option. In this case 
the next best thing for the home government is also setting the tariff just below 
tl as in the above case. 
4.3 Extension of the Model 
In this section we extend the basic model to include a second foreign firm. 
With two foreign firms, the interaction of the game includes the independent 
(home market entry) decisions of the two foreign firms as well as the optimal 
tariff setting of the domestic government. We assume that firm 1* is more 
efficient than firm 2* i. e. c; < c2*. Also assume that the marginal costs of the 
two foreign firms are not bigger than the average marginal cost of the home 
firm, so that the optimal tariff is not prohibitive for the two foreign firms. 
Consider the case where the two foreign firms move first. In this case the two 
foreign firms must first choose between the export option and the DFI option, 
and then the domestic government will choose the optimal tariff level 
accordingly, and then the two foreign firms set their production level in the 
final stage. 
Again we are analysing this problem by working backward. Given that we 
rule out the cases where the two foreign firms produce zero output in the final 
stage, the following table show the payoffs for the two foreign finns: 
Firm 2* 
Firm Pi Export I DFI 
Export Tc, *', ir; ' or ir, ', ; iTF2*' or 121 
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(PA * 
_tA)2 _Cj _tA)2, (PA _C2 (PB 
0 *)2 
_C I _tB)2, 
(PB 
_X2 
DFI -*C *C Irl 
,r2 
or 
-*D -OD ; rl 
, 
; r2 or 
(PC *)2, (PC X1 C2 
_tC)2 
*)2, (PD 0)2 (PD 
_ 
XI X2 
Table 2: Foreign firms' payoffs from home market entry ecisions 
There are four scenarios, A- (export, export), B- (export, DFI), C- (DFI, 
export), and D- (DFI, DFI). The equilibrium domestic prices for the four 
sccnarios in the final stagc arc 
pA= 
A+C+c, * +c; +2tA 
=pF+ 
2tA 
(17a) 
n+3 n+3 
p B=A+C+cl*+7v; +tB =PF + 
t2 +t B (17b) 
n+3 n+3 
pC= 
A+C+ycl*+c; +tc 
=PF + 
ti + tc (17c) 
n+3 n+3 
A+C+ r(c, * + c, *) pF+ 
tl + t2 (17d) 
n+3 n+3 
Where p' 
- 
A+C+cl* +C, * is the free trade price, tj =(r-I)cl* is the lowest 
n+3 
tariff that will induce finn 1* to switch to the DFI option, and t2 =(r-')C2 
is 
the lowest tariff that will induce finn 2* to switch to the DFI option. We note 
21)> that t2 - tl = (#V - WC2 - Cl 
In the second stage the home government sets a tariff to maximise the 
home welfare. We show the full derivations of the optimal tariff for each 
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scenario in appendix Al. In the following table we show the home welfare and 
the relevant optimal tariff for each scenario : 
Case Home Welfare Optimal Tariff 
A 
WA= (A-p A)2 + A)2 +tMA (h t A= (n + 3)[2H 
F+ (n + 1)( 
j 2 4[(n + 1)(n + 3) 
- 
(2n + 1)] (E, E) 
B 
_PB)2 (A OB 2 8 " 
; F]+ (3 (n + 3)[H F+ (n + 2)h *F 
- 
h2 
n+ 4)t 12 B ) W 
. 
+E(h +th i t = 2 i-I 2(n + 2)(n + 3) - (2n + 1) (E, l) 
C C)2 
c (A-p 2 hc h *c 
FF *F]+ 
2 
-hj (3 (n + 3)[H + (n + 2)h; n+ 4)tI c w ) ( +t 2 = t 2 2(n + 2)(n + 3) 
- 
(2n + 1) (I, E) 
D 
WD (A-p D)2 n )2 No optimal tariff 
2 
J 
F *F ;F Where M=h, * + h2 
,H and h, +h are the total sales under free trade of the home 
firms and those of the two foreign firms, ti (r - I)c, * and t2 (r -1)C2 
Table 3: Home welfare and the optimal tariffs 
The home government sets the relevant optimal tariff by taking into account 
the home market entry decisions of the two foreign firms. For scenario D (DFI, 
DFI) where both foreign finus pre-empt the home government by choosing the 
DFI option, the tariff is virtually ineffective. By comparing the three optimal 
tariffs we can show that tB > tc. " The comparisons between IA and the other 
two tariffs are more complicated but it is reasonable to presume that 
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A<t, 
< t, 
. 
23 The possible reasons behind this result are that there are more 
imports and the effect of a small change in tariff on the domestic price is 
greater in scenario A. Thus a smaller tariff is needed to capture the net welfare 
gains optimally. 
Given that the home government will set the tariff optimally for each 
potential scenario, each foreign firm will make its market entry decision in the 
first stage by taking into account of these optimal tariffs. To find the dominant 
strategy for each firm, we need to compare the payoffs. Referring to the payoff 
matrix presented in table 1, we can show that export option will be the 
1* if 7r*A -*C OB -*D dominant strategy for firm I- ir, >0 and ; r, - 7r, > 0. But the DFI 
option will be the dominant strategy for firm I* if ; r, *' -; -rl*' <0 and 
; r*B 
_ 
-*D 
I ; r, < 0. For firm 2*, the export option will be the dominant strategy 
if 
2 
22 Sincc tB_tC= [(n+3) +(3n+4 -1) C2 -Cl > 0. 
2(n + 2)(n + 3) 
- 
(2n + 1) 
23 For tA and t B, wc can show that 
BA3 *F 2 *F 
t_t= f)[(2n + I)HF+(3n +19n2+35n+20)h - (n3+5n +10n+3)h 21+ 4% 
where Q= 
2(n + 3) 
->0, and [4(n + 1)(n + 3) 
- 
2(2n + 1)] [2(n + 1)(n + 3) 
- 
2(2n + 1)] 
T= 3n+4 > 0. Since hl*F > h; F (as firm I* is more efficient), we 2(n + 1)(n + 3) 
- 
2(2n + 1) 
have tB _tA > 0. For tA and t 
C, 
we can show that 
C- A2 ;F 
_(113 +5112 *F + Itl tt =0[(2n+I)HF+(3n'+19n +35n+20)h + 1011 + 3)hl 
Although the above equation has ambiguous sign in general, we expect tC-IA>0 as the 
h*F 
multiplier on the positive term 2 is very large comparing to the multiplier on the negative 
*F 
term h, 
. 
Unless the foreign firm I* is extremely large, the foreign firm 2* is extremely small 
AC 
and the home firm industry is very small, we expect t to be smaller than t 
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Ir*C -*D ir; ' 
- 
-*' >0 and 
_ 
Ir > 0. The DFI option will be the dominant IT 222 
if r*A 0 
- 
;r *D <0. strategy for firm 2* and 7r*c 
-i2 2 22 
We present the full derivation of the necessary conditions for the Nash- 
equilibrium in appendix A2. We find that scenario B (export, DFI) will not 
happen. This is because the marginal cost of production for the DFI option also 
depends on the foreign firms' efficiency, if firm 2* (which is less efficient) just 
finds it profitable to switch to the DFI option, firm 1* (which is more efficient) 
must have switched to the DFI option already. The relevant necessary 
conditions for the other three scenarios to be the Nash-equilibrium are: 
If tj > (n 
+ I)tA + tC 
and t2 > tc, then A (export, export) is the Nash- 
n+2 
equilibrium. 
If tl < 
(n + I)t" + tc 
and t2 > tc, then C (DFI, export) is the Nash- 
n+2 
equilibrium. 
If tt < 
(n +1)tA +tC 
and t2 < tc then D (DFI, DFI) is the Nash- 
n+2 
equilibrium. 
Thus the foreign firms will make their market entry decisions based on the 
positions of the expected optimal tariffs relative to those of the switch-over 
tariffs. We also find that the foreign finns are switching to the DFI option in 
order of their efficiencies. 
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In the case where the home government moves first, the analysis is 
similar to the previous case of a single foreign firm. The welfare function is 
given by 
n 
2+ tM W= 
2 +Ehl i=l 
The home government will set the tariff optimally by taking into account the 
response of the two foreign finns. From the previous analysis, we find that 
there are three possible outcomes A (export, export), C (DFI, export), D (DFI, 
DFI). Thus there will be three welfare functions for the home government to 
consider 
WA= (A 
-p 
A)2 n 
A)2 *A *A 
+E(hi +t(h, +h2 (I 8a) 2 b-I 
Wc 
= 
(A-p C)2 n C)2 
+th*c (I 8c) +Ei2 2 1-1 
(h 
WD=(A-P 
D)2 
D)2 
+E(hi (18d) 2 i-I 
The home govemment would ideally want to maximise the three 
components of the welfare function fully. Thus scenario A (export, export) 
offers the highest potential welfare for the home country. If tA< t,, then the 
home government will set the tariff at tA and both the foreign firms will 
choose the export option. In this case there is no constraint on the tariff policy 
since both foreign firras are not induced to switch to the DFI option. If 
however t' induces finn 1* (but not firm 2*) to switch to the DFI option, then 
tA is no longer at its optimal level since it is designed on the assumption of 
both foreign firms choosing the export option. The relevant tariff in this case is 
146 
t' (provided that tc is less than t2). The home government will need to 
compare the welfare WA evaluated at tj with the maximum welfare of WC. 
24 
It is possible that the non-optimised welfare WA at t, is larger than the 
optimised welfare WC if the tariff revenue from the more efficient foreign firm 
is relatively large. In such case the home govemment will set the tariff just 
below t, to prevent firm 1* from switching to the DFI. If tc induces firm 2* to 
choose the DFI option then the home government needs to compare the welfare 
WA evaluated at t, with the welfare Wc evaluated at t2. The home firms' 
profits are higher (as the price is higher) at t2but the consumer's surplus loss is 
smaller and the tariff revenue is likely to be larger at ti. It is worth noting that 
the welfare Wc evaluated at t2 is larger than WD (which has only one value) 
since at t2 the prices are the same but Wc has the gain from tariff revenue 
while WD has not. Thus for the home government there are effectively four 
tariff rates to consider: tA 
, 
t, 
, 
tc and t,. The tariff tA is the first best option if 
it is possible, if not the home government needs to compare the welfare levels 
at t, 
, 
tc (not always possible) and t2 
* 
4.4 Conclusions 
In this chapter we consider the issue of foreign market entry decision 
(export vs. direct foreign investment) by using the game theoretic approach. In 
particular we investigate the interaction between the potential multinational 
24 At t, the welfare under WA function is higher than the welfare under TV C function by the 
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foreign firm and the welfare maximising home government in a sequential 
game. We -find that the identity of the first mover is important. If the home 
government moves first, it will set a tariff that does not induce the foreign firm 
to switch to the DFI option. The tariff set may yield maximum welfare if it 
does not induce the foreign finn to switch to the DFI option. However if the 
optimal tariff level induces the foreign firm to switch to the DFI option, the 
second best option for the home country is to set the tariff just below the 
switch-over level. If the foreign firm moves first, the outcome of the foreign 
firm choosing the DFI option is also possible. If the foreign finn expects the 
optimal tariff to be higher than the switch-over level, it will be more profitable 
for the foreign firm to pre-empt the home government by switching to the DFI 
option in the first place. 
We also find that the relative efficiency of the foreign firm and the number 
of home finns also affect the outcomes of the game. If the foreign firm is very 
inefficient compared to the home firms and the home industry is large, the 
optimal policy for the home government might be to get rid of the foreign firm 
by setting the tariff at the prohibitive level. This is because the increase in 
home firms' profits might outweigh the losses in the small tariff revenue and 
the consumer's surplus. However the presence of the alternative DFI option for 
the foreign firm will make the prohibitive tariff policy by the home firm 
ineffective since the foreign fin-n can either (if moves first) pre-empt the 
government action or (if move second) just switch to the DFI option. 
*A distance equals to t1h, 
. 
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If there are more than one asymmetric foreign firm, the home market entry 
decisions may not be unified. In our model we find that as the tariff rises the 
more efficient foreign firm will switch to the DFI option before the less 
efficient foreign firm. For the home government, it needs to set the optimal 
tariff according to the combination of the foreign firms' market entry decisions 
or (if it moves first) it needs to compare the potential welfares from various 
scenarios. It is possible that the non-optimised tariff that does not induce both 
foreign firms to switch to the DFI option may yield higher welfare than the 
optimal tariff calculated on the assumption that only one foreign firm chooses 
the DFI option. 
Some results from this model may seem to be extreme. This is because we 
do not include the potential welfare gain from the DFI activity. The DFI 
activity may increases the home welfare via the spill-over of technologies, the 
tax revenue from profits of the multinationals or the increase in employment. If 
these factors are taken into account the government may not always want to 
prevent the foreign firms from switching to the DFI option. 
Appendix 
Al Derivations of optimal tariff for each scenario 
For scenario A (export, export), the welfare is 
n 
2+ tM +Zhi 
i-I 
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where M=h, *' + h, *' is the total imports, then 
AndA dW ad p 
=-D P +E2h,, 
dpA+M+2t(zý--I) 
dt dt i=l dt dt 
We can substitute the total demand, D=H+M to get 
dW 
=H 
±P- 
+ (M 
- 
2t)(I 
- 
dp) 
dt dt dt 
Note that 
ýpý 
=2, we have 
d 2W 
=_2(n 
2 
+4n+5) 
< 0. Then we can find dt n+3 dt2 (n + 3)2 
the optimal tariff by setting 
dW 
= 
0, which gives dt 
2H+(n+l)(M-2tA)=O 
F 
+(P_PF *F +(P_PF 
_tA), We can write h, = hi ) and h, *' = h, then the above 
equation becomes 
2H' + 2n(p _PF)+ (n +1)[MF + 2(p _PF -t)-2tA] =0 
A 
Since p-pF=, the optimal tariff for this scenario is 
n 
F *F *F)] 
A (n + 3)[2H + (n + 1)(h, + h2 
4[(n + 1)(n + 3) 
- 
(2n + 1)] 
For scenario B (export, DFI), the home government will respond by 
maximising the domestic welfare which is given by 
n 
+ Ehi'+ thl*' 
i-I 
Similar to the above analysis, we can find the optimal tariff by setting 
dIV 0 Tt ý: 
which gives (note that in this case dpB =I) dt n+3 
ISO 
(H-h2*") (n 2)(h, *B 
-t 
B) 
=0 2 
F +(P_PF) *F +(P_PF 
_tB), Substituting h, = hi , hl*' = h, 
*F +(, P_PF) T2 
=h2- t2 into the above equation, we get 
HF 
-h 
*F 
+ (n + 2)h *F +[n 
-l+ n +2](p _PF)+ t2-2(n+2)tB =O 21 
Since p- pf -t2 
+B 
for case B, the optimal tariff is given by 
n+3 
F *F *F I+ 
tB 
= 
(n + 3)[H + (n + 2)hl 
- 
h2 (3n + 4)t2 
2(n + 2)(n + 3) 
- 
(2n + 1) 
And by using similar calculation as in case B, the optimal tariff for scenario C 
(DFI, export) is given by 
*F *F]+ 
tC 
(n + 3)[H F+ (n + 2)h2 
-hl (3n + 4)tl 
2(n + 2)(n + 3) 
- 
(2n + 1) 
A2 Conditions for dominant strategies for-the two foreign finns 
Recalling the payoffs matrix for the two foreign firms 
Firm 2* 
Firm P Export DFI 
Export 7r, *, ir*' or 2 ; r, 
*, 7-r*' or 2 
(PA 
_C* _tA)2, (PA 
A)2 
_C2 _t (Pa 0 $)2 _Cj _tB)2, (PB _X2 
DFI *c or ; r, *c, ; r2 
OD 
, 
-*D Ir, ; r, or F 
-xl*)2')(PC -C2 -tV (PC 2 
C (PD *)2 
_X; )2, (PD _X 2 
In order to determine the dominant strategy for each firm, we need to compare 
four pairs of profits: 
(1) the Sign of 7C JOA - ii, *c depends on the sign of h, *A _ TI, *C , and 
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*A_ ý*c 
= 
(n+2)t, 
-(n+I)tA -tc h, In+3 
7r; l -*D 
T*D (11) the sign of 
_; T, depends on the sign of h; ' -I, and 
hl*'o 
- 
h, *D 
=(n + 
2)(t, 
- 
tB) 
n+3 
; r2*A 
_ 
~*B AB (III) the sign of 1r, depends on the sign of h2-h2, and 
h *A - T*B (n+2)t2- (n 
+I)tA 
_tB 
22 
n+3 
*C -OD (IV) the sign oflr2 - 'T2 depends on the sign of h*c - h*', and 22 
h*c 'OD = (n+2)(t2 -tC) 2- T2' 
n+3 
Noting that t2> tj and tB > tC > tA 
. 
Then 
Scenario A (export, export) will be the Nash-equilibrium if both firms' 
dominant strategies are exports which require 
tj > (n + I)t' +c (from 1), ti > t' (11)l t2 > (n 
+I)tA +, B (III) and t2 > tC 
n+2 n+2 
(IV) 
Scenario B (export, DFI) will be the Nash-equilibrium if firm I*'s dominant 
strategy is export and firm 2*'s dominant strategy is DFI. In this case we need 
ti > 
(n + 1) t' + t' (1), tj >tB (11), t, <(n + I)t' 
+tB (III) and t, < tc 
n+2 n+2 
Since we establish that t2 > t, and t' > tc, then tj > tB and t2 < tC cannot be 
both true. Thus scenario B (export, DFI) cannot be the Nash-equilibrium. This 
U 
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result is not surprising sinceýwe expect the more efficient firm (firm I*) to 
switch to the DFI option before firm 2*. 
For scenario C (DFI, export) to be the Nash-equilibrium, we need firm P's 
dominant strategy to be export and firm 2*'s dominant strategy to be DFI, i. e. 
tl < 
(n + I)tA +tc W, tl < t' M), t2 > (n +I)tA +tB (111) and t2 >tC (IV) 
n+2 n+2 
And for scenario D (DF, DFI) to be the Nash-equilibrium, we need 
ti < 
(n + 1)t' + t' Ml tl < t' ('1)9 t2 < (n+l)t' +t' (III) and t2 <t 
n+2 n+2 
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CONCLUSIONS 
In this thesis we used a simple partial equilibrium analysis to examine the 
effects of tariffs and quotas on mergers and direct foreign investment. In the 
first two chapters we directed our attention on the effects of the two policies on 
merger profitability. By extending Falvey (1998) which examines the effects of 
tariffs on mergers, we studied the case of quotas and mergers. When a merger 
produces no cost synergies, i. e. a case of market-concentrating merger, we 
found that quotas seem to protect the inefficient firms in both the restricting 
and the non-restricting countries from being merger targets while tan s on y 
protect the inefficient firm in the restricting country. Thus when trade barriers 
are reduced we expect to see the increase in merger activity (national and 
international) that involves the closure of inefficient finns in the restricting 
country in the tariff case, and the increase in most types of merger that involves 
the closure of inefficient firm in the quota case. The comparison of the two 
regimes also reveals that the merger profitability of national mergers (both in 
the restricting country and the non-restricting country) is higher under the 
equivalent quota regime. 
In chapter 3 we showed that the tariff-quota equivalence under Cournot 
oligopoly can also break down if the foreign finns have the option of direct 
investment. We examined the home market entry decisions of the foreign firms 
when the direct investment is possible under the tariff and the quota (which are 
imposed by the home government). The main difference between the two 
policies is that a foreign firm will switch from the export option to the direct 
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investment option when the tariff is sufficiently restrictive, while a foreign firm 
under the quota will find it is more profitable to choose both options when the 
quota rate is sufficiently restrictive. Comparisons between the two policies 
showed that although we can find price equivalent tariffs and quotas, the 
import equivalence cannot be found in some range of quotas. Moreover there is 
no uniform condition for the equivalence of the two regimes, the adjustment on 
the equivalent conditions needs to be made for different levels of each trade 
policies. We also found that the quota rate that starts inducing direct 
investment production is less restrictive than the tariff rate that starts inducing 
the more efficient foreign firm to switch to the direct investment option. But 
once the tariff policy induces direct investment, the size of DFI is generally 
larger under the tariff regime than the price-equivalent quota regime. 
In chapter 4, we examined the interaction between the welfare-maximising 
home government and the foreign firm who has the direct investment option. 
By incorporating game theoretical technique we showed that the optimal tariff 
policy by the home government may be hindered by the availability of direct 
investment option to the foreign firm. In the case where the foreign firm moves 
first, it may pre-empt the home government by choosing the direct investment 
option in the first place if the expected optimal tariff is too high. In the case 
where the home government moves first and the direct investment offers no 
welfare benefit to the home country, the home government will set the tariff at 
the optimal level provided that the tariff does not induce the foreign finn to 
invest or it will set at the level just below the switch-over tariff 
The collection of essays in this thesis demonstrated the uses of a simple 
international Cournot model to examine the issues concerning trade policies, 
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mergers and foreign direct investment. Although tariffs and quotas are believed 
to be equivalent under the Cournot oligopoly, the difference in nature of these 
two policies may lead to the different results when merger and direct 
investment activities are considered. In addition we also showed the different 
approach to examine the effects of a tariff policy on direct investment by 
endogenising the active role of the home govenunent. 
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